

Migrants' Attitudes and the Welfare State

The Danish Melting Pot

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Edward Elgar
PUBLISHING

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

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Published by
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
The Lypiatts
15 Lansdown Road
Cheltenham
Glos GL50 2JA
UK

Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
William Pratt House
9 Dewey Court
Northampton
Massachusetts 01060
USA

A catalogue record for this book
is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Control Number: 2020950863

This book is available electronically in the **Elgaronline**
Sociology, Social Policy and Education subject collection
<http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781800376342>

ISBN 978 1 80037 633 5 (cased)
ISBN 978 1 80037 634 2 (eBook)

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PART I

1. Introduction

Denmark is known for its comprehensive welfare state. It has carried such labels as a Nordic welfare state, a universal welfare state, a social-democratic welfare state, a generous or encompassing welfare state, or simply a third way between liberalism and socialism. A long line of research has studied this particular way of organizing a society and its consequences (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990; 2000; Fritzell, Hvinden, Kautto, Kvist, & Uusitalo, 2005). These studies are often fuelled by an interest in the social outcomes accompanying this welfare state, such as relatively high levels of economic prosperity and equality, at least among the native insiders. Denmark is also known for having a people that support this way of organizing society. This is both a matter of *the people* getting what they want, through democratic processes, and a matter of *the will of the people* being shaped by long-standing institutional structures (Larsen, 2008; 2013; Rothstein, 1998). The public support for welfare states is both embedded in values and norms (ideas about how society should be) and perceptions (ideas about how society is). We use welfare attitudes as the overall concept for the individuals' positive or negative assessment of various parts of the welfare state, with reference to a standard definition of an attitude being "... an individual's disposition to respond favourably or unfavourably to an object, person, institution or event, or to any other discriminable aspect of the individual's world" (Ajzen, 1989:241).

The welfare attitudes the Danish people (and the neighbouring Nordic people) hold towards various parts of the welfare state have been studied in a long line of research (e.g. Andersen, 2011; Edlund, 2007; Hedegaard, 2015; Svallfors, 1997; 2012). Thus, it is empirically well-documented that contemporary Danes are highly in favour of the ways social services and benefits are organized by the state; including the relatively high taxes that follow. They are also highly in favour of the ways the labour market and the family are organized and regulated, which is intimately linked to the organization of the welfare state. The Danish welfare regime comes with high minimum wages, a regulated labour market, many public employees, and a dual-earner family structure. Less is known about what the growing number of new residents – the migrants – think about this way of organizing society. This is what the book sets out to explore. We use the term migrant to denote a person who has crossed a nation-state border and settled in this new destination country (see

Chapter 3 for more specific definitions). Thus, we use the term immigrant and migrant synonymously. We ask the following two research questions:

1. *To what extent do migrants assimilate to the welfare attitudes of native Danes?*
2. *What are the mechanisms of migrants' assimilation to the welfare attitudes of the native Danes?*

Following the emerging literature on welfare attitudes of migrants in the Northern European welfare states, the book demonstrates that in general migrants *do* to some extent assimilate to the welfare attitudes of native Danes. Therefore, we chose “The Danish Melting Pot” as the subtitle of the book. It is with reference to the idea of an American melting pot, where settlers from a large variety of nations, like small pieces of metal, melted together into a new substance. The exact character of this new American substance was, and is, difficult to specify (Brubaker, 2001). The idea of transforming, melting, migrants has also been heavily criticized. However, as a mental image and a national narrative, the melting pot idea has influenced three centuries of American thinking about migrants' settlement (Smith, 2012). We do not use the melting pot term to signal that migrants *should be* transformed or melted to use the images of the metaphor. We use the term to describe what seems to take place; at least when it comes to values, norms, and perceptions related to the welfare state. We are well aware that the “assimilation” concept opens up connotations to a long debate on the exact meaning of this concept (e.g. Alba & Nee, 2003; Brubaker, 2001). In Chapter 2, we clarify the concept in this specific welfare state context. Basically, we refer to a social process rather than a desirable, unavoidable outcome and we refrain from making judgements about when a person is assimilated enough. “Danish” is added to the title as both the drivers of assimilation and the end results are believed to differ from the North American context. The American melting pot has its specifics. One thing is the absence of a well-developed welfare state. The Danish melting pot has its specifics. One thing is the presence of an already well-developed welfare state.

The book provides a solid basis for answering the first descriptive research question. The book is based on two large survey studies combined with unique Danish register data, which allow us to establish representative samples of migrants born in Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, ex-Yugoslavia (primarily Bosnia), Turkey, the Philippines, China, Japan, Russia, the USA, Great Britain, Spain, Poland, and Romania. The book provides more tentative answers to the difficult second question about causality as we are limited by the cross-sectional nature of our data material, as most other studies in this field. However, we

will develop a causal theoretical argument, which is accompanied by data approaching a most-different design logic (elaborated further below).

OUR INTEREST IN THE MIGRANT PERSPECTIVE

We have several reasons for finding the question of migrants' assimilation into the welfare attitudes of natives interesting. First, it is interesting in its own right to investigate whether the residents of a given state, migrants included, find existing institutions and policies to be legitimate. Second, most public statistics are concerned with how migrants enter socio-economic domains, especially the level of employment, education, and crime. These measures are indeed interesting and important. However, they do not tell the full story and one cannot infer from these structural data what migrants "think". If we are to describe what migrants think, in general, migrants need to be asked. This is a rather difficult and time-consuming process, but it can be done (see Chapter 3). Third, migrants' welfare attitudes could be seen as a valid indicator of more overall assimilation. If migrants, in large, turn out to be supportive of the current way of organizing the Danish society, one could argue that they share some of the most prevalent values and norms of native Danes. Fourth, one could imagine that what migrants think about the welfare state could have political consequences. As the share of migrants and descendants increases, so does their democratic political power; at least among the group that obtains citizenship. If migrants turn out to be supportive of the welfare state, one could imagine that it could counterbalance the theorized decline of support from the natives (see below). These four reasons are all related to contemporary public discussions about migrants and their impact on Northern European welfare states.

We also have two more pure academic reasons for writing the book. The first is that the literature on what migrants think and their subjective orientations is dominated by data collected in the US, which is distinguished by less generous welfare benefits and a smaller role for universal services than what is found in Western Europe, in particular in Northern Europe. Thus, Denmark is a vastly different setting, where an impact from public institutions on the minds of migrants is much more likely to be found. We contribute to migration studies by bringing in insights from the Nordic welfare state context. The second reason is that migrants' welfare attitudes might tell us a more general story about how the existing institutions and policies shape the public mind. We follow emerging literature that uses migrants' relocation as a "natural experiment" that changes the cultural and institutional environment of the individual. Thereby, we also hope to deliver a contribution to general institutional theory, which has been the point of departure for our theoretical reasoning.

Finally, we would like to stress that it is an open question whether assimilation into the welfare attitudes of native Danes is something desirable. That the trust levels are high among all groups in a society is difficult to dislike. However, whether migrants *should* assimilate into the prevailing norms for example about public childcare is more contested. As always, it depends on your normative point of departure.

THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE WELFARE STATE

The term welfare state refers to major publicly organized benefit schemes such as pensions, disability benefits, unemployment insurance, and social assistance as well as service schemes such as education, healthcare, childcare, and elderly care. As for the benefits, nearly all industrial societies have developed public schemes to provide economic security during times of sickness, disability, unemployment, and old age. The collective effort to cover these social risks started at the end of the 19th century. Germany was a frontrunner with the introduction of compulsory insurance systems for urban workers in the 1880s, which since has been labelled a Bismarckian welfare state. Denmark was also a front-runner but entered a different path, as general tax payment was favoured over compulsory insurance contributions paid by employers and employees (except for the risk of unemployment) (Ebbinghaus & Gronwald, 2011; Kangas & Palme, 2005). This developed into what is often labelled a universal welfare state, where the whole population (not only the insured) is entitled to economic security in the case of absence of work-income. The classic Danish example is the tax-financed Danish people's pension, which in 1891 was introduced to cover all residents in (deserving) need and later in 1956 came to cover all residents independent of need. The classic pension schemes have been adjusted, changed, and supplemented throughout the 20th century but one still finds universal elements in many Danish benefit schemes (Kongshøj, 2014). This holds for the Danish people's pension, disability pension, unemployment insurance (which is characterized by high tax-financing, high coverage, and de facto flat-rate benefits despite insurance-based eligibility), child allowances, parental leave schemes, and student allowances. As for services, close to all industrial societies also developed collective systems for schooling and basic healthcare. In the Danish case, the Danish people's school (Almueskolen) was established in 1814, including a demand for compulsory schooling of all children (Buchardt, Markkola, & Valtonen, 2013). The Danish healthcare system started as a voluntary insurance movement but was backed and subsidized by the state in the first legislation in 1893. In 1971 it turned into a fully fledged tax-financed universal system (Christiansen, Petersen, Edling, & Haave, 2005; Kongshøj, 2014). A marked characteristic of the Danish welfare state is that the

public service sector expanded tremendously especially in the second half of the 20th century. Denmark developed a fully tax-financed educational system, including free public universities, and a close to fully tax-financed child- and elderly-care systems. To that should be added public libraries, health visitors, education guides, employment services, and integration workers. Thus, by 2017 close to 30 per cent of all Danish employees work within the tax-financed public sector.

The welfare state is, in our view, not merely a collection of functional institutions that cover the risks of individuals living in industrial and post-industrial societies. It is also a way of organizing society, which relies upon and reproduces a broad set of values and norms. Values can broadly be defined as beliefs about what is good/desirable and bad/undesirable, while norms are more specific guides to actions in particular situations. The Danish welfare state often carries the label of being a social democratic welfare regime; denoted by Esping-Andersen in his classic book *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Thus, social democratic ideological values about state intervention being desirable, possible, and effective (reformism) and economic redistribution from the more advantaged to the less advantaged are often believed to be embedded in this kind of welfare regime. The book will investigate whether migrants support the very idea of state intervention in different areas, whether they think state intervention is effective and functional (institutional trust) and whether redistribution from rich to poor is desirable. The values, norms, and perceptions of the Nordic welfare state do not only concern the sphere of the state. The regime term was used by Esping-Andersen to point out that the organization of welfare benefits and services are interlinked with the organization of the family and the market, especially the labour market. The classic example is that the Nordic universal provision of child- and elderly care both generated new jobs in the public sector, largely occupied by women, and freed women from family responsibilities. The establishment of these schemes relied on acceptance of such tasks being a public responsibility. At the same time, the contemporary presence of these schemes generates values and norms about dual-earner family structures and gender equality. Therefore, the book also investigates migrants' support for values and norms about female labour force participation and childcare.

The literature that focuses on *values* tends to see the Nordic welfare state as the democratic realization of what is desired by "the people"; with the addition of institutional feedback effects. In a historical chronology, the expansion of the welfare state did indeed go together with the establishment of democracy, the mobilization of an "imagined" shared civic identity of being a Danish citizen, and a social democratic party that embraced national solidarity over worker solidarity (Anttonen, 2012; Baldwin, 1990). It is also true that the Nordic countries still score high on happiness, life satisfaction, and democratic

involvement. This is the bright side of the story. However, there is also a literature on the more prescriptive *norm* enforcing side of the Nordic welfare state. One could call it the darker side of the story. The point of departure is that the European welfare schemes were established in pre-democratic times with ambitions by the elites to construct an obedient and compliant population willing to pay tax, go to war, and reluctant to support revolutionary movements (Tilly, 1994). It is telling that the German legislation of the 1880s was established by the conservative non-democratic chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who had military ambitions and a need to keep the recently united German federation together. In this perspective, the Danish welfare state schemes can be seen as a culmination of state centralization of power. The state and its employees in the intervening “service-sector” set harsh prescriptive norms, for example about parenthood and healthcare, which can be sanctioned by strong state authorities. This can be described as the central state’s use of expert-knowledge regime (Foucault, 1983) or as a more open dialectic civilizing process needed in a highly functional differentiated society with citizens embedded in long chains of mutual interdependence (Elias, 1998). To study these aspects of the Nordic welfare state, the book also investigates migrants’ assessments of whether most people can be trusted. Belief in the high trustworthiness of other people could be a precondition for functioning in a highly functional differentiated society like the Danish (Luhmann, 1979). We also study attitudes towards the exclusion of migrants from social benefits and services.

MIGRANTS AND THE WELFARE STATE

The link between welfare states and migration has received a lot of public and academic attention within the last two decades. The main concern has been whether the existence of a generous welfare state and immigration is incompatible in the long run. Or in more popular terms, whether the Nordic model is only possible in a world with little migration. The argument goes: (1) that generous welfare schemes will be a magnet for low-skilled migrants with little chance at the labour market, which generates an unsustainable economic burden on the welfare state (Borjas, 1999; Freeman, 1986), and (2) that the solidarity needed for generous welfare schemes will erode as publics get divided between “them” and “us” (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Goodhart, 2004).

Research into both questions has proliferated and results are decidedly mixed and nuanced. Generally, welfare generosity matters little, if at all, next to more important factors for migration flows such as geographical proximity, network/diaspora effects, inclusion policies (citizenship, etc.), wages and employment, returns to education, or asylum policies (Brekke, Røed & Schøne, 2016; Giulietti, 2014). Some studies have found that minor “welfare magnet” effects apply in regimes of free movement of labour (intra-EU or

intra-US migration), but also that generous welfare states may attract both high- and low-skilled labour on the longer term (Razin & Wahba, 2015).

As regards the more fundamental question of whether immigration and ethnic diversity pose a threat to solidarity within nation-states, the literature does not offer any easy answers here either (Holtug, 2020; Schaeffer, 2013; Van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). An attempt at a short and insightful summary would be that increasing ethnic diversity might be a challenge for solidarity and trust, but that there is no simple one-way route between ethnic diversity and solidarity and trust. Rather, context matters and contingent effects abound. At the macro-level, economic equality and fair, impartial, and non-corrupt public institutions have been found to alleviate negative links between ethnic diversity and social trust (Charron & Rothstein, 2018; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010; Larsen, 2013). The political mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiments exacerbates negative associations between immigrant stocks and social trust (Helbling, Reeskens, & Stolle, 2015). While research into the local or neighbourhood levels has found greater support for negative effects of diversity, also in Denmark, residential segregation of ethnicities is a major culprit behind negative effects upon social trust (Dinesen & Sønderskov, 2015; Uslander, 2011; Van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). At the individual level, socio-economic deprivation further exacerbates negative links, while high labour market integration of migrants has been found to eliminate negative links between immigration and support for redistribution (Burgoon, 2014; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009; Sturgis, Brunton-Smith, Read, & Allum, 2011; Tolsma, Van der Meer, & Gesthuizen, 2009). In short, economic equality, just and well-performing institutions, benevolent political alignments, residential and economic integration as well as economic security all help mitigate potential negative effects of diversity upon social cohesion, which is not to say that it is not a major political challenge to achieve such cocktails of benevolent circumstances.

The aim of this book is not to enter this heated debate about migrants' potential negative impact on welfare states. Rather, we want to emphasize that, until recently, what the migrants themselves think about the welfare states in their destination countries has been puzzlingly absent from these discussions. When the migrants' perspective occasionally enters the equation, it often takes the form of bold assumptions about migrants being rational agents optimizing living conditions (as in the welfare-magnet thesis) or cultural doped agents clinging to norms and values in the country of origin (as in the "us" and "them" solidarity argument). Thus, the book aims to open the black box of what migrants think about the welfare state.

There are reasons to believe that migrants' welfare attitudes could be more complex. From a self-interest perspective, it is clear that some groups of migrants (like other groups) have vested interests in benefits and services schemes. As will be shown in Chapter 5, some migrants take more out of

the Danish welfare state than they put in through taxes. At a very general level, this holds for migrants that came as asylum seekers or through family unification with former asylum seekers. However, even from a self-interest perspective, these migrants might have an ambivalent attitude to a welfare state with high minimum wages and a regulated labour market, which makes it difficult to enter the formal labour market or find supplementary work in the black market. At the same time, Danish policymakers have limited migrants' access to social assistance and made it, in general, more difficult to enter and receive unemployment benefits (Andersen, 2007; Breidahl, 2012; Sainsbury, 2006, see Chapter 5 for further introduction to migrants' access to benefits and services). It is also clear that other groups of migrants take less out than they put in through taxes. At a very general level, this holds for the high-skilled workers that entered through guest workers programmes and for the increasing number of especially East European workers that entered through the right to free mobility of workers within the EU. From a narrow self-interest perspective, one should anticipate these groups of migrants to be sceptical about the Danish welfare state.

From a sociological perspective, one could also anticipate migrants' support for the Danish welfare state to be complex. The groups of migrants explored in this book have been socialized in nation-states from all over the world. Some of them have been raised in nation-states that leave more responsibility to markets and families and less responsibility to the state, that provide less redistribution from rich to poor, where (formal) female employment is lower and trust in institutions and fellow citizens is also low. Others have been socialized in a context with a communist legacy, where state responsibility, at least in ideological terms, was more pronounced than in the Nordic countries. The religious backgrounds of migrants also differ. Most of the migrants we study have been socialized in more religious societies than the Danish, but variations are large, from Muslims and Catholics to Buddhists. Thus, as a point of departure, one could expect at least some migrants to be sceptical about the norms and values in which the Danish welfare state is embedded.

In our view, the self-interest perspective and the values/norms perspective just presented are too simple. In Chapter 2, we present a theoretical framework rooted in the field of migration studies and comparative welfare studies. From the migration studies, we adopt the idea that migrants do not arrive with fixed preferences and cultures. On the contrary, the preferences and cultures of migrants seem to be highly flexible and adaptive. From the comparative welfare studies, we adopt the idea that existing institutions shape perceptions, norms/values, and attitudes; both those of natives and migrants. In combination, this adds up to the overall thesis of the book, namely that migrants' welfare attitudes to a high extent assimilate into those of native Danes despite large differences in self-interests and cultural backgrounds. This is "The

Danish Melting Pot”. The book presents several different analytical results and nuances, but we do find support for our overall thesis, as the omission of a question mark in the title indicates.

THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH – A COMPARISON
ACROSS MOST DIFFERENT GROUPS

Our overall theoretical approach is shown in Figure 1.1. Following the previous research tradition on general welfare attitudes, we assume that respondents' welfare attitudes (1) are influenced by values/norms/perceptions related to the welfare state (2), which again are influenced by socio-economic positions (3). Finally, all these variables at the individual micro-level are either directly or indirectly influenced by the institutional and broader cultural context of respectively the destination (4) and origin (5) country. The theoretical argument is further developed in Chapter 2.




Figure 1.1 Overall theoretical framework

Studying assimilation denotes a process. Thus, the optimal design would be to follow different groups of migrants over time; preferable from the country of origin and at different time points after entering a destination country. Unfortunately, such panel data is not available and very difficult to establish. Our alternative analytical strategy is to compare across different groups interviewed at the same point in time. We will use the following three indicators to capture assimilation processes. First, when data are available, we compare the welfare attitudes of migrants in Denmark with the welfare attitudes of residents in their specific country of origin. If these two groups have very different welfare attitudes, we take it as a sign of assimilation in the former group. Second, we compare the welfare attitudes of migrants with those of native Danes. Here we take an absence of differences as a sign of assimilation. Third, we compare the welfare attitudes of specific migrant groups in Denmark with each other. Again, we take an absence of differences in welfare attitudes between migrant groups living within Denmark as a sign of assimilation.

In comparisons between native and migrants and between specific migrant groups, we utilize a data design that in many respects approaches a most-different design logic: The 14 groups of migrants we analyse are selected to be very different in terms of the institutional and cultural context in the country origin (box 5, in Figure 1.1) and in terms of socio-economic status in Denmark (box 3, in Figure 1.1). Thus, as a point of departure, one could expect differences in welfare attitudes. The most-different design logic is strong in the case where one finds similarity on the dependent variable, in our case similar welfare attitudes, despite a plethora of very different origin countries and different socio-economic positions in Denmark. Such a pattern makes it easier to single out the few things that the most different cases have in common. In our case, the most obvious candidate is that migrants and native Danes have a common experience of living in Denmark (box 4, in Figure 1.1). Thus, the absence of differences across most-different groups is our main empirical evidence of a strong influence from the institutional and cultural destination-country context (box 4), which overrule the potential influence from the origin country context (box 5).

The comparisons across groups provide indications of assimilation and potential causality. However, we are well aware that the design does not deliver bulletproof evidence of assimilation. The comparison between immigrants in Denmark and residents in their country of origin is troubled by the fact that particular kinds of people choose, or are forced, to migrate. In other words, forces of selection or self-selection might be at play. So small differences vis-à-vis native Danes and large differences vis-à-vis the origin countries might not (only) be a matter of a process of assimilation in Denmark. Thus, we will be cautious in our interpretation of these differences. It is indeed a possibility that some migrants choose Denmark because they already in the country of origin supported a Danish-type welfare state. Thus, an absence of difference between migrants and natives and between groups of migrants might not (only) be a matter of assimilation. In our view, the self-selection into Denmark is not a major concern as other motives for immigration are much more prominent than (support for) the Danish welfare state, as discussed briefly above on the “welfare magnet” hypothesis. Furthermore, when comparing across natives and migrants and across specific migrant groups, we control for differences in a large number of background variables. If comparisons still indicate an absence of differences in welfare attitudes, we take it as a fairly clear indication of assimilation.

The drivers of assimilation processes will be theorized in Chapter 2 and within each specific chapter, covering a specific domain of the welfare state. The specific drivers will be empirically assessed in statistical models, which only include migrants. Across almost all chapters, we will explore the impact of the number of years in Denmark, the level of national identification, the

level of Danish language skills, the level of religiosity, and having a Danish citizenship. As assimilation is a process, it is fairly easy to imagine that it takes time. Whether the time effect is present, and how strong it is, is a central empirical question. The impact that national identification, language skills, and religiosity have on assimilation is more disputed. We will address it as an empirical question, well aware that time, national identification, language skills, the impact of having a Danish citizenship, and the level of religiosity are interrelated.

The main analytical pitfall of our approach is an implicit tendency to perceive migrants from the same country of origin as a homogeneous group. This is not the case, and Chapter 4 delves into variations within nationalities across a range of variables. However, at least our country of origin approach produces more nuances than studies that treat migrants as one group or apply the rough distinction between EU-/non-EU migrants or alternatively Western/non-Western migrants. The latter distinction is often used in Danish debates and national Danish statistics. Finally, we will only welcome future research, which looks even more specifically at differences across groups of migrants from the same country of origin.

THE SELECTED MIGRANT GROUPS

The selection of very different groups of migrants is not only a convenient analytical tool. It also reflects the substantive development that immigration into Denmark over time has become more mixed; both in terms of various reasons for migration and various countries of origin. The number of migrants in Denmark has increased from 135,000 in 1980 to 614,000 in 2019. We follow definitions by Statistics Denmark in which migrants are foreign-born with neither of the parents born in Denmark as carriers of Danish citizenship (if there is no information on the parents, but the person has been born abroad, he or she is also defined as a migrant). The numbers are shown in Figure 1.2.

In 1980 the largest three groups were migrants born in neighbouring Germany (24,000), Sweden (14,000), and Norway (12,000), while the Turkish coming mainly as guest workers in the 1960s and early 1970s was the fourth largest group (12,000). These four groups constituted almost half of all migrants. In 2019, the four largest groups were born in Poland (41,000), Syria (36,000), Turkey (33,000), and Germany (30,000). These four groups only constituted one-quarter of all migrants. Thus, as it is the case in most other Northern European countries, “migrants” have become a larger and more diverse group. The 14 groups covered by the book constituted 41 per cent of the group of migrants in 2019, see Figure 1.2. The three largest of the groups covered are migrants born in Poland (41,000), ex-Yugoslavia (34,000),




Figure 1.2 Number of migrants in Denmark from 1980 to 2019 by selected 14 groups and others

and Turkey (33,000). The three smallest groups are migrants born in Russia (6,000), Spain (6,000), and Japan (1,800).

The number of descendants from migrants (born in Denmark with both parents being migrants, as defined above) has also increased and become more mixed. In 1980, 18,000 descendants lived in Denmark. By 2019 the number had increased to 186,000. In 1980, the four largest groups of descendants were of German, Swedish, Pakistani, or Turkish descent (around 2,000 in each group). In 2019, the four largest groups were descendants with parents from Turkey (31,000), Lebanon (14,000), Pakistan (11,000), and Iraq (11,000). What the descendants think about the Danish welfare state is not covered by the book, although one of our surveys did include descendants. See Chapter 3 for a further introduction to the data material.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The book is structured in four parts. The remainder of the first part is divided into two chapters. In Chapter 2, we discuss the concept of assimilation, review previous literature, and elaborate our theoretical position. In Chapter 3, we introduce our data material in detail; data collection, weighting procedures, and so on.

In the second part of the book, Chapters 4 and 5, we describe the migrant groups and demonstrate how they are indeed most-different cases. Chapter 4 describes the composition of the 14 migrants across the length of stay in Denmark – gender, household composition, education, labour market position, naturalization, level of religiosity, and national identification. Chapter 5 describes in detail the mixed self-interest the 14 migrant groups have in the Danish welfare state. Using register data, the chapter shows their exact wage incomes, tax payments, and various forms of benefit receipt. The chapter demonstrates that some groups are indeed net receivers whereas others are net providers.

In the third part of the book, Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 we turn to the main dependent variables. In Chapter 6, we analyse to what extent migrants assimilate to the trust levels exhibited by natives in public institutions. In Chapter 7, we analyse to what extent migrants assimilate to natives' attitudes towards state responsibility. In Chapter 8, we analyse assimilation to preferences for redistribution and poverty relief. In Chapter 9, we analyse assimilation to natives' preferences for female employment. Finally, in Chapter 10, we analyse assimilation to preferences for public childcare. As already mentioned, the overall pattern provides us with evidence for assimilation but there are important nuances and different mechanisms across the different areas covered by the book.

In the fourth part of the book, Chapters 11, 12, and 13, we describe assimilation to values, norms, and preferences that are a little more distant to the welfare state than those analysed in Part III. In Chapter 11, we analyse assimilation to natives' preferences for the extent to which migrants should have access to welfare benefits and services. In Chapter 12, we analyse assimilation to high interpersonal trust levels among natives. The fourth part of the book shows less assimilation than the third part of the book. Thus, migrants' assimilation to the welfare states does come with limitations. Finally, we end the book with a conclusion that summarizes the overall findings, discusses limitations, and points to future areas of research.

The book provides a detailed insight into 14 specific migrant groups, assimilation into a specific Danish welfare state context. In our view, such insights at the micro- and meso-level are pivotal for a research field, which sometimes is haunted by bold claims about the compatibility or incompatibility of welfare states and migration.

2. Theoretical perspectives on the assimilative impact of welfare state institutions

For more than a hundred years migration scholars, in particular from North America, have been engaged in the question of what happens to individuals who move from one social and geographical context to another. This has further led to questions about how and to what extent migrants and their descendants are incorporated into their new destination societies, and how to conceptualize the processes taking place. In particular, the last question on “conceptualizing” has been theoretically disputed for many decades. These comprehensive and contested questions are the point of departure for the theoretical discussions in this chapter. In the two first sections, we present the contested assimilation concept, we specify how we use it, and we describe three elements, which distinguish our book from American studies of the assimilation of migrants. In the third section, we turn to drivers of assimilation and the emerging literature on the importance of destination country contexts. In the fourth section, we introduce the comparative welfare state literature as a way to understand important aspects of the Danish destination country context. In the fifth section, we describe existing findings on how welfare state institutions influence the welfare attitudes of the general public. Finally, the sixth section presents previous studies, which have found these institutions also to affect the welfare attitudes of migrants. The chapter ends with a small summary of our overall theoretical arguments and discusses a few competing theoretical positions.

THE CONTESTED ASSIMILATION CONCEPT

In 1995 Richard Alba termed the assimilation concept as “America’s dirty secret”:

Assimilation has become America’s dirty little secret. Although once the subject of avid discussion and debate, the idea has fallen into disrepute, replaced by the slogans of multiculturalism. At best, assimilation is considered of dubious relevance for contemporary minorities, who are believed to want to remain outside the fabled “melting pot” and to be, in any event, not wholly acceptable to white America.

However, assimilation was, and is, a reality for the majority of the descendants of earlier waves of immigration from Europe. Of course, it does have its varieties and degrees. (Alba, 1995:1)

To understand why Richard Alba used this term, one must turn attention to the broader history of North American migration research. The research discipline of migration research was founded at the Chicago School of Urban Sociology in the early 1900s and these scholars were the first to use the concept of “assimilation” for understanding the experience of immigration (Alba & Nee, 2003; Burgess & Park, 1921; Thomas & Znaniecki, 1996).

Thomas and Znaniecki’s (1996) *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, first published between 1918 and 1920, is a seminal study on the migration of Poles to the USA. In their analysis of the interplay between individual migrants and the destination society, they write about the incorporation of new institutions and values. Although this study is seen as the foundation of the classical assimilation theory, it is interesting to note how the experience of coming from one society to another is far from seen as a one-way process, or as one that must eliminate all traits from the ethnic origins (see also Burgess & Park, 1921). This point is illustrated in the following extract:

And the striking phenomenon, the central object of our investigation is ... the creation of a society which in structure and prevalent attitudes is neither Polish nor American but constitutes a specific new product whose raw materials have been partly drawn from Polish traditions, partly from the new conditions in which the immigrants live, and partly from American social values as the immigrant sees and interprets them. It is this Polish-American society, not American society, that constitutes the social milieu into which the immigrant who comes from Poland becomes incorporated and whose standards and institutions he must adapt himself. (Thomas & Znaniecki, 1996:108)

Since these early and classical writings, the question of how to define incorporation patterns has been heavily discussed. This is, in particular, illustrated in later conceptualizations of assimilation in the mid-20th century, where assimilation was approached as something much more normative and as an inevitable one-way process (Gordon, 1964; Warner & Srole, 1945). Most notable, Milton Gordon’s book from 1964 *Assimilation in American Life* has been regarded as controversial in posterity. Not least because “... the middle-class cultural patterns of, largely, white Protestant, Anglo-Saxon origins” (Gordon, 1964:72) were pointed out as the reference point for migrants and their children. It was because of this normative turn in the assimilation theory that the concept became controversial (Alba & Nee, 2003; Schneider & Crul, 2010:1143).

Some of the first influential and critical thoughts on the concept of assimilation were put forward from multicultural approaches in the “Civil Rights

Era” of the 1960s, inspired by the African-American civil rights movement; sometimes also referred to as pluralists (Portes & Zhou, 1993). The normative notions of assimilation and the hierarchical ordering of race and culture were condemned. Furthermore, the multicultural approach stated how cultural ties and practices should be seen as an important precondition for the establishment of a successful life, and that diverse racial and ethnic groups can play a positive role in society. Scholars rooted in the so-called transnational perspective, furthermore, have critiqued assimilation theory as bounded by the nation-state and interested only in processes within the boundaries of the receiving society and for overlooking the ongoing relevance of the links and multiple social ties that migrants maintain to their countries of origin (e.g. Portes & Zhou, 1993; Schiller, Basch, & Blanc-Szanton, 1992). As pointed out by Brubaker, these multicultural and pluralist perspectives have become predominant throughout the years:

Pluralistic understandings of persisting diversity, once a challenge to the conventional wisdom, had become the conventional wisdom, not only in the US and other classic countries of immigration such as Canada and Australia, but also in much of northern and western Europe. (Brubaker, 2001:531)

Consequently, these perspectives have also been successful in condemning the assimilation concept within academia and in the broader public debate. Thus, assimilation is seen as a prescriptive/normative concept (and not an analytical concept) and associated with state policies that assimilate people against their will.

However, despite all the criticism, the concept of assimilation has witnessed a revitalization in recent decades owing to several American migration scholars (Alba & Nee, 2003; Brubaker, 2001; Portes, 1997). In particular more recent theoretical perspectives such as the “new assimilation theory” and “segmented assimilation” offer concepts of assimilation that are neither normative nor prescriptive but analytical and open-ended (Friborg, 2016). Besides, the segmented assimilation perspective represents not only a refined but also a very critical theoretical alternative to classical assimilation theory (Portes, 1997; Portes & Zhou, 1993). In the segmented assimilation perspective, society is viewed as segmented, emphasizing diverse routes of adaptation of first and second generations of migrants into the destination society, and one of the important concerns has been the downward mobility among some ethnic groups (e.g. African Americans) and their social problems (Crul & Schneider, 2010; Portes & Zhou, 1993).

OUR USE OF THE ASSIMILATION CONCEPT

In this book, we follow the recent American literature and use assimilation as an analytical and open-ended concept and not as normative or prescriptive. Our interest is to what extent migrants assimilate to native Danes' support for the welfare state and its values and norms. Thus, our focus *is* on the migrants and native Danes *are* used as a reference category. However, this does not mean that attitudes of the native Danes are our normative standards or a desirable standard. Neither does this mean that the native Danes' support for the welfare is unaffected by migrants.

Although the book is inspired by the recent American literature about assimilation it should be noticed that our analytical focus is somewhat different from what is found in these studies. We want to pinpoint three elements that distinguish our study from the dominant American migration research.

The first element concerns the domains studied in this book. Most of the empirical conclusions from the American literature on assimilation focus on outcomes such as education, employment, and wages. In Figure 1.1. in Chapter 1, we label this migrants' socio-economic position. In Chapters 4 and 5, we will give a detailed description of the socio-economic position of the 14 migrant groups, that the book studies. However, this is not done in order to assess the level of assimilation to the socio-economic position of native Danes. The main focus of the book is on migrants' welfare attitudes (box 1 in Figure 1.1), which make the socio-economic position an explanatory variable rather than the dependent variable. Some of the American literature does, however, also refer to assimilation processes in more socio-cultural domains, for example when it concerns the languages spoken in the home and interethnic marriage patterns (Alba & Nee, 2003). In continuation hereof, one has to be aware that some "elements" of the socio-cultural sphere might be easier to adapt to than others. Schnapper (1988) distinguishes between the "hard-core" and the "periphery" of the culture of origin (see also Navas, García, Sánchez, Rojas, Pumares, & Fernández, 2005). The hard-core refers, among others, to marriage rules, the concept of honour, relations between the sexes while the periphery refers to how to behave in more public life and attitudes towards government and politics. Thus, from the perspective of migration scholars, one could argue that the book is concerned with a periphery of the socio-cultural sphere.

The second element concerns the time perspective. The American assimilation literature typically study processes over time and generations. The strongest evidence for assimilation processes is based on studies of second- and third-generation descendants (Alba & Nee, 2003). Due to the research design of this book (a cross-sectional design inspired by a most-different logic), we cannot follow our 14 migrant groups over time. The book has a narrow

time perspective. It focuses on the level of assimilation of welfare attitudes among first-generation migrants. Therefore, widespread assimilation might be somewhat surprising. In many of our analyses, we will include the number of years spent in Denmark as an independent variable, which does provide a time perspective. However, this measure might also include effects from the simple ageing of migrants and generational patterns. In any case, we operate with a relatively narrow time perspective, which, as a part of the design, makes assimilation less likely than in the classic American assimilation studies.

The third element that distinguishes our study from the dominant American migration research is the theoretical approach. Although we are inspired by theoretical and analytical insights from recent assimilation theories (Alba & Nee, 2003; Portes, 1997), the theoretical perspective of the book differs by including insights from the comparative welfare state literature. The new assimilation and segmented assimilation scholars only deal with the role of the welfare state in a very implicit way. The segmented assimilation perspective refers to the role of the structures of the receiving government, society, and pre-existing ethnic community. However, the role of these structures has not been operationalized in an appropriate way nor used explicitly in empirical studies in the field (Waldinger & Catron, 2016). The new assimilation perspective (Alba & Nee, 2003) refers to several different mechanisms at the individual level, the group level, and the broader context of the society – where the latter refers to the influence of the civil society, discrimination, and economic structures of migrant incorporation patterns. We expect a more direct influence from welfare state institutions, theorized below, which was one of the reasons for studying different migrant groups living in Denmark (Bredahl & Fersch, 2018).

THE DRIVERS OF ASSIMILATION AND THE EMERGING COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

It is notoriously difficult to pinpoint the factors that hinder or facilitate migrants' assimilation. The process takes place in a complex interaction between the characteristics of the migrant, the country of origin, and the country of destination. One point of departure in previous research has been the individual strategies of migrants. One of the most cited scholars is John Berry, who has developed a famous two-by-two table to conceptualize different psychological so-called acculturation strategies among migrants (Berry, 1997). His point of departure was that crossing of nation-state borders, and the identities attached to these territories, leave migrants in a psychologically stressful situation, which they try to cope with through different strategies. In his two-by-two table, he distinguished between the level of so-called cultural maintenance of one's previous identity and characteristics, which often is

linked to the country of origin, and the level of so-called contact and participation with the majority in the country of destination.

Rooted in the psychological tradition, Berry had a natural point of departure in the individual and his or her coping resources and strategies. The typology was followed by a larger conceptual framework where the long-term acculturation was dependent upon several characteristics of the destination country, the country of origin, the diaspora, and a large number of moderating individual characteristics; the most obvious being the length of time being in the host country. Berry was not unaware of the importance of host-country strategies or policies for acculturation. In a later piece, he conceptualized how the four acculturation strategies of migrants corresponded to four acculturation strategies of the larger society (Berry, 2001). However, empirically, the American migrant literature has primarily been concerned with the US, which has the obvious drawback that it has been difficult to study the importance of (variations in) destination country contexts. Thus, empirically we are left in the dark as to what matters in other contexts and what mattered in the American contexts.

The larger inflow of migrants in other Western countries has spurred an emerging theoretical and empirical comparative literature on the importance of (variations) in destination countries' contexts for migrants' incorporation patterns (Crul, Schneider, & Lelie, 2012; Dörr & Faist, 1997; Reitz, 2002; Sainsbury, 2012; Söhn, 2013). The difference in theoretical orientation may reflect that the European countries, compared to America, can be "... considered as a 'natural laboratory' for integration processes" (Crul & Schneider, 2010:1250). Many of these studies have analysed the impact of welfare state and labour market arrangements on the socio-economic position of migrants. This includes studies of whether comprehensive and generous welfare states pose a problem for successful socio-economic incorporation of newcomers in various domains, such as the labour market, segregation, and crime (Diop-Christensen & Pavlopoulos, 2016; Dörr & Faist, 1997; Kogan, 2006; Koopmans, 2010; Van Tubergen, Maas, & Flap, 2004). Another contribution from European migration scholars has been labelled the comparative integration context theory (Alba & Foner, 2015; Crul, 2013; Crul & Schneider, 2010; Heath, Rothon, & Kilpi, 2008). This theory focuses on migrants' participation in social organizations and feelings of belonging in local communities in different European cities and nation-states. The theory outlines a broad range of national contextual factors such as institutional arrangements in education, the labour market, housing, religion, and legislation. There is also a small comparative literature on migrants' values and norms, which come closer to the focus of this book. Ersanilli (2012) is explicitly concerned with whether migrant integration policies, meaning whether the host countries tolerate and facilitate cultural diversity and access to individual citizens' rights, in several Western

European countries influence the degree to which migrants adopt values akin to those of the general population of their countries of residence. Based on survey data among Turkish migrants and their descendants in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, Ersanilli (2012) concludes that the impact of different integration policy models on socio-cultural incorporation patterns is limited and modest (see also Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011 for similar findings).

The comparative migration literature is indeed promising, but it is naturally troubled by the fact that destination countries' contexts include a myriad of different elements, which migrants are exposed to more or less at the same point in time. In Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, we simply labelled it "destination country institutional and cultural context" (box 4). This makes it extremely difficult to single out the effects of specific elements in the destination country contexts. Furthermore, the specific destination country elements probably influence different domains differently. Some elements might influence the socio-economic position of migrants (box 3 in Figure 1.1), for example, high minimum wages in some destination country contexts, while they have little impact on what migrants think, for example, whether public childcare is a good or bad thing (boxes 2 and 1 in Figure 1.1). The contribution of the book is to focus especially on attitudes towards the welfare state among migrants and to theorize the contextual effects on these specific attitudes. Our point of departure is a well-established comparative welfare state literature, which has studied how variations in institutional contexts across countries in general influences welfare attitudes.

THE COMPARATIVE WELFARE STATE LITERATURE

The comparative welfare state literature is embedded in what has been labelled new institutionalism. It goes back to the so-called "bringing the state back in" perspective promoted in the 1980s by political scientists and sociologists (Béland, 2010; Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1985). This literature urged researchers to pay attention to the role of state structures by emphasizing how the state as an actor and/or institution has its own important impact. This theoretical approach to the state has been an important point of departure for later theorizing on historical institutionalism and policy feedback mechanisms, which argues that existing policies can have major effects on politics (Béland, 2010; Mettler & Soss, 2004; Pierson, 1993).

The comparative welfare state tradition has more specifically theorized how so-called welfare regimes make feedback effects. For decades, different welfare states in the Western world have been classified into various typologies and when considering attitudes towards the welfare state and to the organization of it, it is difficult not to get around Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) and his seminal book *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Essentially,

the argument goes (cf. Chapter 1) that the provision of welfare in Western countries is broadly organized across three welfare state regimes: liberal, conservative-corporatist, and social-democratic. These regime types are characterized by not simply the amount of social spending, but also by the extent and basic principles of social rights granted by the welfare state. Thus, the residents are not only exposed to a particular way of organizing the state. They are exposed to larger institutional structures, which influence many aspects of life.

Since its publication, Esping-Andersen's (1990) influential welfare state typology has been much debated and subject to extensive criticism based on theoretical, methodological, and empirical considerations (Bambra, 2007). Consequently, several competing welfare state typologies within the comparative social policy literature have been proposed, many of which bear similarities to that of Esping-Andersen (1990), but which differ in their concepts of causes, classifications, and impacts of policies (Arts & Gelissen, 2010; Van Kersbergen & Vis, 2015). In this book we are not committed to one specific typology – they depend on the policy domains or social outcomes we are studying. However, we adhere to the argument that welfare states differ according to various overall regime-patterns, that these patterns tend to cluster, and that these broader patterns can influence both natives and migrants.

THE EFFECT OF WELFARE INSTITUTIONS ON GENERAL PUBLIC ATTITUDES

The historical inherited welfare institutions are believed to influence welfare attitudes of residents in several ways. One way to theorize these effects is to distinguish between what James G. March and Johan P. Olsen have labelled the logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2006). The logic of consequentiality is what is theorized within so-called rational choice institutionalism. The pivotal argument is that existing institutions shape the self-interest of actors, including individual residents of a country. Thus, as illustrated in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, there is an effect from the institutional context of a destination country (box 4) to the socio-economic positions (box 3); not only for migrants but for residents in general. This could, through self-interest effects, influence the welfare attitudes of both natives and migrants. The logic of appropriateness is what is theorized within so-called sociological institutionalism. The “logic of appropriateness” mechanisms rely on the assumption that (welfare) state institutions and their endogenous logic underpin certain societal norms, understandings, and values because individuals are “deeply embedded in a world of institutions that have the potential to affect their very identities, self-images and orientations towards the world” (Sjöberg, 2004:112). Institutions thereby have an impact on what residents see as morally justifiable. The pivotal argument is that the existing

welfare institutions (box 4 in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1) shape values, norms and perceptions (box 2), and welfare attitudes (box 1) directly, that is, not only through the self-interest effects (box 3 in Figure 1.1) theorized by rational choice institutionalism.

In between these two “extremes” we have a middle position approaching individuals’ attitudes, norms, and values as cognitive reflections of both knowledgeable and institutional embedded humans. This more eclectic approach is often labelled “historical institutionalism”, although these nuances are not limited to historical institutionalism (Fioretos, Falleti, & Sheingate, 2016). In this perspective, the preferences or interests of political actors are not only exogenous to political institutions but also shaped by them. Interests make institutions, but institutions also make interests. Similarly, values and norms are not exogenous to political institutions but shaped by them. Thus, in a real world setting actors are embedded in a complex process, where ambiguous norms and values are constantly moulded (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Following this logic, the book builds on the assumption that institutions influence self-interests, values, norms, perceptions, and welfare attitudes, as illustrated in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1.

Returning to the aforementioned welfare regime literature, the classic fusion of power resources theory and welfare regimes assume that welfare states founded upon coalitions between classes create broad support by moulding broad class interests (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi & Palme, 1998). This is a logic of consequentiality related to the self-interest of individuals and the classes into which they are embedded. Approaches from political sociology also elaborate on how strong and universal welfare states create their own broadly shared cultures of equality and social justice (Mau, 2004). The values of universality and equality embedded in universal welfare policies may simply have a socializing effect, and we see a strong “logic of appropriateness” here. Other strands of institutionalist literature elaborate on how universal welfare regimes are argued to simply perform better and more effectively in the eyes of the public (Rothstein, 1998). If the needs of the public are met more effectively and basic norms of justice more easily upheld (or at least less easily questioned) in such a context, the welfare state will have high and broadly shared levels of legitimacy. Several studies build on this foundation and elaborate how universal or encompassing welfare institutions facilitate social trust while mitigating low perceived deservingness or negative stereotypes of groups with low socio-economic status (Larsen, 2006; 2013; 2019; Rothstein, 1998). This literature is not easily pigeonholed in terms of the logic of consequentiality or appropriateness. In this literature, institutions do not only shape self-interest, norms, and values. Knowledgeable individuals also rationally reflect, which increases the importance of perceptions of how the world actually looks and functions. In brief, the argument goes that, for example, universal welfare

institutions are more easily perceived as just, fair, and efficient. Therefore, residents who have experience with such institutions support them.

The overall argument is that welfare institutions are likely to shape self-interest, values, norms, and perceptions. Throughout the chapters, we illustrate how these different mechanisms are at stake depending on what policy domain we are studying within the Danish welfare state. It is not necessarily the same institutional mechanisms that influence attitudes towards female employment, institutional trust, social trust, or attitudes towards government responsibility. Therefore, it is important to make a distinction between the “regime level” and the “policy level”. As regards the regime level, it has already been specified what is special about the Danish welfare state in Chapter 1. As for the “policy level”, the institutional structures of the Danish welfare state will be discussed in the individual chapters. However, the overall argument of the book is that existing welfare institutions influence welfare attitudes.

THE EFFECT OF WELFARE INSTITUTIONS ON MIGRANTS’ ATTITUDES

The simple logic of the book is that migrants are exposed to many of the same welfare institutions as natives are, which leads to the expectation that migrants’ welfare attitudes assimilate into the welfare attitudes of natives. This theoretical argument relies on the assumption that welfare institutions are present and visible both for natives and migrants. This is, we argue, particularly the case in a comprehensive welfare state with a long tradition of strong state involvement as the Nordic welfare states (Olwig, 2011). Hence, as argued by Kumlin and Rothstein (2005):

Citizens in developed welfare states frequently come into direct personal contact with many different types of public agencies and services. Social insurance, childcare, benefit systems, public health care, unemployment insurance, elder care, and public education are but a few examples of this variation. In many cases, such institutions can be pervasive factors in people’s daily lives. (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005:347)

That the institutions of welfare states can influence the values, norms, perceptions, and welfare attitudes of migrants is substantiated in a small number of recent studies. Kumlin & Rothstein (2010) found that in Sweden, equal and fair treatment during personal contacts with public authorities and services not only went together with higher trust among natives but also among migrants. These findings are in line with earlier writings by Rothstein (2005) and his theorizing on the impact of state institutions and state capacity on making and breaking social capital (social trust). The idea is that positive perceptions of

the institutions of the welfare states are an important precondition for generating social trust (i.e. trust between people), based on the assumption that "... people's views of the society around them and their fellow human beings are partly shaped by their contacts with such public welfare-state institutions" (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2010:63). When it comes to the underlying mechanisms, Rothstein highlights the high degree of universalism in the design of institutions, based on the assumption that there is a linkage between what is called "procedural fairness" and the credibility and trustworthiness of institutions. In addition, Dinesen finds that a high degree of institutional quality (e.g. freedom from corruption and concomitant perceptions of institutions) has a positive impact on the level of generalized trust (in other people) among non-Western migrants now living in Western Europe (Dinesen, 2011; Dinesen & Hooghe, 2010; Nannestad, Svendsen, Dinesen, & Sønderskov, 2014). The social and institutional trust of migrants is further theorized respectively in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11.

Another example is Reeskens and van Oorschot (2015) who study what migrants in 18 European welfare states think about government support to ensure a reasonable standard of living. They also find that attitudes towards government spending among migrants in these different welfare states are highly structured by the institutional and cultural contexts of the destination country. Hedegaard and Larsen (2019) also conclude that welfare state context matters. They find that US migrants exposed to the institutional context of North European welfare states are more supportive of governmental responsibility for sick people, pensioners, and unemployed people as well as governmental responsibility for redistribution than are the US citizens (non-migrants settled in the US) with similar characteristics (the control group). The migrants' attitudes towards governmental responsibility are further theorized in Chapter 8.

A final example is Breidahl and Larsen (2016), who focus on attitudes towards women's paid work among migrants. They examine to what extent and how fast migrants adapt to the prevalent attitudes towards women's paid work in 30 European countries. They conclude that migrants adapt to destination country's attitudes towards women's paid work to a high extent and that the attitudes towards women's paid work among male and female migrants alike are highly structured by different family policies including the institutional and cultural contexts of the destination country. Migrants' attitudes towards female employment and childcare is further theorized in Chapters 9 and 10.

THE EXPECTATION OF ASSIMILATION, LIMITATIONS, AND COMPETING THEORIES

As already highlighted, the main theoretical argument of the book is that migrants, and various migrant groups, are exposed to the same overall institutional structures as native residents. Therefore, we expect to observe throughout the empirical chapters that migrants and native Danes hold fairly similar attitudes towards the welfare state. Therefore, we also expect even most different migrant groups, in terms of socio-economic position and attitudes in the origin country, to have fairly similar attitudes towards the Danish welfare state. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis is based on a combination of migration studies and comparative welfare state studies. If welfare state institutions have “an assimilative impact” on welfare attitudes, we should expect to find this impact in a Danish welfare state context characterized by, among others, developed welfare programmes, a long tradition for strong state capacity and involvement in the daily lives of the residents. Hence, Denmark (together with the other Nordic countries) can be seen as best cases for assimilation of welfare attitudes (Breidahl, 2017).

Migrants and natives are, at an overall level, exposed to the same Danish welfare regime. However, one of the limitations of our theoretical argument is that natives and migrants might not be exposed to the same welfare institutions at the policy level. As regards the policy level, residents – natives as well as migrants – experience different parts of the welfare state in different parts of their lives. Some have children, others have not (e.g. experience with family policies), some spend some of their life being unemployed – others do not (e.g. experiences with the unemployment system), and so on. Furthermore, refugees are often more intensively confronted with the welfare state than other groups because introductory programmes for those newly arrived are obligatory and because more refugees (compared to migrant workers) face problems entering the labour market (Olwig, 2011). Other migrants, such as mobile EU workers, might have little direct contact with the Danish welfare state. In the next chapter, we describe how we have sampled the 14 migrant groups, and throughout the book we discuss the effect from specific institutions and specific groups.

We are fully aware that the overall research design of the book does not allow us to isolate the impact of welfare institutions from other destination country characteristics. A competing argument would be that the welfare attitudes of migrants could be shaped by more general exposure to Danish culture. Native Danes and various migrant groups are indeed exposed to overall Danish culture. However, one of the advantages of our study is that we have migrants coming from very different origin countries. A broader cultural perspective

would normally predict that values and norms are stable in adolescence regardless of whether we relocate to a new context (Norris & Inglehart, 2012). This would lead one to expect differences across migrant groups in welfare attitudes. The idea about cultural stability among migrants and intergenerational transmission as a way of reproducing cultural attitudes among migrant families has, in particular, been prominent in studies on migrants norms about gender equality and attitudes towards women's paid work; see, for example Chapter 9 (for an overview of this debate see Breidahl & Larsen, 2016). We argue that if one finds similarity across culturally very different groups, it gives some support for institutional arguments.

As will be apparent in the analysis to come, the distinction between institutional and broader cultural arguments is mostly a matter of degree. In most of our empirical analysis, we find relatively small differences across (most-different) migrant groups, which supports an institutional argument, but significant differences are still present. Whether these remaining differences reflect some kind of "country of origin effect", "logic of appropriateness" (assimilation takes time), or something else is difficult to detangle as cultures and institutions are embedded in each other in the real world. However, throughout the empirical chapter, we try to come closer to some of the underlying mechanisms by taking a number of factors into account, including numbers of years in the destination country, national identification, the socio-economic background, and so on. It will not allow us to provide clear-cut answers but, hopefully, qualify a debate that often tends to end with "culture" as a residual for what is unexplained.

3. The surveys and register data

In this chapter, we will present the two surveys that serve as the data material for the book. The two surveys are called “Community conceptions among ethnic and non-ethnic Danes” (Comcon) and “Migrants’ attitudes to welfare” (Mifare) and will mainly be referred to using the two abbreviations. Combined the two surveys have migrants living in Denmark originating from 14 different countries. Mifare has migrants from four countries that, at the time, were members of the European Union (EU) in the form of Poland, Romania, Spain, and Great Britain, and six countries outside the EU and Europe in the form of China, Japan, the Philippines, Turkey, Russia, and the United States (US). The Comcon survey includes migrants from Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, and ex-Yugoslavia. The two surveys thus cover a wide and diverse selection of the world. In addition, both surveys contain a group of Danes that represent the native population. Throughout this chapter, we will introduce the two surveys in more detail, and discuss similarities and dissimilarities between the two surveys. This we will do by going over the most common issues that face surveys targeted at migrants and discuss how the two surveys handled them.

Migrants and their descendants make up an increasingly large part of the population throughout Western Europe. Therefore, more attention is paid to what migrants think about topics like society and the welfare state. These are the kinds of questions that surveys are traditionally good at answering. However, using existing population surveys to study the migrant sub-populations can be problematic. Even if the country of origin is included in the survey, which is not always the case, then the general population survey would make a poor basis for saying something about what migrants think about a given subject. In the Danish case, migrants and descendants combined made up about 14 per cent of the population in 2015. Therefore, following normal sampling logic a random sample of the population should provide us with the same percentage of migrants and descendants. As a result, we would need approximately 7,000 respondents from a general population survey to find around 1,000 migrants and descendants, which is normally the number needed for statistical analysis. Some studies have pooled comparative surveys over several waves to overcome this problem, but this approach comes with other problems (Dinesen, 2012; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2015). This issue is further complicated by the fact that migrants are a very heterogeneous group, who in most cases cannot be treated as one, but have to be divided into sub-groups, often based

on origin country or ethnicity. For this reason, more and more surveys are being targeted at migrants or specific migrant groups (Font & Méndez, 2013; Hedegaard, 2017), which is also the method used by this book. However, with this targeting comes new issues that we will cover in this chapter.

DEFINING THE TARGET GROUPS

The first step of making any survey is defining the target group. In this case, it would be migrants or specific national groups. How the groups are defined is determined by both theoretical and practical considerations. Of theoretical considerations, one could imagine that the survey focused on specific national groups, as they represent certain traits in the migrant population. For instance, the Comcon survey selected migrants that represent some of the largest groups of non-Western migrants in Denmark. The purpose of the study was to study the community conceptions of the migrants originating from these countries since the values and socio-cultural integration of these groups looms large in both public and academic debates (Breidahl, 2017; Breidahl, Holtug, & Kongshøj, 2018). The Mifare survey, on the other hand, more directly focused on socialization and institution experiences, asking questions about how migrants perceive the welfare institution and how attitudes in the origin country might shape this. Therefore, the origin countries were mainly selected based on being present in international comparative surveys, and maximizing on diversity (Hedegaard & Bekhuis, 2018; Lubbers, Diehl, Kuhn, & Larsen, 2018). Further, this socialization perspective meant that the migrants who were included were all over the age of 16 when they arrived in Denmark, that is, they were socialized in the country of origin.

Access to data and how migrants are defined is a more practical consideration. In the Danish context most surveys among migrants, including Comcon and Mifare, are sampled with the help of Statistics Denmark. Statistics Denmark runs the Civil Registration System (Det Centrale Personregister or CPR-register in Danish), which since 1968 has registered everybody with permanent residence in Denmark for more than three months. In the case of refugees, CPR-numbers are assigned from the first day of arrival. The CPR-number is used throughout Danish society, for example for bank accounts, housing contracts, and healthcare, which makes it extremely difficult to live without being registered. This gives us a very reliable way to sample migrants and natives, but also means that Statistics Denmark's definitions of migrants and descendants shape the sampling process. Statistics Denmark defines a migrant as a person born abroad, where none of the parents are born in Denmark and hold Danish citizenship. If the person is born abroad but one parent holds Danish citizenship and is born in Denmark, then he or she is classified as Danish. Descendants are defined as persons born in Denmark

with both parents being migrants as defined above; with the addition that the descendants turn Danish if one of the parents get Danish citizenship (and abandon former citizenship in a different country). In these definitions, some aspect is implicitly included and excluded. The definitions are, for instance, limited to the first generation (migrants) and the second generation (descendants). Further, the status as a migrant or a descendant can change if the migrant or their parents become Danish citizens. This definition seems very inclusive from a citizenship standpoint but also means that some will be included and excluded (Hedegaard, 2017). For instance, some studies of migrants, based on these definitions, have been criticized for selecting out the most well-integrated migrants who managed to become citizens. These definitions vary across countries and therefore we have to be careful when comparing the results to other contexts, as the sampling procedures might differ a lot (Font & Méndez, 2013).

SAMPLING

When the target group has been defined, the next step is to sample it. There is a large literature regarding the sampling (Groves, Fowler Jr, Couper, Lepkowski, Singer, & Tourangeau, 2011), but in relation to surveys among migrants, there are some specific issues. The first issue is whether to sample among migrants in general or among selected migrant groups. If the sample was drawn among all migrants, then the survey would be able to say something about the attitudes of migrants in general in a given country. This would be the “standard approach” in population surveys. Most survey studies of migrants, however, opt for targeting selected migrant groups. This gives the opportunity to translate the surveys and target the questionnaire towards specific groups. The downside of this is that the survey only is valid regarding these groups and not all migrants. Another aspect to consider is whether to include a sample of the majority population, which can serve as a yardstick or a “control group” (see discussion about assimilation in the previous chapter). Both the Comcon survey and the Mifare survey have opted for the solution of targeting a selected number of migrant groups, as well as a sample of native Danes. Denmark Statistics classification of the country of origin was used. This information is based on the birthplace of a person’s mother and secondary her citizenship (if the mother’s status is unknown, the father is used, if none is available, then the country or origin is classified as the country of birth of the individual). The samples sizes and number of responses are seen in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 shows the sample size and number of respondents across the origin countries. For the Mifare survey, the goal was to have at least 300 respondents from each group. This was not fully reached for migrants originating from Turkey, Poland, Romania, and the Philippines. In the Comcon

Table 3.1 *Sample sizes, number of responses, and response rates in the Mifare and Comcon surveys*

Mifare			
Origin country	Sample size	Number of responses	Response rate
TUR	1000	216	22
ROU	1000	277	28
PHL	1000	280	28
POL	1000	293	29
USA	900	310	34
ESP	900	339	38
CHN	1000	346	35
JPN	900	379	42
GBR	900	402	45
RUS	1000	408	41
DNK	900	397	44
Total	1050	3646	35
Comcon			
Origin country	Sample size	Number of responses	Response rate
YOU	315	129	41
IRQ	320	105	33
LBN ¹	315	82	26
PAK	315	110	35
TUR	315	92	29
DNK	1990	1182	60
Total	3570	1703	48

Note: ¹ The group from Lebanon also includes stateless Palestinians.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and Comcon survey (2015).

survey, the goal was to have at least 100 respondents in each of the groups. This was not fully reached. We also see large variances in the response rate across the two surveys. Low response rates are in themselves bad, as it leads to fewer respondents and less statistical power. This is further complicated by the fact that non-responses are not random, meaning that certain groups like the less well educated, men, and newer migrants tend to be among those who participate less in the surveys (Deding, Fridberg, & Jakobsen, 2008). This could lead to biases in the results if the attitudes of such sub-groups are under-reported, and this has been highlighted as an issue in survey studies of migrant groups (Hedegaard, 2017).

In order to establish more representative results, we construct statistical weights adjusting for non-response in each of the sampled groups. Since our samples are linked to detailed register data, we know how the sample is distributed across the register variables for both respondents and non-respondents. Therefore, we can pinpoint the non-respondents with larger precision than surveys that use simple population weights. To be more specific we use weighting class adjustment (WCA) (Biemer & Christ, 2008). A set of variables suspected to be related to non-response is chosen. Within the cells produced by all possible combinations of these variables, response propensities may vary. Respondents are then weighted according to the response propensities within each cell. In this case, the weighting variables are age, equivalized disposable income, cohabitation, citizenship, and employment status. Age is divided into three groups (18–30, 31–45, 46–60 years). Equivalized disposable income is also divided into three roughly equal-sized groups based on the variation within the general population in Denmark (below 200,000 DKK, 200–299,000 DKK, above 300,000 DKK). Cohabitation distinguishes between singles and couples (regardless of marriage or not). Citizenship informs us whether people hold Danish citizenship or not. Employment status simply distinguishes between employment and non-employment (based on the main source of income throughout the year). These weighing procedures do not solve all problems with non-response but do bring us close to representative data for the 14 specific groups and the group of natives.

Generally, both surveys had minor non-response issues that were to be expected, but with some variation across nationalities (Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, & Degen, 2018; Kongshøj, 2015). Younger, male, single, and non-employed had response propensities that were a little lower. The biggest differences are to be found with regard to citizenship status in the Comcon survey. Weighting generally reduces the share of respondents with Danish citizenship by about 10–20 per cent, from a small majority to a large minority (except for the Lebanese migrants where a clear majority possess citizenship, see also Chapter 4). In other words, migrants that had achieved Danish citizenship were overrepresented in the survey. Weighting adjusts citizenship status downward with only a few percentage points in the Mifare survey, but here the share with Danish citizenship is also much smaller in general, as shown in Chapter 4.

What differences does weighting make for our survey questions? This depends on two things: First, the degree of non-response bias on the weighting variables (which, as mentioned, were relatively minor except for citizenship in the Comcon survey), and second, the degree to which the socio-demographic weighting variables affect survey attitudes. As subsequent chapters will show, individual differences in socio-demography do not correlate strongly with welfare attitudes and our other dependent variables. These are the reasons

why weighting in the end seems to make a relative negligible difference. A comparison of the distribution of some of our dependent variables – attitudes towards redistribution, perceived corruption/institutional distrust, and generalized social trust – by each nationality (not shown) reveals that the statistical weights in our case do not substantially change results. At best, the weights only change attitudes and perceptions for some of the nationalities by a few points on the 0–100 scales we use throughout the book for each dependent variable. These differences are very small, and they are in any case well within the margin of statistical error. Regardless, we will continue to use weights throughout the book as a safeguard for all statistical analyses.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMCON AND MIFARE

The Comcon and Mifare surveys differ in three important ways in regard to their populations of migrants. First, Mifare includes everybody over the age of 18, while Comcon is limited to the 18- to 60-year-olds. Second, Comcon includes both first and second generation of migrants, while Mifare only includes the first generation. Third, Mifare includes migrants who were over the age of 16 when they migrated, and who have been in Denmark for at least one year, while Comcon does not have these requirements. In terms of the samples among natives, there is also a small difference. Mifare has sampled Danes born in Denmark as children of parents with Danish citizenship. Comcon includes a selection of the general population, which therefore also includes some migrants from all over the world. This amounts to 153 of the 1,282 respondents in the Comcon data, around 12 per cent (as the share should be according to Danmarks Statistik (2016)).

To ensure comparability in the analyses, we have made some cuts in the populations. From both surveys, we only included first-generation migrants between 18 and 60 years old. Thus, those older than 60 were excluded from the Mifare survey, and descendants were excluded from the Comcon survey. In the sample that represents the general population in the Comcon survey, we removed the migrants, to ensure comparability to the Mifare survey. We have chosen not to exclude those who were younger than 16 when they migrated or who have been in the country for less than a year from the Comcon survey. Though this creates small differences in the population, excluding on that criteria would eliminate too many respondents from the Comcon survey, rendering statistical analysis impossible for some of the migrant groups. However, to control for this we will include a variable that measures the number of years lived in Denmark in the analysis. For the Mifare survey, there was also a minor reduction in the number of respondents after the survey data were linked to the administrative data. This was due to a clerical error at the agency responsible

Table 3.2 *Sizes of the populations in the two surveys after mutual exclusion rules*

	Mifare		Comcon
DNK	232	DNK	809
TUR	184	TUR	119
ROU	255	YOU	97
PHL	220	IRQ	55
POL	237	LBN ¹	67
USA	229	PAK	61
ESP	306		
CHN	316		
JPN	233		
GBR	279		
RUS	365		
Total	2856		1208

Note: Only included are first-generation migrants or Danes, 18–60 years old. ¹ The group from Lebanon also includes stateless Palestinians.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and Comcon survey (2015).

for sampling the data. We are unfortunately not able to account for any bias this creates. Table 3.1 outlines the population sizes following the reduction in sizes using the criteria outlined above.

There are differences as well with respect to the data collection methods and translations. The Mifare survey was translated into the language spoken by most people in the origin country and was collected via mail or web. The Comcon survey was collected via telephone interviews or web, and it was therefore not possible to translate it, as it would require the interviewers to speak a number of languages. Experiences from the Mifare survey show that about half of the respondents chose to answer the survey in their native language, but what it exactly did for the response rates is impossible to say. For both surveys, the respondents reviewed a written invitation to participate along with a link and a code for the web-based collection of the survey. Mifare also sent out a set of written questionnaires, in Danish and the native language, along with a return envelope. The Mifare survey also offered an incentive in the form of a voucher for a movie ticket (value 10 euros) to those who participated in the survey. Mifare sent out two reminders, two weeks apart. For the Comcon survey, the reminder consisted of phone calls and phone interviews for those who preferred that. The Comcon data was collected in 2014, while Mifare data was collected in 2015.

SCALING OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND STATISTICAL METHOD

The dependent variables that we use throughout the book are all attitudinal survey questions measured on different scales. Generally, most of them follow 1–5 point-scales such as the standard Likert-scale from “Fully agree” to “Fully disagree”, while a few others feature 1–4 point-scales with no middle category. In three cases from the Comcon survey – institutional trust, attitudes towards redistribution, and childcare – respondents replied to a 0–10 scale. To ensure comparability and easy understanding across chapters, all dependent variables are recoded to a 0–100 scale. For instance, in the case of a 1–5 point-scale, this means that “1” becomes “0”, “2” becomes “25”, “3” becomes “50”, “4” becomes “75”, and “5” becomes “100”. Naturally, readers should be mindful that our reported differences on a 0–100 scale refer to differences on an original scale with a much lower number of values. In all chapters, we explain our dependent survey questions and original scales.

Methodologically, we utilize linear (OLS) regression throughout all chapters. Unstandardized linear regression coefficients have the clear advantage that they are easy to understand and interpret. For instance, a regression coefficient of 3.5 simply means that a 1-point increase on the scale of the independent variable (examples could be age or citizenship status) is associated with a 3.5-point increase on the 0–100 scale of the dependent variable. This would imply, for instance, that each additional year on the age-variable or possessing Danish citizenship (since the latter variable only features two categories on a 0–1 scale) correlates with scoring 3.5 points higher on the dependent variable.

The results from our regression models will be presented in figures with coefficient plots, visualizing coefficients and confidence intervals for each nationality. In these models, native Danes will be the reference point, and coefficients for each immigrant group will then show differences relative to native Danes on the 0–100 scale of the dependent variable. This makes it easy to visually assess differences in attitudes between our various immigrant groups and native Danes (as well as the statistical confidence intervals for the attitudes of each group), and to see how well our models explain these differences on the 0–100 scale as we include independent variables in the models.

Generally, subsequent chapters will present at least three models with coefficient plots. The first “binary” model simply shows bivariate coefficients showcasing descriptive group differences on the 0–100 scale of the dependent variable without any other variables taken into account. The second “composition model” shows group differences once we control for the register-based, socio-demographic control variables gender, age, income (distinguishing between wages and benefits), education, and civil status (single, ethnically

homogenous, and mixed couples). The “full model” takes all other, generally survey-based, variables into account, such as national identification, religiosity, language skills, and so on. This makes it possible to see how well each group of variables manage to explain group differences. Depending on specific chapters, other, generally intermediate models between “composition” and “full model” may show the effects of single variables of particular interest in that chapter. This will be explained if relevant.

ESTABLISHING AN EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION

It is a cumbersome and difficult task to establish data on migrants' welfare attitudes. The chapter has outlined several pitfalls and challenges. The data are far from optimal. We only have data from a single point in time, we can only select the registered migration and we can only study those that answer our surveys. Furthermore, we have pieced data together from two different surveys, which also came with methodological challenges. However, it is not impossible to collect data on welfare attitudes among migrants. We have answers from 3,023 migrants living in Denmark, who fulfilled all our criteria. We also have a data material based on a randomized sampling within a comprehensive register. Non-registered migrants are not included but this is a group that is close to absent among settled migrants due to the widespread use of CPR-numbers throughout Danish society. Furthermore, we have a weighting procedure, which enables us to adjust for biases in none-response among those selected in the sample. It enables us to reduce the potential pitfall of making inferences from data with a strong overrepresentation of the most assimilated migrants. The rich register information we have on the none-response is a unique feature of our data. This is by no means a guarantee for fully representative data but the data are unique by comparative standards in the field, both in terms of the number of origin countries, the number of respondents, and the (register-based) data quality. We have a unique link between the surveys and rich register data, which enable us to know more about the respondents that answered the survey than what is typically the case. For example, we have detailed information about tax payment, income, and use of welfare benefits from the registers, information that is difficult and sometimes impossible to collect in surveys. We also have registered the time of arrival, citizenship status, and many other indicators. Thus, in the two chapters to come, we will use a mix of survey and register information to describe the 14 migrant groups of the book.

PART II


4. The mixed background of the migrant groups

The 14 groups we study have the common denominator that they have left a country of origin and resettled in a social-democratic welfare regime. On most other parameters they vary. They vary in the composition of gender, length of stay in Denmark, reasons for migrating, naturalization, current family constellation, educational background, labour market attachment, and religious beliefs. Thus, if such factors are believed to scape migrants' assimilation, in general, or welfare attitudes specifically, one could expect sizeable variation across migrant groups. This chapter describes the variation in background variables of the 14 different groups, which contributes to the overall most-different design logic of the book. Furthermore, the chapter gives a first contextual insight into the 14 migrant groups' socio-economic position in Denmark. The descriptions are based on those migrants who answered our survey; using weighted data to provide descriptions that are close to being representative of the 14 different groups.

THE DIFFERENT LENGTHS OF TIME SINCE THE FIRST SETTLEMENT IN DENMARK

Time in the destination countries is often considered the main driver of assimilation, as discussed in Chapter 2. Figure 4.1 shows the first time the Mifare migrants were registered with permanent settlement in Denmark. The interviewed migrants from Turkey have arrived from the 1970s onwards. The median number of years since first registration in Denmark is 21 years. Thereby the migrants from Turkey are the group with the longest attachment to Denmark, on average. The migrants from Great Britain (GBR) have also arrived steadily since the mid-1970s. The median number of years in Denmark is 16 years. However, the most common is to be registered in Denmark in 2014. Seven per cent of migrants from Great Britain were registered for the first time in 2014. The migrants from the United States (USA) have also been connected to Denmark for a long time, on average. The median number of years since the first registered settlement is 11 years. However, 10 per cent were registered in 2014, which again is the most common registration year. In contrast, the migrants from Romania, Spain, and Poland primarily entered

Denmark within the last five years. The median numbers of years since first registration is respectively four, five, and seven years. The migrants from Japan, China, the Philippines, and Russia are somewhere in-between the early and later arrivers. Unfortunately, the Danish registers do not provide historical information on the type of entrance. However, as all Mifare-origin countries are stable, close to none of these migrants came as forced migrants applying for asylum. Instead, it is a mix of work-migration, family reunification, and a minor group of students (see description of employment situation below).




Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 4.1 The first year of registered settlement in Denmark. Mifare migrants

The Comcon migrants came from more unstable countries and larger groups have experienced forced migration. Especially, the migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Lebanon arrived in a few concentrated periods, see Figure 4.2. Most of the interviewed migrants from ex-Yugoslavia were forced to leave due to the civil war in the mid-1990s. Thus, half of the interviewed were registered in Denmark in 1995. Thus, the median number of years in Denmark is 19. The migrants from Iraq started to arrive in the mid-1980s, as a result of the Iran–Iraq war, but peaked around 2001, as a result of the fall of the Saddam regime. The median number of years for this group is 15. The migrants from Lebanon are primarily stateless Palestinians fleeing from the

civil wars in Lebanon in the 1980s. The median number of years in Denmark for this group is 25. Finally, the Comcon migrants from Pakistan and Turkey arrived steadily from the beginning of the 1970s onwards. The median number of years for both groups is 24 years. In the Comcon-data, migrants were asked in the survey with what status they entered Denmark. The most common answer for migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Lebanon was that they came as refugees; respectively 75 per cent, 55 per cent, and 59 per cent. The second most common answer was that they came through family unification; respectively 15 per cent, 44 per cent, and 35 per cent. For the interviewed migrants from Turkey and Pakistan, the dominant answer was that they came through family unification; respectively 77 per cent and 74 per cent. The second most common answer was that they came to work or study; respectively 19 and 16 per cent.



Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 4.2 The first year of registered settlement in Denmark. Comcon migrants

One of the general trends in the Western European countries is that the migration flows have both increased in size and become more diverse, as discussed in Chapter 1. This trend is represented in our data. In terms of length since the first registration, the figures demonstrate a considerable variation across the groups. The work-migrants from Poland, Romania, and Spain have

been in Denmark for a relatively short time. The work-migrants from Turkey and Pakistan have been in Denmark for a much longer time and many of the interviewed have entered through family unification with the guest workers of the 1960s and 1970s or their descendants. The migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Lebanon have been in Denmark since the wars in the origin country. Finally, there are less well-known groups of short-, medium-, and long-term migrants from Great Britain, the US, Japan, China, the Philippines, and Russia.

THE DIFFERENT NATURALIZATION

From a narrow state perspective, formal citizenship is what distinguishes “the foreign” from “the natives”. Those with citizenship are typically recognized as equal residents of the state. Thereby the naturalized enjoy the civil, political, and social rights of the state. At the same time, accepting citizenship is also a leap of faith for the migrant as the protection of the origin country is reduced, if not fully abandoned. Thus, naturalization both has a demand-side, the readiness of migrants to become formal citizens, and a supply-side, the readiness of the destination society to grant formal citizenship. Denmark has gradually tightened access to citizenship and is currently one of the most restrictive countries in Europe (Jensen, Fernández, & Brochmann, 2017). Thus, as the migrant groups arrived at different points in time, it is therefore difficult to use formal citizenship as a valid indicator for broader assimilation. Nevertheless, the differences are displayed in Table 4.1.

In the Mifare-data, close to none of the migrants from Spain (1 per cent), Japan (1 per cent), US (2 per cent), Great Britain (3 per cent), Romania (3 per cent), and Poland (4 per cent) hold Danish citizenship. Among the migrants from China (10 per cent), Russia (13 per cent), and the Philippines (14 per cent), it is around one out of ten that hold Danish citizenship. It is only among the respondents from Turkey that one finds a sizeable group holding Danish citizenship. The share is 22 per cent in the Mifare-data. The share with Danish citizenship is larger in the Comcon-data. Stateless Palestinians from Lebanon are a special case as Denmark has signed the United Nations (UN) conventions on statelessness. Thereby these refugees had a right to immediate access to Danish citizenship. This is reflected in the data: 72 per cent hold Danish citizenship. The other groups of primarily forced migrants, those from ex-Yugoslavia and Iraq, also have a relatively high share with Danish citizenship; respectively 43 and 47 per cent. Finally, 35 per cent of the migrants from Turkey and 36 per cent of migrants from Pakistan hold Danish citizenship. Thus, there is a sizeable difference between the migrants from Turkey respectively interviewed within the Mifare- and Comcon-data, which is probably caused by differences in sampling (see Chapter 3). Besides constant changes in the rules for naturalization, the differences are likely to reflect the incentives

Table 4.1 *Percentage with Danish citizenship*

MIFARE											COMCON				
ESP	JPN	USA	GBR	ROU	POL	CHN	RUS	PHL	TUR		TUR	PAK	YOU	IRQ	LBN
1	1	2	3	3	4	10	13	14	22		35	36	43	47	72
N	306	233	229	279	255	237	316	365	220	184	61	67	119	97	55

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and Comcon survey (2015).

of the different groups of migrants. Migrants from unstable origin-states, or even dissolved origin-states, have a clear incentive to seek citizenship in the destination country. Migrants from stable origin-states have fewer incentives; especially in the case of European Union (EU) migrants, where many civil and social rights are secured by EU treaties (Pennings & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2018). Nevertheless, most importantly, we got variation across the groups.

THE DIFFERENT GENDER AND FAMILY COMPOSITION

It is a well-known fact that migrant flows are gendered in several different ways. The gender distribution could also be of importance as it is a standard finding among natives that females are more in favour of the welfare state than are males, especially so in the Nordic countries. Whether women and men assimilate differently is less clear. However, in the case of marriage-migration, which is probably more pronounced among female than male migrants, one could expect larger contact between natives and migrants. The gender distribution and household constellation in the Danish household are displayed in Table 4.2.

It is only among the migrants from Great Britain (71 per cent), Lebanon (63 per cent), and Pakistan (63 per cent) that males constitute the largest share. Females constitute the largest share of the interviewed migrants from the Philippines (91 per cent), Russia (82 per cent), and Japan (78 per cent). The gender differences go together with differences in the family constellation for households in Denmark. Starting with the male-dominated groups, the most typical for the migrants from Great Britain is to live in ethnically mixed couples in Denmark (54 per cent). This is the largest share found in all of the 14 groups. The pattern is very different for migrants from Lebanon and Pakistan. The most typical for these somewhat male-dominated groups is to live in same-origin couples in Denmark; respectively 57 and 63 per cent. Thus, around six out of ten are married or cohabit with a person from the same country of origin living in Denmark. None of the interviewed migrants from Lebanon lived in ethnically mixed couples. The figure is 7 per cent for

Table 4.2 *Gender distribution and current family constellation in the household in Denmark¹ (per cent)*

	Male	Female	Single	Same-origin couple	Mixed couple	N
DNK(Mifare)	42	58	36	60	5	232
POL	40	60	50	37	13	237
ROU	49	51	53	39	8	255
ESP	53	47	58	16	25	306
GBR	71	29	34	13	54	279
TUR	46	54	18	72	10	184
USA	47	53	42	9	49	229
JPN	22	78	52	6	43	233
CHN	36	64	40	37	23	316
PHL	9	91	42	10	48	220
RUS	19	82	38	22	40	365
DNK(Comcon)	50	50	37	61	17	809
YOU	55	45	34	55	11	119
IRQ	52	48	49	51	0	97
LBN	63	37	33	57	0	55
PAK	63	37	30	63	7	67
TUR	50	50	21	72	4	61

Note: ¹ Based on Denmark Statistics classifications. Couples include cohabitation. Origin-country family situation not included, i.e. single means living alone in a household in Denmark.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and Comcon survey (2015).

the interviewed migrants from Pakistan. For the female-dominated groups, there is a tendency to live in mixed couples. Of the interviewed migrants from the Philippines, Russia, and Japan respectively 48, 40, and 43 per cent live in mixed couples. Thus, there is a pattern of Danish men living together with females from these countries of origin. These patterns of cohabitation across ethnic groups could potentially influence assimilation processes. Thus, again, the most-different design logic is underpinned by our data.

THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EDUCATION

The level of education is notoriously difficult to compare across countries. Migrants constitute a particularly difficult group as they might have education from the country of origin, the country of destination, and from other third or fourth countries. Therefore, it is very difficult to compare educational levels

across migrant groups and across natives and migrants. In Chapter 5, we will describe differences in registered wage levels, which probably is a more valid indicator of human skills than are indicators of education levels. Nevertheless, there is a clear non-economic side to education, which influences norms and values. In the Nordic countries higher education tends to go together with larger support for the welfare state; especially if one controls the opposite effect of higher income. Therefore, we have established a rough measure of the highest level of education based on the international ISCED classification system. The Mifare survey asked specifically about education in the country of origin (in origin country terms) and Denmark. The Comcon survey only asked about education level in general. Due to measurement problems, we use a basic distinction between those having basic primary and lower secondary education (available in close to all countries), those having more education, but not a university degree, and finally those having a university degree (also available in close to all countries). In the ISCED terminology the three categories are lower secondary (or below), higher secondary/post-secondary, and tertiary education. Though tertiary education is available in close to all countries, it is well-known that the content varies. The Danish system follows a German tradition where university degrees are restricted to academic disciplines at centralized universities, whereas many other countries have a broader definition of university degrees, often carrying the label of “college”. Despite all these pitfalls, the distributions in educational levels are shown in Table 4.3.

As for the groups having no or only very basic schooling, the interviewed migrants from Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq stand out. In the Mifare-data, 38 per cent of the migrants from Turkey have no or only basic schooling. In the Comcon-data, the share is 42 per cent. The share among migrants from Lebanon and Iraq is respectably 46 and 32 per cent. As for the groups with tertiary education, the share is low among the interviewed migrants from Lebanon (2 per cent) and from Turkey in the Comcon-data (3 per cent). For the Mifare migrants from ex-Yugoslavia (16 per cent), Iraq (14 per cent), and Turkey (20 per cent), the presence of tertiary education is as widespread as among native Danes (15 per cent in the Comcon-data / 18 per cent in the Mifare-data). For the rest of the groups, having tertiary education is more common than it is for natives. The highest shares with tertiary education are found among migrants from the Philippines (79 per cent), the US (78 per cent), China (76 per cent), Japan (73 per cent), followed by migrants from Spain (66 per cent), Russia (65 per cent), Great Britain (56 per cent), and Romania (55 per cent). These high education levels are probably a real phenomenon, which underlines that highly educated people have better chances of being mobile (both in terms of economic resources and language skills) and having easier access to destination countries. However, the educational levels also reflect the difficulties in defining what a university/college degree is. In any case, Table

Table 4.3 *Education levels (per cent)*

	Lower secondary education or below	Higher secondary and post-secondary	Tertiary education	N
DNK(Mifare)	10	72	18	230
POL	13	53	34	237
ROU	4	41	55	254
ESP	11	24	66	302
GBR	10	34	56	278
TUR	38	42	20	180
USA	7	15	78	227
JPN	13	14	73	232
CHN	7	17	76	313
PHL	5	15	79	219
RUS	6	29	65	361
DNK(Comcon)	9	76	15	807
YOU	22	62	16	116
IRQ	32	55	14	96
LBN	46	52	2	52
PAK	29	45	26	67
TUR	42	55	3	61

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and Comcon survey (2015).

4.3 again demonstrates a very substantial variation both across and within the groups when it comes to education.

THE DIFFERENT LABOUR MARKET POSITIONS

Table 4.4 shows the dominant labour market status again based on the Danish register data. As discussed in Chapter 2, entering the labour market is often seen as a driver of broader assimilation. A long line of research has also shown that the labour market status of natives influences attitudes towards the welfare state. One of the standard findings is that the self-employed often are more sceptical about government interventions. The self-employed, however, make up a relatively small share of both natives and migrants; the largest share is 10 per cent of migrants from Turkey in the Mifare-data. Another standard finding is that the unemployed are more positive towards redistribution and unemployment benefits than the employed tend to be. In Table 4.4, the unemployed are calculated as the group having a primary income from unemployment benefits

Table 4.4 *Dominant labour market status based on register information from 2015 (per cent)*

	Self-employed	Wage earners	Students	Unemployed (registered)	Others	N
DNK(Mifare)	3	74	8	6	9	232
POL	3	71	6	6	14	237
ROU	1	65	20	7	7	255
ESP	3	48	29	4	15	306
GBR	8	67	5	8	12	279
TUR	10	41	3	20	26	184
USA	4	53	20	7	16	229
JPN	3	38	19	4	36	233
CHN	4	54	19	6	18	316
PHL	2	50	7	2	39	220
RUS	4	49	13	1	21	365
DNK(Comcon)	4	70	14	5	8	807
YOU	2	48	9	19	21	119
IRQ	1	24	21	17	36	97
LBN	2	23	3	40	32	55
PAK	7	60	4	11	18	67
TUR	4	53	6	12	25	61

Note: Based on Denmark Statistics classifications.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and Comcon survey (2015).

or social assistance (in 2015). The share among the interviewed natives is respectively 6 per cent (Mifare-data) and 5 per cent (Comcon-data). Some of the migrant groups have a higher share of people who are unemployed. Especially migrants from Lebanon (40 per cent), Turkey (20 per cent in Mifare-data, 12 per cent in Comcon-data), ex-Yugoslavia (19 per cent), and Iraq (17 per cent) have high unemployment rates. This group of unemployed, receiving benefits, clearly have a self-interest in parts of the welfare state, which following the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2 could influence their welfare attitudes.

The interests and the welfare attitudes of wage earners have proved more difficult to predict though they are net contributors to the Nordic welfare state in this stage of their lives (18- to 60-year-olds, see Chapter 3). Wage earners make up the largest share of the native respondents (74 per cent, Mifare-data, and 70 per cent, Comcon-data). It is also the most common status for all the migrant groups besides the interviewed migrants from Iraq and Lebanon,

where the share is down to 24 and 23 per cent, respectively. One of the complications with predicting the self-interest of the Nordic wage earners is that many are employed in the public sector. Based on survey information, around one-third of the wage earners answer that they work in the public sector (both in the Mifare- and Comcon-data). On the one hand, this group pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits and services. On the other hand, many of them get their salary from positions within welfare services, for example within teaching, child- and elderly-care, and healthcare.

The previous studies of natives' welfare attitudes have primarily focused on the groups of self-employed, unemployed, and wage earners. However, even in a sample of 18- to 60-year-olds, there is a sizeable group of respondents who are completely outside of the labour market. This is especially the case for migrants. One group is those registered as students. This group makes up respectively 8 and 14 per cent of the native samples. This share is more sizeable among migrants. They make 29 per cent of the interviewed migrants from Spain and around 20 per cent of the migrants from Romania, the US, Japan, China, and Iraq. This overrepresentation in some migrant groups could influence attitudes and values as state-run schools and universities are classic institutions for socialization. It is also an obvious place to get in contact with young adult natives. In other migrant groups, the share is around or below the share found among natives. Finally, in some of the migrant groups, there is a sizeable share who are outside the labour market and at the same time are not students. This group constitutes 39 per cent of the interviewed migrants from the Philippines, 36 per cent of the migrants from Japan, 36 per cent of migrants from Iraq, and around 25 per cent of migrants from Turkey. Part of this group of persons outside the labour market, in their working age, might receive disability pensions or other health-related benefits. However, the registers show that it is *not* a sizeable share when it comes to migrants. Most of this group of migrants live without public benefits, which means that they rely on the income of the partner/family or occasionally work in the shadow economy. How this group of "others" relates to the welfare state is difficult to theorize or predict. For a start, we simply conclude that there are large differences in labour market status both across natives and migrants and across different migration groups. The exact incomes, the tax payment, and the amount of social benefits received is the topic of the next chapter.

THE DIFFERENT INTENSITY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

The level of religiosity might also both affect the general process of assimilation and welfare attitudes. As discussed in Chapter 2, migration scholars typically perceive religious belief to be part of a hard-core cultural orientation, which is less affected by destination contexts than more peripheral cultural

Table 4.5 *The intensity of religious beliefs (per cent)*

	Very religious	Fairly religious	Not particularly religious	Not religious at all	N
DNK(Mifare)	0	8	53	38	231
POL	9	38	38	14	236
ROU	4	38	37	21	253
ESP	1	7	30	62	303
GBR	3	11	35	52	274
TUR	17	40	26	17	175
USA	6	9	32	53	227
JPN	3	19	44	34	233
CHN	7	16	25	52	313
PHL	6	49	40	5	218
RUS	2	22	49	26	361
DNK(Comcon)	2	12	57	29	808
YOU	4	21	43	32	119
IRQ	8	28	50	15	97
LBN	11	29	49	10	54
PAK	17	56	26	1	67
TUR	19	32	43	6	61

Note: Don't know excluded; small differences in wording in Mifare- and Comcon-data.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and Comcon survey (2015).

orientations. How religious belief goes together with welfare attitudes is difficult to predict. Among natives, there is little correlation between religious beliefs and welfare attitudes in the Nordic countries. However, if less religious belief is an indicator of more assimilation of general cultural orientation, one could predict a negative association. The Danish destination-country context is Protestant but rather secularized. Few natives indicate that they are "very religious" (in the Mifare- and Comcon-data respectively 0 and 2 per cent) or "fairly religious" (respectively 8 and 12 per cent). See Table 4.5. Most of the migrant groups indicate a higher level of religious belief. The exceptions are migrants from Spain, Great Britain, and the US, who are as secularized as the natives.

Intense religious beliefs are found among migrants with Christian and Muslim backgrounds. Among those with Christian beliefs, the most religious are migrants from Poland, Romania, and the Philippines. Among those with Muslim beliefs, the most religious are migrants from Turkey and Pakistan. Finally, there are groups with moderate-to-higher religiosity than natives.

These are migrants from Japan, China, Russia, ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Lebanon. Thus, again the data underpin the most-different design logic of the book.

THE DIFFERENT IDENTIFICATION WITH ORIGIN- AND DESTINATION-COUNTRY

In part the of the literature it is argued that natives' support for the welfare state, especially when it comes to the most redistributive elements, is dependent on a shared national identity (Miller, 1993). To some extent, this is a competing theory to the institutional arguments presented in Chapter 2. The empirical results vary, as always, but one piece of evidence for this suggestion is Singh's (2015) study of how Indian states with more (sub)nationalism developed better education and health service in the post-colonial period (Singh, 2015). The studies that have searched for a micro-level link between natives' national identity and support for the welfare schemes or redistribution are more inconclusive (see Miller & Ali, 2014, for an overview). The most obvious reason is that surveys are typically fielded in well-established nation-states where close to all responding residents feel a basic sense of national belonging (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Janmaat, 2006; Larsen, 2016a). Thus, what is studied is only the effect from the strength or the character of national identity (e.g. Shayo, 2009; Wright & Reeskens, 2013), while the importance of national identification in itself is less explored. However, the situation might be different among migrants as one cannot take basic identification with the destination-country for granted (Staerklé, Sidanius, Green, & Molina, 2010). Therefore, it is relevant to describe the basic national identification of the 14 migrants groups.

In the Mifare-data, we use a question about the feeling of belonging with "Danes" as our primary indicator for national identification. The response categories were "not at all", "weak", "moderate", "close", and "very close". Elaborated analyses including friendships and media consumption indicate that feeling of belonging with Denmark is inversely correlated with the feeling of belonging with the country of origin (not shown). Table 4.6 shows the simple distribution across the ten migrant groups in the Mifare-data; ranged after the share indicating "not at all" and "weak".

Most of the interviewed migrants feel a "moderate" or "close" belonging to Danes. The most common answer is "moderate", which is given by 35 per cent. The second most common is "close", which is given by 25 per cent. Added together, the largest share with, what one could label, dual-cultural national identities is found among the migrants from the Philippines (81 per cent; 42 + 39). Thus, in terms of national identification, the general pattern is dual cultural. It is *not* a pattern of full assimilation as we expect when it comes

Table 4.6 *Variation in national identification. Feeling of belonging with Danes across Mifare migrant groups (per cent)*

	“Not at all”	“Weak”	“Moderate”	“Close”	“Very close”	Per cent	N
ESP	16	32	28	18	7	100	301
JPN	21	24	38	14	3	100	232
ROU	9	30	35	18	8	100	250
POL	11	22	35	24	9	100	233
CHN	7	23	46	18	7	100	310
RUS	9	17	36	20	10	100	342
USA	5	20	35	29	12	100	227
TUR	5	12	41	35	7	100	172
GBR	6	10	35	35	15	100	272
PHL	3	9	42	39	7	100	218
	9	19	35	25	11	100	2694

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and Comcon survey (2015).

to welfare attitudes. It is a minority, who feel “very close” belonging with Danes. The overall share is 11 per cent. The share with the most assimilated national identification is found among migrants from Great Britain (15 per cent) and the US (12 per cent). The share is lowest among migrants from Japan (3 per cent). It is also a rare phenomenon to have no feelings of belonging at all. The overall share answering “not at all” is 9 per cent. The share answering “weak” is 19 per cent. Added together, the share answering “not at all” or “weak” is highest among migrants from Spain (48 per cent; 16 + 32), Japan (45 per cent), and Romania (39 per cent). The share is lowest among migrants from the Philippines (12 per cent), Great Britain (16 per cent), and Turkey (17 per cent).

In the Comcon-data, we do not have a question about the feeling of belonging with Danes (as in the Mifare-data). Instead, we use a question about feeling of belonging with the country of origin. It does not make much of a difference as long as the national identities are one-dimensional, which we also find in elaborated analyses of the Comcon-data (not shown). The response categories were “very strong”, “fairly strong”, “not strong”, and “none”. Table 4.7 shows the distribution across the migrant groups; ranked after the share indicating “very strong”.

The most common answer is that the interviewed feel “fairly strong” or “not strong” belonging with their country of origin. The overall share is respectively 29 per cent and 42 per cent. We interpret this as dual-cultural in terms of national identity. The largest share with dual-cultural national identification is found among migrants from Pakistan (81 per cent, 43 + 38). The lowest share

Table 4.7 *Variation in national identification. Feeling of belonging to the country of origin (Comcon-data, per cent)*

	“Very strong”	“Fairly strong”	“Not strong”	“None”	Per cent	N
TUR	25	27	43	6	100	59
PAK	18	43	38	1	100	64
IRAQ	18	28	37	16	100	94
YOU	16	34	40	10	100	119
LBN	6	14	54	27	100	53
	16	29	42	13	100	389

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and Comcon survey (2015).

is found among migrants from Iraq (65 per cent; 28 + 37). As it was the case in the Mifare-data, it is a minority that has fully assimilated national identification; in the Comcon-data measured as having “none” for feeling of belonging with the country of origin. Overall, 13 per cent answer that they have “no” feeling of belonging towards the country of origin. The largest share with assimilated national identification is found among migrants from Lebanon (27 per cent). The lowest with assimilated national identification is found among migrants from Pakistan (1 per cent). The share with “very strong” feelings of belonging with the origin is a little higher; 16 per cent in the overall Comcon-data. This share is largest among migrants from Turkey (25 per cent) and lowest among migrants from Lebanon (6 per cent).

The overall conclusion is that differences in national identification seem smaller than differences in socio-economic positions. Thus, for all the 14 migrant groups, the typical response is dual cultural identification respectively with Denmark and the country of origin. Thus, in general, the migrants do not assimilate to only identifying with Denmark. This is hardly surprising as we study first-generation migrants. Whether this has an impact on migrants’ welfare attitudes will be analysed in the chapters to come.

THE MIXED MIGRATION

In the public debates, in statistical yearbooks, and even in research-based questionnaires, one often finds the term “immigrants”. Sometimes statistics are broken down to EU/non-EU immigrant, Western/non-Western migrants, or refugees/non-refugees. However, a closer look across and within different migrant groups reveals that migration into Northern European countries has become mixed. The chapter has demonstrated sizeable differences even within the group of first-generation migration in their working ages coming from the same country of origin. However, the chapter also found structural patterns

across the 14 selected groups, which underpin the most-different design logic of the book. Some groups, for example the migrants from Poland, come close to how work-migration within the EU is often imagined. Many of these migrants have only been in Denmark a few years, they have not naturalized, around half of the interviewed are single, most are wage earners and they have not assimilated to the secular beliefs of natives. Other groups, for example the migrants from Lebanon, come close to how forced migration is often imagined. Many from this group have been in Denmark since the civil wars in the 1980s, they have naturalized, their educational level is low, and many have not found their way into the labour market. They are also more religious than natives. However, for most of the 14 groups we interviewed, it is not easy to find one telling label for each group. The migrants from Russia, for example, arrived throughout the period since the end of the cold war, few have naturalized, most are women, most are highly educated, around half are wage earners, most live in mixed couples, and few are religious. As for the interviewed migrants from Pakistan, most are women, most are wage earners, most live in non-ethnic mixed couples, and most have arrived through family unification. Together with the migrants from Turkey, they are the most religious groups. Finally, it goes for the all the 14 migrant groups that they feel a mix of identification with both the country of origin and destination. The overall take-away message from this chapter is that we do indeed have most-different groups. Thereby we maximize potential differences in overall assimilation and assimilation related to welfare attitudes. In the next chapter, we describe the tax payments and the value of social benefits received by both natives and migrants in the working-age population living in Denmark, in order to specify variation in different migrant groups' vested interest in the Danish welfare state.

5. The mixed self-interest in the welfare state

In this chapter, we describe the wage income, benefit incomes, and tax payments of the 14 migrant groups of the book. This information is available to us via the register data linked to the original survey data. Typically, surveys only include rough measures of self-assessed income. The register data allow for a more precise and fine-grained description of taxes and various kinds of income. This is useful not only for the descriptive intents of this chapter but also for later analyses of the effects of socio-economic factors (box 3 in Figure 1.1, in Chapter 1) on welfare attitudes (box 1). The register data will further highlight how our surveys cover an array of apparently quite different migrant groups. A few of these groups are very similar to native Danes as regards the wages and benefits they receive as well as the taxes they pay. A few of the groups earn little in wage incomes, pay little in taxes, and are generally very dependent on welfare benefits. Most of the groups have relatively low wage incomes, but also receive a little less in income benefits than native Danes. Thus, the various groups have different levels of vested interests in the Danish welfare state.

In the literature, various indicators of individual socio-economic position (SEP) are typically included as variables to investigate the role of self-interest from a rational choice perspective. It is sometimes simply assumed that individuals with low SEP stand to gain more from a welfare state and therefore they are generally in favour of welfare benefits and services. However, benefit reciprocity, which we can capture in nuance with the Danish register data, is a more precise and valid indicator when seeking to sort out self-interest. Since some migrant backgrounds face many barriers for labour market entry, and so may on average be more dependent on the welfare state, migrant status by itself has sometimes been used as an indicator of self-interest for a high-risk group (Blomberg, Kallio, Kangas, Kroll, & Niemelä, 2012). This is also too simple. Others have considered individual differences in SEP for migrants. Reeskens & van Oorschot (2015), for instance, find that differences in SEP relate modestly to welfare attitudes among migrants across European countries. This chapter proceeds to operationalize indicators that are better suited to assess the potential effect of self-interest. Utilizing the register data, we can, at the individual level, precisely measure different kinds of benefits and

the amounts received, as well as taxes paid. For instance, this chapter will show how particularly migrants from Great Britain and the US gain very little from the Danish welfare state, while they pay more in taxes due to high wage incomes. Most of the other groups in the Mifare survey earn smaller wages relative to native Danes, but they are not necessarily more dependent on the welfare state. Often, they receive a little less in income benefits as well. The migrant groups from the Comcon survey, however, are generally more reliant on public income benefits, while fewer earn wage incomes. This applies particularly to the migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Lebanon.

The chapter starts by outlining the entitlement criteria for various income benefits in Denmark while paying special attention to residency requirements that in particular affect migrants' access to the benefits. The remaining bulk of the chapter describes differences across our 14 migrant groups concerning wage income, benefit income, and tax payments. It should be noted that we do not include data on the consumption of public services such as education, healthcare, or care services for children and the elderly. Such measures are not readily available with register data, or rather, they further require complicated assumptions and estimates concerning the value of these services (Verbist, 2017). Generally, various studies in the field find that public services further reduce inequality (Verbist, 2017). This applies to Denmark as well (Ploug, 2017). However, there is no doubt that our migrant groups and respondents also vary significantly concerning their consumption of public services, and these variations may not simply follow the pattern that we see with regards to income benefits. Finally, it should be noted that both benefits and services might have an insurance effect, that is, they might have value even for those who do not consume these benefits and services at the moment. Thus, it is by no means an easy task to calculate how the institutional structure of destination countries (box 4 in Figure 1.1) shapes migrants' self-interest in the welfare state. However, the chapter establishes some first rough estimates for the Danish context.

INCOME BENEFITS AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN WORKING AGE

The income benefits we will cover here are unemployment insurance, social assistance, and disability pension. These are the main benefit schemes for working-age people who are either considered unemployed (unemployment insurance and recipients of social assistance deemed "ready for work") or outside of the labour force (disability pension and recipients of social assistance deemed "ready for activity", that is, training, activation, and subsidized employment). We also provide information on the major supplementary benefits that are not particular to labour market status and may be combined with

the other schemes, namely child support and housing benefits. Later analyses in this chapter will divide benefit incomes into these schemes.

Generally, there is some degree of myth-making regarding the generosity of income benefits in Denmark and the Nordic countries. When measured via compensation rates, that is, benefits levels in relation to previous wages, most income benefits for working-age people in Denmark and the other Nordic countries (except Norway) have regressed towards the OECD average over the last few decades (Dølvik, Andersen, & Vartiainen, 2015; Kongshøj, 2014; Pedersen & Kuhnle, 2017). The particularities of the “Nordic model” are more evident in other areas of social policy. What has been a Nordic particularity is the coverage or inclusivity rather than the generosity; meaning that very few have been excluded altogether from either the labour market or access to social benefits and services. This characteristic still applies to some extent. However, a series of reforms within the last decade also have resulted in a more insecure situation for some groups, particularly long-term unemployed or people who previously would be eligible for disability pensions (Dølvik, Andersen, & Vartiainen, 2015; Kongshøj, 2014). There have also been several reforms in Denmark, which directly reduce migrants’ entitlements to social assistance. Table 5.1 describes the eligibility rules, with special attention to rules directed at immigrants, and general benefit amounts as they were in 2018. It should be noted that the rules apply to 2018 and that some of them were slightly different in 2015/2014 when the two surveys were fielded. These differences are summarized in Table 5.1.

Over time, the general trend has been towards lower benefit levels and stricter eligibility rules. Rules that additionally affect immigrants are noteworthy. In social assistance there has been some degree of political contestation and policy fluctuation; lower benefit levels targeting immigrants were first adopted in 1998 and removed again in 2000 by the same centre-left government. A new right-wing government re-introduced this measure in 2002, but it was abolished in 2011 when a centre-left coalition came to power once again. After government power switched back towards the right in 2015, the present “integration assistance” was adopted (Breidahl, 2012; Schultz-Nielsen & Hansen, 2017). The benefit was reduced further in 2019 and re-named “repatriation benefit” for people with a refugee background. As regards other income benefits, new or stricter residency requirements have been a more recent, but steady trend. Residency requirements for full child support were introduced in 2010 and were raised to the present six years (within the most recent ten years) from 2018 (Table 5.1). In 2017, it was decided that the present 4/5-requirement for full disability benefits (as explained in the table) would be raised to a 9/10 requirement from 2019. Migrants with a refugee background were previously exempted from the residency requirements for full disability (and old age) pension indicated in Table 5.1, but this exemption was removed in 2015 for

Table 5.1 Social rights for major income benefits for people of working age (2018)

<i>Unemployment insurance</i>	<i>Social assistance</i>	<i>Disability pension</i>	<i>Child support</i>	<i>Housing benefits</i>
Eligibility				
Membership of a voluntary unemployment fund for at least 1 year (students exempted).	Residual benefit if no qualification for other benefits in the case of a social event (unemployment, sickness, etc.). Must be available for job or participate in activation/ training measures.	Municipal rehabilitation teams decide if health or employability is sufficiently and permanently reduced.	General child benefits: All children younger than 18. Supplemental child benefits: May be applied for by single parents, pensioners with children, parents in education, or parents of twins/triplets.	All forms of rental housing are eligible. Old age or disability pensioners may also be eligible in other forms of housing.
At least 228,000 DKK of wage income within past 3 years (full-time benefits).	Not eligible if total personal assets are worth more than 10,000 DKK (generally). Municipalities may disregard certain assets necessary to retain certain standards of living or employment/ education opportunities.	If applicant is younger than 40, it must be proven that there is no future employability.		
Benefit duration is minimum 2 years, prolonged by double the amount of work hours since the beginning of benefit receipt.		Benefit is only granted after at least one "resource procedure". The content is determined individually and may consist of participation in different initiatives within health, education, employment training, etc.		
Subsequent re-qualification is 1,924 hours of work within the past 3 years (full-time benefits).				
Must be actively looking for a job.				

<i>Unemployment insurance</i>	<i>Social assistance</i>	<i>Disability pension</i>	<i>Child support</i>	<i>Housing benefits</i>
	Residency requirements, etc., for immigrants			
Work periods from other EU/EEA countries may be included in the work criterion if member of a Danish employment fund for at least 1 year. If not, at least 3 months of employment must have been in Denmark when fulfilling the work criterion (full-time benefits).	Reduced "integration assistance" if residency time in Denmark is less than 7 years within the previous 8 years (not applicable to EU/EEA citizens). Between 6,200 and 12,300 DKK/month, depending on marital and parental status. Benefits may be raised by 1,600 DKK upon completion of a language test.	Danish citizenship required. Intra-EU/EEA work-mobility exempted. Immigrants with more than 10 years of residency since 15 years of age exempted. Benefits reduced gradually (for all immigrants) if residency period in Denmark corresponds to less than 4/5 of the time since 15 years of age. No benefits if residency in DK is less than 3 years since 15 years of age.	Residency requirement of at least 1 year; 3 years for special child benefits. Benefits reduced gradually if residency in Denmark (or EU/EEA) is less than 6 years within the previous 10 years. No benefits if residency is less than 2 years.	

<i>Unemployment insurance</i>	<i>Social assistance</i>	<i>Disability pension</i>	<i>Child support</i>	<i>Housing benefits</i>
General amounts				
90% of previous work income up to a ceiling of 18,600 DKK monthly (full-time benefits). The vast majority of the workforce simply receive 18,600 DKK monthly.	15,000 DKK monthly for parents; 11,300 DKK if no children. Benefits significantly reduced below 30 years of age. A "benefit ceiling" means that recipients de facto will not receive (significant) supplementary benefits – besides child support (which is exempted from the ceiling). If below 30 years, however, the ceiling allows for some supplementary benefits. After 1 year of receiving SA benefits, a "225-hour rule" requires 225 hours of work within the past year. If the requirement is not met, the SA benefit is lost for cohabitating people. For singles, the benefit is reduced by up to 1,000 DKK.	Different levels depending on marital status and whether old benefit rules may apply; generally 15,000 DKK to 20,000 DKK monthly. When participating in "resource procedure" the amount is generally 11,200 DKK or 15,000 DKK monthly, depending on marital status.	General child benefits: Age graded. Maximum is 1,500 DKK monthly for each child 0–2 years, minimum is 900 DKK 7–17 years (2018). Reduced by 2% of any private income above 766,000 DKK annually for each parent in the household. Supplemental child benefits: At least 500 DKK monthly for each child, may be higher in some circumstances for pensions, students, etc.	Dependent on household income, wealth, the number of adults and children in the household and the size of the residence (different formulas apply). Maximum 4,500 DKK monthly for parents (max 1,000 DKK if no children). Maximum of 5,000 DKK (max 3,600–4,000 if no children) for old age and disability pensioners.

Note: The legislation applies to 2018, while the two surveys were conducted in 2015/2014. The legislation back then deviated from Table 5.1 in the following ways: (1) Unemployment insurance: Access did not depend on an income criterion, but a work criterion of 1,924 hours (as required for re-qualification). No possibilities for extending benefit duration beyond 2 years. (2) Social assistance: Reduced "integration assistance", the "benefit ceiling" and the "225-hour rule" had not yet been adopted. However, the "integration assistance" had been implemented from 1 September 2015, just a few months before the survey went out. (3) Disability pension: Refugees were exempted for the residency requirement. (4) Child support: The residency requirement was at least 2 years within the previous 10 years.

Source: Data collected from Borger.dk (2020) and star.dk (2020).

the old age pension, and later in 2018 for disability pension (the exemption was first removed in 2011, but the centre-left coalition that came to power that same year re-instated it in 2014).

MEASURES OF TAXES AND BENEFITS

The remainder of the chapter will show how our 14 immigrant groups and natives differ across nine measures of wages, taxes, and benefits. In Denmark, a few public reports on net contributions of migrants have figured prominently in public debates (Finansministeriet, 2018; Schultz-Nielsen & Tranæs, 2014; Wadensjö & Orrje, 2002). What we know from these reports lead us to expect considerable variation across our 14 migrant groups, and also a more basic divide between the migrant groups in the two surveys. We can broadly expect the Comcon nationalities to exhibit high amounts of benefit receipt and lower tax payments. The aforementioned reports routinely divide the immigrant population into Western and non-Western origins. The Ministry of Finance (Finansministeriet, 2018) and Schultz-Nielsen and Tranæs (2014) estimate large net public deficits for non-Western immigrants, and Comcon includes the five biggest nationalities from this group. The immigrants from Mifare are different in this respect, even though Mifare contains both so-called Western and non-Western immigrants. For instance, the Ministry of Finance (Finansministeriet, 2018) estimated that non-Western immigrants and descendants in total resulted in a net deficit of 36 billion DKK (4.8 billion EUR) in 2015. The figure for Western immigrants and descendants was a plus of 3 billion DKK (0.4 billion EUR). The figures include estimations of consumption of public services in addition to income benefits. Interestingly, both the Ministry of Finance (Finansministeriet, 2018) and Schultz-Nielsen and Tranæs (2014) show that most of the net deficit for non-Western descendants is simply due to the age composition of the group (most of them are below 18 years, and nearly all are below 40 years). When age is considered, non-Western descendants are significantly better integrated into the labour market, resulting in much smaller negative net contributions. The projections of Schultz-Nielsen & Tranæs (2014) even estimated a small positive net-contribution from non-Western descendants by 2050. When distinguishing between migrant groups, all five groups covered by the Comcon survey exhibit significant negative net contributions per capita according to the Ministry of Finance (Finansministeriet, 2018), particularly migrants from Iraq and Lebanon. Among the groups covered by the Mifare survey, migrants of Turkish origin (which are also in Comcon) exhibit a negative net contribution, while most of the other groups show small negative or positive net contributions. American and British immigrants show relatively high positive net

contributions. Estimations for Japanese immigrants are not included, probably because the group is quite small.

The calculations by the Ministry of Finance provide a basic insight into the net contribution from the 14 migrant groups covered by the book. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the book only includes analyses of the first-generation migrants, which have been sampled in a particular way. Furthermore, the book only covers the migrants in the age group from 18 to 60 years old. Therefore, we provide a more detailed description of the respondents in the survey. As regards the specific measures in this chapter, we start by including wages. Work income can then be compared later on with social benefits. It should be noted that this does not include other sources of private income beyond wages. In other words, we have no indication of capital incomes, and so on. This means that we cannot see whether a few very rich people have been included in the survey. In addition, we can show total tax payments (from all sources of income). While income taxes are not high in general in Denmark, and both low-, mid-, and high-wage groups end up with a total income tax rate somewhat below the OECD average, the marginal tax for high incomes is somewhat above the OECD average (OECD, 2020c). Five other variables cover total benefits received as well as five sub-components. Three variables decompose total benefits into: (1) unemployment insurance, social assistance, and related benefits (see note to Table 5.2 for details), (2) disability pension, and (3) other benefits (see note to Table 5.2 for details). From “other benefits” we will also distinguish the two major forms of support outlined in Table 5.1, namely child support and housing subsidies. Finally, an overall measure subtracts income benefits from taxes. This variable simply indicates whether an individual gains more from the welfare in benefits than he or she pays in taxes. It should be emphasized once again that this book does not cover the consumption of public services. Table 5.2 shows us how all of the above measures vary by the survey respondents (weighted) and Figures 5.1 to 5.6 visualize the most important variations across the groups. We use an average over the year of the survey study and the two years before, that is, figures from 2012 to 2014 for the Comcon migrants and 2013 to 2015 for the Mifare migrants.

When considering Figures 5.1 and 5.2, we see a picture across nationalities that broadly match what we should expect based on the Ministry of Finance (Finansministeriet, 2018). The average migrant from the US or Great Britain looks very similar to an average native Dane in terms of wages, taxes, and benefits. Many of the other migrant groups from the Mifare survey do not exhibit very noticeable differences from the Danes as regards income benefits, but their wages are smaller. Migrants from Russia, however, do receive more in income benefits. The migrant groups from the Comcon survey (including Turkey in both surveys), on the other hand, receive both noticeably more in income benefits and less in wage incomes, particularly migrants from Iraq and

Table 5.2 *Average wage, benefits, and income taxes per year over a three-year period (DKK)*


Country	(1) Wage income	(2) Taxes	(3) Total benefits (4+5+6)	(4) Unemployment benefits and social assist. ¹	(5) Disability	(6) Other benefits (7+8+ others) ²	(7) Child support	(8) Housing subsidies	(9) Benefits minus taxes (3-2)
				Comcon survey (2012-2014)					
DNK	279131	114480	39121	16086	8638	14397	5604	1114	-75359
YOU	153105	76086	89738	41233	34385	14120	5728	1228	13652
LBN	93902	53944	106713	37520	34496	34697	9522	8366	52769
IRQ	71342	54126	138703	70958	44951	22794	11626	7852	84577
PAK	172823	69976	49008	25533	7182	16293	7627	3400	-20968
TUR	163263	63135	54890	29218	8725	16947	7941	3984	-8245
				Mifare survey (2013-2015)					
DNK	308796	130032	37715	14344	11134	12237	4399	1212	-92317
POL	216423	80889	34928	22360	1404	11164	5484	1611	-45961
ROU	155798	53597	37190	19858	0	17332	3517	1285	-16407
ESP	199444	73167	25319	13157	1283	10879	3197	680	-47848
GBR	308298	125059	28660	17578	3377	7705	2867	767	-96399
TUR	124048	59357	76119	39423	20959	15737	8332	2831	16762
USA	254574	101081	21795	14195	657	6943	3203	592	-79286
JPN	164356	60751	24009	9998	111	13900	7470	1068	-36742
CHN	179292	67411	28549	15578	514	12457	5658	691	-38862

Country	(1) Wage income	(2) Taxes	(3) Total benefits (4+5+6)	(4) Unemployment benefits and social assist. ¹	(5) Disability	(6) Other benefits (7+8+ others) ²	(7) Child support	(8) Housing subsidies	(9) Benefits minus taxes (3-2)
PHL	131524	44933	20838	9246	279	11313	4824	359	-24095
RUS	178423	72021	54648	28551	2251	23846	10056	3329	-17373

Notes: Weighted results (see Chapter 3) for native Danes and migrants aged 18–60 years.
¹Unemployment insurance, social assistance (regardless of status as unemployed or not), “integration benefit” (lowered social assistance for immigrants and returning Danish expatriates), leave benefits (sickness and maternity).
²Student allowance, housing subsidy, child support, and other benefits.
Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and Comcon survey (2015).


Lebanon. As mentioned before, we should also expect these two nationalities to be particularly noticeable when considering the report from the Ministry of Finance (Finansministeriet, 2018).

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 also show the income level when adding together wages and benefits, and subtracting the taxes paid in Denmark. When considering taxes, transfers, and wages as a measure of total disposable income, we notice the levelling effect of the welfare state. Disposable incomes are not that different for migrants in the Comcon survey, while there is more variation for migrants in the Mifare survey. This mainly reflects that the Comcon groups, have come to Denmark mostly via asylum or family reunification as described in the previous chapter. This picture might change in the future, considering the stricter residency requirements described in Table 5.1 and the removal of exemptions for refugees. The Mifare migrants, on the other hand, are presumably segregated into different wage segments on the labour market, and their generally employment-related migration means that they are not covered by the welfare state to the same extent. Hence, we see bigger differences in incomes. The poorest immigrants are the Japanese and Filipinos, while the richest are, as expected, the British.



Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 5.1 Wages, benefits, and taxes (DKK, annual averages 2012–2014), Comcon




Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 5.2 Wages, benefits, and taxes (DNK, annual averages 2012–2014), Mifare

Figures 5.3 and 5.4 further decompose benefits into various types of benefit and show tax payments compared to the benefits received. Among the Comcon migrants, the migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Lebanon are particularly overrepresented in disability benefits, but also unemployment insurance and social assistance. The migrants from Lebanon exhibit very high reciprocity of all these benefits. For the Mifare migrants, on the other hand, reciprocity of disability benefits is relatively low (except for migrants from Turkey). Here, variations in benefit incomes generally reflect variations in receipt of unemployment insurance and social assistance. Migrants from Poland and Russia receive relatively high amounts of these benefits.

The two figures also compare taxes with income benefits and present a measure of the extent to which respondents receive more in benefits than they pay in taxes (note once again that public services are not included here). For the Comcon survey, we find that the average native Dane of working age pays much more in taxes than he or she receives in benefits, while the migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Lebanon receive more in benefits than they pay in taxes. For the Mifare survey, the pattern corresponds to what we should expect based on our previous observations. For most of these groups, the difference between taxes and benefits is smaller than for native Danes. American and British migrants, however, are once again more similar to the native Danes.




Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 5.3 Benefit types and taxes (DNK, annual averages 2012–2014), Comcon


Besides averages across groups, there is naturally variation within our 14 migrant groups. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 depict the variation in wage income by migrant group. Benefits are not shown since variation by nationalities are relatively small and follow what would be expected from the previous figures. Taxes, unsurprisingly, mirror the wage variations below.

For native Danes (both surveys), we notice a group of people without any wage income, whereas the rest of our respondents exhibit a normal distribution, with a big group of wage earners between 300,000 and 400,000 DKK annually. The right tail of the distribution – high wage earners – is small, but long. Notice that the graphs have been capped at one million DKK. In other words, for better visualization of the distribution (shorter scale), respondents earning more than a million DKK are not included here. This affects primarily the British and American samples, where eight and seven millionaires respectively constitute 3.1 and 3.4 per cent of the survey respondents. In both Mifare and Comcon, they constitute 1.6 per cent of the native Danish samples. Other migrant groups in our surveys include 0 to 1 per cent millionaires.




Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 5.4 Benefit types and taxes (DKK, annual averages 2012–2014), Mifare



Graphs by origin country
Note: Unweighted results for survey respondents.
Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 5.5 Variation in annual average wages before taxes (2012–2014, DKK), Comcon



Note: Unweighted results for the survey respondents.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 5.6 Variation in annual average wages before taxes (2013–2015, DKK), Mifare

As expected from previous figures, we identify the biggest group of non-wage earners among migrants for Iraq and Lebanon. In the Mifare-data, non-wage earners are most widespread among the migrants for Turkey. However, in both surveys, we also see that a group of Turkish immigrants are relatively successful with mid-level or high wages. We also see that most migrant groups have relatively few high-wage earners. The exceptions are migrants from the US or Britain, where we see a sizeable group of wage earners above 500,000 DKK. Among some of the group from the Mifare survey (Spain, Great Britain, USA, Japan, and China), we also see that wage variations are relatively large without any of the noticeable or pronounced peaks that we know from the standard normal distribution. The Eastern European migrants (Poland, Romania, and Russia), but also immigrants from the Philippines, on the other hand, are more concentrated around the low end of the wage scale.

THE DANISH WELFARE STATE AND MIGRANTS' SELF-INTERESTS

Traditional indicators of SEP are relatively poor indicators of potential self-interest concerning the welfare state. This book takes advantage of the

possibilities that follow from linking survey to register data, and defines a range of measures of wages, benefits, and taxes that allow us to approach potential self-interest as closely as possible. Across the two surveys, the 14 migrant groups constitute a diverse array of groups vis-à-vis taxes paid and benefits received. Compared to the native Danes, the non-Western or Middle-Eastern migrants in the Comcon survey are quite reliant on income benefits, while wages, on the other hand, play a significantly smaller role as a source of income. This is most pronounced for migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and particularly Lebanon. In the Mifare survey, the migrants from Asia, Eastern Europe, or Western countries receive a little less in income benefits, generally due to a smaller incidence of disability benefits, but their wages are often smaller as well. Migrants from the US and Great Britain, however, provide the biggest contrast to the Comcon migrants as their taxes paid and benefits received are similar to that of native Danes.

The overall conclusion of the chapter is that, as discussed in Chapter 2, the welfare institutions of the destination country do indeed influence SEP and thereby also the self-interest of various groups. This chapter has shown that access to benefits is conditioned on several specific criteria despite Denmark being categorized as a social-democratic universal welfare regime (see Chapters 1 and 2). The tightening of these criteria over the last two decades means that “free lunches” are rare; especially so for migrants relying on social assistance. However, we do study groups of migrants who receive more in benefits than they pay in taxes. Following the self-interest perspective discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, this would lead to attitudes in favour of the Danish welfare state. We also study groups of migrants who receive less in benefits than they pay in taxes, which within a self-interest perspective would lead to attitudes opposing the Danish welfare state. In the following chapter, we will see whether the migrants from the US and Great Britain are critical of the welfare state, while migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and Lebanon are the most supportive of the welfare state. Furthermore, we will include the established indicators as control variables in the analyses to come, that is, we will describe how various variables, primarily the country of origin, are correlated with migrants' welfare attitudes controlled for self-interest effects. Following the discussion in Chapter 2, this is a way, far from a perfect one though, to distinguish between the logic of consequentiality theorized by rational choice institutionalism and the logic of appropriateness theorized by sociological institutionalism.

PART III

6. Migrants' trust in Danish institutions

Whether migrants assimilate to the welfare attitudes of native Danes is intimately linked to trust in state institutions. Trust in public institutions and those in charge of them is pivotal for public support for building and maintaining a welfare state. This is one of the most basic theoretical arguments derived from rational choice-inspired political scientists (Levi, 1997). Corruption and arbitrariness in public administration makes the public question whether taxes are collected and spent/redistributed in a procedurally just and efficient way. Thus, institutional trust is believed to be a necessary condition for supporting a welfare state (Larsen, 2008; Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009; Rothstein, 1998). The argument goes that even a person highly in favour of the moral principle of redistribution from rich to poor will not support state intervention if he or she distrusts state institutions (Svallfors, 2013). Even the most altruistic person will refrain from being the sucker that supports a corrupt and inefficient system. Attitudes towards redistribution are analysed in Chapter 8. In the Danish context, it is primarily a matter of evaluating and maintaining an existing welfare state; it is not about building a welfare state from scratch. Whether institutional trust is a sufficient condition for supporting a welfare state is more questionable, especially the redistributive elements.

Denmark is not just a country with the normal European standard of institutional quality. It is known to be a best-case for the absence of corruption and arbitrariness in the public administration (Fukuyama, 2011; Jensen, 2013). From 2012 to 2016 Denmark was ranked as the country perceived to be the least corrupt in the world by Transparency International. Denmark is together with Norway and Sweden also ranked at the top by the World Governance Indicators. That native Scandinavians have high institutional trust is well-described in previous research, while the institutional trust of migrants is less explored. Previous research in other destination country contexts has found that migrants display higher trust in destination state institutions than natives do. Mexicans in the US (Weaver, 2003; Wenzel, 2006), migrants from non-democratic countries in Canada (Bilodeau & Nevitte, 2003), and Caribbeans and South Asians in the UK (Maxwell, 2008) are found to have higher trust in destination country institutions than natives. The same has been found in the European context, based on the heterogeneous pool of migrants responding to the general European Social Survey (Maxwell, 2010; Röder & Mührlau, 2011; 2012) and in a Danish survey study comparing a number of


migrants, descendants, and native Danes (Gundelach & Nørregård-Nielsen, 2007). The higher institutional trust among migrants is somewhat puzzling as (the studied) migrants have a lower socio-economic status than natives (see previous chapter) and potentially have experiences with discrimination in the destination country context. The dominant explanation for the puzzle has been that migrants use the state institutions in their country of origin as a reference point. This interpretation is supported by the empirical findings: (1) that migrants' institutional trust is less dependent on (lower) socio-economic position (SEP) and (negative) evaluation of concrete policies in destination countries than is the institutional trust of natives, (2) that the difference between natives and migrants is largest upon arrival, (3) that the difference diminishes with the length of stay in the destination country (Maxwell, 2010; Röder & Mühlau, 2012; Weaver, 2003; Wenzel, 2006), and (4) that the difference is absent among descendants (Röder & Mühlau, 2012). More directly, Röder and Mühlau (2012) found that the difference between the quality of origin and destination countries (measured by the World Governance Indicators, WGI) helped to explain the higher institutional trust among migrants, in the overall European context. They also found the expected effect of acculturation, measured by the length of stay, language skills, and citizenship. The longer the migrants had stayed in the destination country and the better they spoke the native language, the lower trust they had in the institutions of the destination country.

From the previous research on migrants' institutional trust and our knowledge of the Danish context, one might arrive at different expectations. Based solely on previous research in different contexts, the standard expectation would be: (1) that migrants in Denmark indicate higher institutional trust than natives do, (2) that migrants' institutional trust in destination country institutions varies reversely with conditions in the country of origin, and (3) that migrants' "over-confidence" in destination country institutions declines with length of stay and identification with Denmark. Another perspective is that the institutional quality of the Danish destination country is so genuine that it will be difficult to find these general effects. This might be caused by migrants' and natives' actual experiences with the Danish institutional context. As already mentioned in Chapter 2, there is previous evidence that migrants' experiences with high-quality Swedish universal services such as childcare, libraries, hospitals, and the national dental service seem to increase interpersonal trust (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005). Thus, it is plausible that personal experiences with Danish public institutions could generate institutional trust. However, there might also be a more social constructivist perspective emphasizing interpretation. One could imagine that the presence of a large developed welfare state underpins the perception that natives, with a lifelong experience of living in this institutional context, apparently have faith in these state institutions,

that they apparently pay into them, and that the track-record of economic prosperity and a well-functioning society could be assigned to institutional quality. This might set Denmark and the other Nordic countries apart from other contexts, where the quality of the destination country institutions is lower and where migrants will come to discover that natives display limited trust in their own institutions; for example, the case where Mexicans acculturate in the American context or where Romanians acculturate in the Italian context. Thus, based on our contextual knowledge about Denmark, our more context-specific expectations are: (4) that migrants' "over-confidence" is absent as native Danes also display exceptional high trust in state institutions, (5) that the effect from differences in the institutional quality of the origin country is limited as the difference between these countries and Denmark, in any case, is sizeable, and (6) that migrants' institutional trust does not decline over time and with destination-country national identification.

PERCEPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY – OVERALL PATTERNS IN THE MIFARE-DATA

From the Mifare survey we use a standard International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)-item about the perceived number of politicians involved in corruption as a rough measure of perception of overall trust in public institutions. The answers have been transformed into a scale from 0 to 100, where an average score of 0 would indicate that "almost none" and 100 that "almost all" politicians are involved in corruption (see note to Figure 6.1). As expected, the perception of corruption is by international standards very low in Denmark. In the ISSP data from 2016 (a representative sample of all adult Danes), the score is 21. It is the lowest measured in any of the 35 countries that conducted the ISSP survey in 2016. In the Mifare native control group (natives, 18–60 years old), the score is 27, that is, somewhat higher but still low by international standards. In the migrants' country of origin, the average perception of corruption is higher. Figure 6.1 is sorted after the score measured in 2016 for the eight available countries. In the countries of origin, the lowest level of perceived corruption was found in Great Britain (46) followed by Japan (56) and the US (57). The highest score was found in Spain (81) followed by the Philippines (72) and Russia (71). Thus, perception of corruption is more widespread in all countries of origin (we assume Romania and China included) but it still comes with large variations. The difference between the score in Great Britain (46) and Spain (81) is 35 (81–46). If one turns to the answers behind the scale, 5 per cent of the British (living in Great Britain) answer "almost all", while the same score is 41 per cent of the Spaniards (living in Spain). Thus, judged by the perception of corruption in the country of origin, the surveyed migrant groups do indeed represent, if not "most different", then at least "different" cases.



Note: Migrants living in Denmark (Mifare survey) and in the country of origin (ISSP survey on the role of government). Scale ranging from “Almost none” (0) to “Almost all” (100).

Source: Data collected from the ISSP Role of Government Module V (ISSP Research Group, 2018), except for Poland which is from the ISSP Role of Government Module IV (ISSP Research Group, 2008).


Figure 6.1 Perception of the number of politicians involved in corruption

The perception of corruption in Denmark among the ten migrant groups living in Denmark is low and on average seemingly lower than among natives. The average scores vary between 17 (China) and 30 (Poland). There is a tendency to lower scores among migrants from countries of origin with a widespread perception of corruption. Whether this is significant after control for composition effects remains to be seen. If the native Danes in the Mifare-data are used as a reference, there is a tendency to less perception of corruption among migrants from China, Spain, and Russia, while there seems to be no difference to migrants from Poland, Turkey, US, Japan, Great Britain, and the Philippines. Whether this holds true after control for composition effects also remains to be seen. In any case, at first sight, Figure 6.1 displays all the three indicators we have for assimilation, see Chapter 1. The difference between migrants in Denmark and the residents of their origin country is sizeable, the difference between migrants and native Danes seems minor, and the differences between the (most different) migrant groups living in Denmark also seem minor.

PERCEPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY – PATTERNS IN THE MIFARE-DATA

The patterns of perceived corruption in the Mifare-data is further explored by means of (OLS) regression, as it allows for cross-model comparison. The binary model in Figure 6.2 simply tests the statistical significance of the score differences between the average of the migrant groups and the Mifare native reference group in Figure 6.1. Migrants from China (-10.2), Spain (-9.8), Russia (-4.8), and Romania (-4.1) indicate significantly less perception of corruption among Danish politicians than natives do. This is in line with previous research that finds more institutional trust among migrants. However, for the six other migrant groups, there is no significant difference relative to the natives, and the overall explained variation of the binary model is low (0.04). This supports the proposition that it is difficult for migrants to have over-confidence in comparison to a group of natives with extremely low levels of perceptions of corruption. In general, the country of origin is a bad predictor of the assessment of corruption among Danish politicians. The composition model in Figure 6.2 controls for different composition of gender, age, education, income, employment, and household composition. There is no effect from gender, age, and household composition. Being highly educated and having a high income reduces perceptions of corruption (coefficients not shown in the figure). However, these individual background variables are also bad predictors of perception of corruption, as seen in the very small increase in explained variation (from 4 to 5 per cent). That there is little effect from the SEP on migrants' institutional trust is also in line with previous research. The main result is that the limited effects from the country of origin are not altered much. Thus, also after control for composition effects, migrants from China, Spain, Russia, and Romania are significantly less inclined than natives to indicate corruption while there is no significant difference between natives and the six other migrant groups included in the model. Furthermore, the "over-confidence" of migrants is at maximum only around 10 points on a scale from 0 to 100. For example, migrants from Spain indicate 8.4 points less corruption (controlled for composition effects) than native Danes in the Mifare-data. However, in the ISSP, the difference between native Danes and residents living in Spain is around 60 points. Thus, despite significant differences in the Mifare-data, there are clear indications of assimilation to the institutional trust levels of native Danes.

The models shown in Figure 6.3 only include migrants as indicators of years in the country and national identification is not meaningful for natives. The "binary model" shows that there are some significant variations across the groups; migrants from Poland are used as a reference in order to maximize




Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing Danes (vertical line) to the migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=2,769.
Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 6.2 Perception of the number of politicians involved in corruption (0–100 scale)

differences. Migrants born in China (-13.4), Spain (-13.0), Russia (-7.6), Romania (-8.2), and the US (-4.8) are significantly less inclined to find Danish politicians corrupt relative to migrants born in Poland. This gives some support to the idea that the institutional trust of migrants varies across groups. However, again the differences are modest, and the explained variation is low. Control for background variables in the “composition model” does not alter the pattern, despite the effect of being a migrant from the US turning insignificantly. Thus, the difference across migrants *cannot* be explained with differences in their SEP in Denmark.

The next model in Figure 6.3 includes years since the first settlement in Denmark. In line with previous research, we find a significant effect (controlled for background variables). The coefficient is 0.16. The longer the time since the first settlement, the larger the perception of corruption in the destination country. However, again the effect is not large, and the explanatory power of the model is modest. Being ten years in Denmark is estimated to increase the perception of corruption with a 1.6 percentage point on the scale from 0 to 100 (10×0.16). That the relationship is so weak supports the proposition that Denmark is a context where the higher trust in destination country institutions



Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing migrants from Poland (vertical line) to other migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=2,464. All models controlled for gender, age, wage-income, benefits, education (in three brackets) and employment situation (degree of employment), household composition.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 6.3 *Perception of the number of politicians involved in corruption (0–100 scale)*


does not fade out as it tends to do in other contexts. This is also seen by the fact that including years since the first settlement does not help to explain (the minor) differences in perception of corruption between migrants from Poland and those from Romania, Spain, China, and Russia. Thus, it is not a matter of the latter groups being longer in Denmark than migrants from Poland. The next model includes our 5-point scale indicator for national identification (and excludes years in the country). The model shows a significant negative correlation with perceptions of corruption. The coefficient is -1.2 (after control for background variables). Thus, the stronger the identification with Danes, the lower the perception of Danish politicians being corrupt. Thus, in contrast to the international findings, the tendency is, in Denmark, that those migrants that identify more with the destination country assess the institutional quality of Denmark to be higher than those identifying less with Denmark. The effect of going from “not at all” feeling a belonging with Danes to “very close” is estimated to 4.8 points of the 0–100 scale (4 times 1.2). The last model in Figure 6.3, the “Full model”, shows that the two latter effects are significant

when included in the same model. In fact, they are strengthened a little. So, the general effect of becoming more sceptical about destination country institutions over time is moderated by increased destination country identification, which in Denmark goes together with higher trust in institutions. Finally, additional analyses indicate no effect from holding citizenship, no effect from language skills, and a weak effect from religiosity (the more religious, the lower institutional trust). However, again Figure 6.3 and the additional analyses clearly indicate that (the minor) differences between migrants from Poland and migrants from Romania, Spain, China, and Russia are not a matter of the latter groups feeling a stronger attachment to Danes, having spent more time in Denmark, or variations in language skills and religiosity.

PERCEPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY – OVERALL PATTERNS IN THE COMCON-DATA

In the Comcon survey, we use a question about overall satisfaction with the way democracy works in Denmark as a measure of perception of overall distrust in public institutions. This is supplemented with analyses of trust in fair treatment in the public administration (see below). We do not have these questions asked in international surveys in the country of origin, as it was the case for eight of the Mifare countries. As an alternative, Figure 6.4 includes the WGI indicator for “voice and accountability” for the five origin countries. We use the rank the country has from 0 (the best-ranked country) to 100 (the worst-ranked country) among the world's countries; 2016 estimates. Denmark was in 2016 ranked as a country in the best first percentile in terms of “voice and accountability”, only surpassed by Norway and Sweden. The five Comcon origin countries belong to the group with little voice and accountability. Bosnia-Herzegovina is ranked in the 58th percentile, that is, 58 per cent of the world's countries are judged to have better voice and accountability. Iraq is ranked in the 78th percentile, that is, 78 per cent of countries are ranked better. Lebanon, Turkey, and Pakistan are ranged to be around the 70th percentile. Figure 6.4 is ordered after this score in the WGI. Thus, in terms of the institutional quality of the country of origin, there is less variation in the Comcon-data than was the case in the Mifare-data. Bosnia-Herzegovina stands out as the country with a somewhat decent institutional quality, while the other four countries are characterized by low institutional quality.

Turning to public perceptions, the natives indicate little dissatisfaction with the way democracy works. In the Comcon-data, the answers are again transformed to a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates low dissatisfaction and 100 indicates high dissatisfaction (see note to Figure 6.4). The score in the Danish Comcon native reference group is 39. It reflects that 3 per cent of the natives were “not at all satisfied with democracy”, 24 per cent were “not particularly”



Note: Migrants living in Denmark (Comcon survey) and in the countries of origin (World Governance Indicators 2016 for “Voice and accountability”). Scale ranging from “Very satisfied” (0) to “Not at all satisfied” (100) (inverted percentile rank for WGI data).


Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015) and World Bank (2020). In the latter case we substituted ex-Yugoslavia with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Figure 6.4 Dissatisfaction with the way Danish democracy works

satisfied, 59 per cent were “fairly satisfied”, and 13 per cent were “very satisfied”. The ISSP citizenship survey from 2014 had a parallel question about the function of democracy rated on a scale from 0 to 10. Only 1.6 per cent of Danes gave an answer on the negative end of the scale (0–4). This was the second lowest share found in the 34 surveyed countries, only surpassed by Norwegians’ satisfaction with the way Norwegian democracy works. Thus, the Danish reference point is low. The Comcon-data shows that migrants in Denmark share this perception and on average seem to be more satisfied with the Danish democracy than the natives themselves. This is again in line with the previous international research. The migrants born in ex-Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Iraq indicate less dissatisfaction with the way the Danish democracy works than do natives, see Figure 6.4. The only exception is migrants born in Turkey, which do not indicate lower dissatisfaction than native Danes. Despite some variation in the institutional quality of the country of origin, the variation across the groups is modest. Thus, two of our three indicators of assimilation seem to be present. The difference between native Danes and migrants is modest (and when a difference is there, it is an over-confidence in Danish institutions) and the difference between the (most-different) migrant groups also seem modest.

The Comcon-data also included a question about mistrust/trust in getting fair and good treatment by the public administration, exemplified by caseworkers

in the municipalities. As expected, distrust among natives is low. The average score is 37 on a scale from 0 to 100 (see note in Figure 6.5). The average reflects that 17 per cent answered on the negative side of the 0–10 scale, 21 per cent in the middle category (5) and 62 per cent on the positive side of the scale. Unfortunately, there are no international questions available from the country of origin and the WGI data have no good proxy for institutional quality at the local level. Thus, we cannot make any comparison between the country of origin and perception of migrants from these countries living in Denmark. Nevertheless, the levels of distrust among the latter groups are shown in Figure 6.5. The overall pattern is that the answers of the migrants resemble those of the natives. There is a tendency to more trust among migrants born in Lebanon (33) and Pakistan (34) than among natives (37). Whether this is a significant difference remains to be seen. In contrast, migrants from Turkey (42) and Iraq (43) tend to indicate a bit less trust than do natives. However, the overall pattern is that there is a high level of trust and that the variation across the groups of migrants is close to absent, which we again take as an indication of assimilation.



Note: Migrants and natives living in Denmark (Comcon survey). Scale ranging from “Very high trust” (0) to “No trust at all” (100).

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 6.5 *Level of distrust in fair and good treatment in public administration*

PERCEPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY – PATTERNS IN COMCON-DATA

The patterns of distrust in Danish institutions measured in the Comcon-data are also explored by means of regressions (OLS). Figure 6.6 shows the patterns of dissatisfaction with the way Danish democracy works. The “Binary-model” on the left side simply shows that the level of dissatisfaction among migrants from ex-Yugoslavia (-10.9), Lebanon (-9.9), and Pakistan (-9.8) is significantly lower than the dissatisfaction found among natives, which is what can be expected from international research. However, this model also shows that this is not the case for migrants born in Turkey and Iraq. Overall, the effects are again modest, and the explained variation is low (4 per cent), which indicates that country of origin is a bad predictor for dissatisfaction in the way Danish democracy works. The “Composition-model” on the left side controls for our standard background variables. As in the Mifare-data, there is no effect from gender and age. In terms of household composition, the singles are more dissatisfied. As in the Mifare, the highly educated and those with high salaries are again less dissatisfied. Once these differences are taken into account, the country of origin effects increases a little. Thus, taking the relative weak socio-economic positions of these groups into account, it becomes clearer that these migrants display more confidence in destination country institutions than do natives, except for migrants born in Turkey. The level of explained variance increases to 6 per cent but even with background variables included, the explanatory power of the model is modest.

The models on the right side of Figure 6.6 only include migrants. The “Binary-model” shows that there are significant differences across the countries of origin; using migrants born in Turkey as a reference in order to maximize the chances of differences. The migrants from ex-Yugoslavia (-10.5), Pakistan (-10.5), and Lebanon (-8.0) are significantly less dissatisfied with the Danish democracy than are the migrants born in Turkey. This holds true after control for differences in the composition of the five groups (not shown). The “Composition plus time” model shows that dissatisfaction with the way Danish democracy work does seem to *increase* by the number of years since the first settlement in Denmark, in line with previous international literature. However, it is a weak effect. Ten years in the country is estimated to increase dissatisfaction by 4.1 points on the 0 to 100 scale. However, it is a significant effect and it remains significant after control for background variables (coefficients not shown). Finally, the “Composition plus identity” model shows that national identification increases dissatisfaction, in contrast to the Mifare-data where the opposite effect was found. However, again it is a modest effect and the correlation turns insignificant after control for background variables.





Figure 6.6 Dissatisfaction with the way Danish democracy works (0–100 scale)

In a model with both years since first settlement and national identification included, the latter also turns insignificant (not shown). Finally, a full model indicates no effect from holding citizenship, no effect from language skills, and no effect from the level of religiosity.

The patterns in distrust in good and fair service in the Danish public administration is shown in Figure 6.7. The “Binary-model” on the left-hand side shows that the migrants from Lebanon (-5.6) and Pakistan (-5.1) have significantly less distrust in fair treatment in the public administration than have natives. However, at the same time, migrants from Turkey (5.0) and Iraq (4.5) have significantly more distrust in fair treatment than have natives, which is difficult to explain in our framework; see discussion at the end of the chapter. There is no difference between migrants from ex-Yugoslavia and natives. The “Composition-model” on the left-hand side shows the results controlled for composition effects. Again, the pattern is that highly educated and those with high incomes have more trust in the institutions (not shown). The origin-country pattern remains stable after control; besides the differences between natives and migrants from Iraq turns insignificant and the difference between migrants from ex-Yugoslavia turns significant. However, again the explanatory power of the model is weak (5 per cent explained variance).

The models on the right-hand side of Figure 6.7 show the differences between migrant groups, using the most distrusting group as reference group, the migrants from Iraq. The migrants from Lebanon (-8.9) and Pakistan (-8.0) have significantly less distrust in fair treatment in the local municipality than have migrants from Iraq. This pattern is stable after control for background variables. It is difficult to give the finding any substantial interpretation based on the country of origin. The institutional quality of Iraq does not seem to be much better than the institutional quality of Lebanon and Pakistan. The “Composition plus time-model” on the right-hand side shows that distrust in fair treatment increases with the years since the first settlement in Denmark; in line with previous findings. The less distrust among migrants from Lebanon and Pakistan also remains stable. Finally, the “Composition plus identity-model” shows that there is no significant effect of national identification. This both holds true with or without control for background variables. It also holds true for models including national identification as a categorical variable and including the years since first settlement in Denmark. Thus, in contrast to the Mifare-data, the level of national identification does not go together with institutional trust/distrust. Finally, the full model indicates no effect from having citizenship, no effect from religiosity, and no effect from language skills. The worse language skills, the less belief in fair treatment at the local municipality (model not shown).



Note: Comcon survey. Regression models comparing native Danes (vertical line, left figure) and migrants from Iraq (vertical line, right figure) to other migrant groups. Years since first settlement and national identification also shown (right). OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=366. Composition means controlled for gender, age, wage-income, benefits, education (in three brackets) and employment situation (degree of employment), household composition.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 6.7 Distrust in fair treatment in public administration (0–100 scale)

MIGRANTS' INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN THE CONTEXT OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY

The overall take-away message from this chapter is that migrants in Denmark display very high trust in the Danish state. This holds true for all the 14 most-different migrant groups. Thereby one of the fundamental necessary conditions for supporting a welfare state is fulfilled. This is an important precondition for migrants' assimilation to the welfare attitudes of natives in general. This finding is consistent with previous research, which has found migrants in other contexts to display an "over-confidence" in destination country institutions. In our data material, there were also indications of migrants having more trust in the Danish destination country institutions than have natives. This was the case for perceptions of corruption of Danish politicians assessed by migrants born in China, Spain, Russia, and Romania. It was also the case for satisfaction with the way Danish democracy works assessed by migrants born in Lebanon, ex-Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and Iraq. Finally, migrants born in Lebanon, Pakistan, and ex-Yugoslavia express significantly more trust in fair treatment in local public administration than natives.

However, there are some specific patterns among migrants living in Denmark, which we believe are caused by Denmark being a country with exceptionally high institutional quality. The "over-confidence" in Danish institutions was modest and for some groups absent. The migrants born in Great Britain, US, Japan, Turkey, Poland, and the Philippines did not indicate lower levels of corruption than did native Danes. Neither had migrants born in ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq more confidence in fair and good treatment in the public administration than had native Danes. The migrants from Turkey were neither more satisfied with the way Danish democracy works or had more trust in equal treatment at the local public administration than had natives.¹ One simple interpretation is that natives have extremely high institutional trust. In our data, we did find a potential effect from the institutional quality of the country of origin. The chapter did not establish measures that allowed us to statistically test this effect, but we did analyse differences across the migrant groups. There were significant differences across groups in the perception of corruption, satisfaction with democracy, and belief in equal treatment at the local public administration. The migrants from China, Spain, Russia, and Romania have significantly higher trust in Danish institutions than had migrants from Poland. This could be a matter of institutional quality in the country of origin. In the Comcon-data, migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and Lebanon had more trust in Danish institutions than migrants from Turkey and Iraq. These differences are more difficult to explain with institutional quality in the country of origin, which could point to the possibility of migrants

from Turkey and Iraq having negative experiences with Danish institutions. However, measured by the explanatory power of these group differences, the effects are weak. One simple explanation is that this is caused by the fact that the difference between Danish institutional quality and origin-country quality is sizeable for all groups.

Finally, it was difficult to find the general pattern of increased distrust as migrants acculturate. We did find that time since the first settlement significantly increased mistrust in destination country institutions; it held true of all three measures used. However, the effect sizes are moderate. Furthermore, identification with Denmark actually had a (weak) significant effect in the Mifare-data. Thus, the stronger the identification, the higher the belief in institutional quality. This supports the proposition that Denmark is a special case where acculturation does not lower institutional trust. However, the findings were a little different in the Comcon-data. For these groups, we found no (significant) link between national identification and institutional trust. Thus, the second overall finding is that migrants' initial "over-confidence" in destination country institutions is only weakly moderated by acculturation in Denmark.

NOTE

1. Given the fact that we do find somewhat different patterns between the two surveys, even for the Turkish groups who should be comparable, this shows that we maybe are picking up on slightly different perception in the two surveys.

7. Migrants' attitudes towards the government providing welfare

In this chapter, we explore what role the 14 migrant groups envision the government having in providing welfare. The term welfare covers a wide range of services and benefits that combined aim to alleviate the issues that citizens of any society will face. This includes issues such as how to provide healthcare for the sick, education, childcare, or ensure a reasonable living for those outside the labour market like the unemployed, disabled, or old (Castles, 2008; Titmuss, 1974). While such needs are almost universal between societies, the way of organizing the provision of welfare differs quite a lot. Both the degree of government involvement in providing welfare and the specific way of providing welfare varies a lot between countries (Castles & Obinger, 2007; Esping-Andersen, 1990). Though many factors, such as historical legacies and economic development, affect the level of government involvement in the provision of welfare, the attitudes of the public do remain a determining factor in how the welfare state develops (Brooks & Manza, 2007; Pierson, 1996). Therefore, it is interesting to look at different migrant groups' views of what role the state should have in providing welfare.

WHAT IS AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE

When one considers the question of the provision of welfare, and attitudes to the organization of it, it is difficult to get around Gøsta Esping-Andersen and his seminal book *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990). As the argument is introduced in Chapter 2, we will not cover it in full detail, but instead, jump right to the core of the argument. In essence, the provision of welfare can be organized in three ways. One option is to say that each individual is responsible for his or her welfare, and therefore if they want help they can get it via the market through insurance or direct payments. Another option is to say that the responsibility falls on the families, charities, or the local community. Finally, a third option is to organize welfare through the state and thereby socialize responsibility and risk (Esping-Andersen, 1990). All societies use all three ways of providing welfare but to different degrees. Denmark, and the other Nordic countries, have often been characterized as state-centric, as they tend to draw more on the state in providing welfare than other countries.

This means that the government plays a more central role in organizing and providing welfare, and the benefits and services tend to be more universalistic in nature (Hedegaard, 2015; Kautto, 2010). Universalism refers to the fact that many benefits and services are awarded based on citizenship, and not as earned right or as a selective benefit (Andersen, 2015). This differs from the countries where the migrants originate from, as they tend to draw more on either the family or the market as providers of welfare (Alestalo, Hort, & Kuhnle, 2009; Kautto, 2010).

So, what is the impact of this on attitudes? The core of institutional theory is the argument that the organization of welfare affects attitudes to how welfare should be organized. The argument is that experiences of how things *are* affect perceptions of how things *should be*. For this reason, this type of argument is also sometimes known as policy feedback theory, as the premise is that the development of policy is not only an outcome of what the public thinks, but also affects, or feeds back into the public attitudes (Pierson, 2000). Following this kind of argument this state-centric organization of welfare should affect attitudes to the role of government in providing welfare. For instance, Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that a state-centric and universalistic welfare state should result in a welfare state carried by the middle class where “All benefit; all are dependent, and all will presumably feel obliged to pay” (Esping-Andersen, 1990:28). Esping-Andersen’s (1990) theory thus provides predictions of the impact of a historically state-centric and universal welfare state on public support, though the clues about how it should work are very vague. Other authors have expanded on the argument of how institutions affect attitudes. Pierson (1994) argues that this happens through a combination of incentives and learning. The welfare state shapes incentives both through taxes and policies, for instance, the combination of high taxes and childcare institutions making dual-earner families both necessary and possible (Pierson, 1994). The learning effect works through welfare policies sending out implicit “signals” of what is and is not a government responsibility, and how the specific target groups should be perceived. For instance, when the state offers childcare services, it signals that this is a government responsibility and that it is of high importance, given the relatively generous spending on it (Seibel & Hedegaard, 2017). Svallfors (2003) phrases this learning effect in another way, arguing that the welfare “... institutions provide ‘normalcy’, that is, they suggest to people what is ‘the normal state of affairs’, and what is deviant or even impermissible” (Svallfors, 2003:172). Empirically the results of this “welfare institution theory” have been mixed at best, though the Nordic countries do tend to stand out as more positive towards state responsibility to welfare, likely due to them living in a more state-centric welfare state (Bean & Papadakis, 1998; Jæger, 2006; Svallfors, 2003). Thus, following the institu-

Table 7.1 Public spending on healthcare, old age pensions, and unemployment benefits in origin countries (as a percentage of GDP)

	Healthcare	Old age pensions	Unemployment benefits
DNK	10.1	8.1	1.4
CHN	5.1		
ESP	8.8	11	1.8
GBR	9.6	6.2	0.3
IRQ	4.1	4.2	
JPN	10.9	9.4	
LBN	8.2		
PAK	2.9	1.8	
PHN	4.5		
POL	6.5	11.2	0.3
ROU	5.1	8	0.2
RUS	5.3		
TUR	4.1	6.2	0.3
USA	17	7.1	
YOU	6.7	10.6	0.4

Note: For healthcare, the data is comprised of data from the World Bank (2017), except in the cases of Denmark, Turkey, USA, and Japan where we used the OECD SOCX database (OECD, 2020a). For old age pensions and unemployment benefits, we used Eurostat (2015). As Yugoslavia does not exist anymore, we used Croatia as a substitute. The results are similar if we had used Serbia instead. Data on Bosnia and Herzegovina is less widely available.

tional argument, then the migrants should become more or less like the Danes, in terms of welfare state support.

All the 14 migrant groups from the two surveys have lived parts of their lives in another country, and might, therefore, have been socialized into a different welfare system. In Table 7.1 we have collected data on public spending on healthcare, old age pensions, and unemployment benefits in the 14 origin countries (when possible). This is measured as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as it gives a rough idea of the differences in spending across the countries.

As we can see in Table 7.1, the 14 migrant groups originate from countries that generally rely less on the state and more on the market as the primary provider of welfare (Alestalo, Hort, & Kuhnle, 2009; Kautto, 2010). This is the case for healthcare where we cover all 14 countries. Only in Japan and the USA is the public spending larger, and for the USA that is partly due to the institutional issues of their healthcare system. For spending on old age pensions, Denmark is closer to many of the origin countries, though it is much

lower for Pakistan and Lebanon. The data for unemployment benefits is much more spotty in coverage, partly because many countries do not offer this, but shows the same overall pattern. Following the logic presented above, this might affect perceptions of how welfare ought to be provided. This “socialization hypothesis” is not necessarily in opposition to the institutional theory, but more of an addition to it, as it argues that prior experiences with institution might matter more than resent experiences (Hedegaard, 2019). A number of recent studies among migrant populations have suggested that socialization from the origin country might affect attitudes, as argued in Chapter 2 and shown in other chapters. If this is also the case regarding attitudes to government responsibility for welfare, then differences might arise between the 14 migrant groups and the Danes.

OUTLINE


The analysis will follow the three questions outlined in Chapter 1. First, we show the attitudes in the countries of origin, where this is possible, using the comparative survey the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Then we will move on to show the attitudes among the 14 migrant groups, and the Danes, using the two surveys. Finally, we will look at to what degree the attitudes in the origin country, presented in the first part, can explain attitudes to welfare. The first two parts will rely on both surveys, while the third part will draw on the Mifare survey alone.

In the analysis below we explore whether the migrant groups think that a number of societal challenges should be a government responsibility or not. Specifically, we will look at whether it should be a public responsibility to provide help for the sick, the old, and the unemployed. The three tasks can be said to be some of the main challenges to all societies and to represent the core of what welfare states do, as well as the majority of social spending in all welfare states (Castles & Obinger, 2007). The results from the different surveys are presented on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. A score of 100 represents a situation in which the group, on average, thinks that it should definitely be a government responsibility, while a score of 0 represents the exact opposite. Besides comparing the scores, a simple analysis, that compares whether the groups are statistically different, is used.

COMPARATIVELY DIFFERENT, NATIONALLY ALIKE

Figure 7.1 shows attitudes to government responsibility for the three tasks in the country of origin from the ISSP “Role of Government” survey. It was not possible to match attitudes in the country of origin to the ISSP survey for all the groups and from the Comcon survey only the Turks are included. The

reason the groups from the Mifare survey are better represented here is that the migrant groups in this survey were partially selected so they could be matched to attitudes in the country of origin using the ISSP. So, with the reservation that only 8 of the 14 groups we are interested in are represented here, we will now look at how the attitudes in the origin country differ from the attitudes in Denmark.



Note: Origin countries (ISSP survey on the role of government). Scale ranging from fully disagree (0) to fully agree (100) that helping the relevant group is a government responsibility. Sorted by mean attitudes to the government helping the sick.

Source: Data collected from the ISSP Role of Government Module V (ISSP Research Group, 2018), except for Poland which is from the ISSP Role of Government Module IV (ISSP Research Group, 2008).


Figure 7.1 Attitudes towards government responsibility for helping the sick, the old, and ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed

Figure 7.1 shows that there are somewhat large differences between the Danes and most of the migrant groups. If we start with attitudes to government responsibility for helping the sick, then we can see that the Danes have a mean score of 92 on the scale from 0 to 100. This represents almost universal support for the idea that helping the sick is a government responsibility. This attitude is mirrored in most of the countries of origin, where the mean score is somewhere between the mid-eighties and low-nineties. However, two of the origin countries do stand out here. The mean score for the United States is 78 and for Japan, it is 68. This represents that the role of the government in providing healthcare is seen differently in these countries. The attitudes to the government's respon-

sibility for helping the old is a bit different. Here the Danes score an average of 85, representing high support for this. Here attitudes in the origin countries are slightly higher in some countries (Philippines, Russia, Spain, and Poland) and slightly lower in others (Turkey, Great Britain, and the United States). All of these scores are within 11 points. Again, the outlier is Japan with a score of 68. Finally, regarding the government's responsibility for ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed, we see much lower support. The Danes score 66, which represents somewhat mixed attitudes to this. As with care for the sick, we also see that attitudes in the origin countries are both lower and higher. However, the variation is much bigger here, representing a much more debated issue, where attitudes tend to move with the business cycle (Uunk & van Oorschot, 2017) and potentially get inflicted with a moral assessment of "the poor" (see Chapter 8). Combined, this shows that attitudes in the origin countries do vary when comparing with the Danes. This variation tends to be larger the less overall support there is for government responsibility for that task. This could give some credence to the socialization ideas presented above, as there are differences in the origin countries.

Next, we move on to the Mifare and Comcon surveys. When looking at the two surveys it is important to take note of the differences in how the questions are worded. The Comcon survey asks whether it is the "... *government or the individual who has the responsibility?*" for providing welfare, while the Mifare survey asks whether it "... *all in all [...] is the government's responsibility?*". Though this is quite similar, the questions do pose slightly different dilemmas, as one outlines the difference between public and private, while the other does not state what the alternative is. The three target groups, who might deserve help from the government, are also described in slightly different ways. We know from the literature on surveys that even small changes in wording can have quite large effects on attitudes (Schuman & Presser, 1977). As a result, the results cannot be directly compared between the surveys, but only within the surveys.

Figure 7.2 gives us the answers to the first two questions posed in this chapter. First, the figure shows that among both the migrant groups and the Danes there is large support for the government providing help for the three groups in question. As in Figure 7.1, based on the ISSP, the support is largest in regards to the government helping the sick and the old, while support for ensuring the living standards of the unemployed is a bit smaller. That there is larger public support for helping the sick and the old than there is for helping the unemployed is sometimes explained by the fact that while the unemployed have some level of control over their situation, sickness and old age are risks that everyone can be affected by (van Oorschot, 2005). However, for none of the groups do we see a value anything close to going under 50, which would reflect overall support for the government taking less responsibility in favour



Note: Immigrants and natives in Denmark (Mifare survey). Scale ranging from fully disagree (0) to fully agree (100) that helping the relevant group is a government responsibility.
Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 7.2 *Attitudes towards government responsibility for helping the sick, the old, and ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed*


of the market or the family. There is thus support for the government providing welfare, among both the migrant groups and the Danes.

Second, if we dig into the two surveys we see that there are some differences when comparing the Danes and the migrant groups. In the Mifare survey, we can see that in terms of having the government responsible for helping the sick the migrants from Japan, China, and the US are significantly less supportive, while the Spanish, British, Turkish, Filipino, and Russian migrants are significantly more supportive. Interestingly, it was also the migrants from Japan and the US who stand out as less supportive of government responsibility in the origin country in Figure 7.1. The differences are, however, quite small and much smaller than in the comparative survey. For attitudes to government responsibility to the sick, the largest differences are between the Spanish migrants (97) and the Japanese migrants (87), on a scale from 0 to 100. This shows that the support is somewhere between very large and almost unanimous. So more than representing differences, this reflects an overall agreement in the view of whether this should be a government responsibility.

We see a somewhat similar pattern when it comes to attitudes to government responsibility for helping the old. Here we can see that seven of the ten migrant groups are slightly more supportive of government responsibility than

the Danes are. However, again it is important to notice that the attitudes exist within a 6-point range between 0 and 100, reflecting very small differences in the level of agreement. For attitudes to the government helping the unemployed, we here find a larger range of attitudes. When asked this question, the migrants originating from Romania, Spain, Turkey, Japan, and Russia were more positive towards government responsibility than the Danes, while the Filipinos were less positive towards the government ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed. Next, we move on to the Comcon survey.

Figure 7.3 shows that, among the migrant groups represented in the Comcon survey, there is a small difference compared to the Mifare survey. For this survey, we find that in regard to government responsibility for the sick migrants originating from ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Pakistan are less supportive than the Danes. However, again the differences are within a quite small range of nine points on the 100-point scale. For attitudes to government responsibility for the old and the unemployed, the Comcon survey shows even smaller numerical differences. Here we only find that migrants from Iraq are a little less supportive of government responsibility for the old than the Danes, while the migrants from Lebanon are a little more supportive of the govern-



Note: Immigrants and natives in Denmark (Comcon survey). Scale ranging from fully disagree (0) to fully agree (100) that helping the relevant group is a government responsibility.

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 7.3 Attitudes towards government responsibility for helping the sick, the old, and ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed

ment ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed. Finally, it is also noticeable how there is a difference in levels of support between the two surveys. For instance, the average support for helping the sick is 92 in the Mifare survey and 82 in the Comcon survey. Even for groups that should be more or less the same across the surveys, like the Danes and the Turks, we see some differences. This we interpret to be the cumulative effect of the differences in questions detailed above, and therefore we do not make the direct comparisons between surveys.

To briefly conclude on the sections above, we see that when it comes to attitudes to the role of government then the differences in both Danes and the migrant groups are in favour of government responsibility for the three tasks. We do find some minor differences in attitudes, both between Danes and migrants and between the migrant groups. However, these differences cannot be explained by the variables we outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 – age, education, employment, income, benefits, religiosity, and origin country of the partner – which should capture the large differences in the composition and self-interest of the groups. We also find that the identification variables – years lived in Denmark, identification with the origin country, citizenship, and language skills – does not help to explain differences between the migrant groups (while also controlling for compositional and self-interest variables). Therefore, we will not show these figures. However, we still believe that this is a noticeable result. Despite large differences in factors like age, gender, income, and benefits this does not explain the differences in attitudes. Similarly, the differences between the migrant groups cannot be explained by factors that are often linked to integration like time spent in the recipient country, language skills, or being a citizen.

IMPACT OF THE ORIGIN COUNTRY

As a final attempt to explain variations in attitudes we will draw on attitudes to government responsibility in the origin country, to show whether this can explain the variation in attitudes. To do this we will draw on the attitudes in the origin country from the ISSP shown in Figure 7.1. To see the impact of the attitudes in the origin country we will substitute the origin country with these numbers. For this final analysis, only the Mifare-data is used and only migrants from Poland, Spain, Great Britain, Turkey, the US, Japan, the Philippines, and Russia are included. Therefore, these results are more limited in their scope, but can still give us an indication of whether the attitudes in the origin country structure the attitudes of the migrant groups living in Denmark. We also included an interaction between the number of years lived in Denmark and the attitudes in the country of origin. This is meant to capture whether the impact of the attitudes in the origin country becomes larger or smaller over

Table 7.2 *The impact of attitudes in the country of origin on attitudes towards government responsibility for helping the sick, the old, and ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed among the eight migrant groups in the Mifare survey*

	Healthcare		Old age		Unemployment	
Years since first settlement in DK	0.08		0.09		0.20	
Attitudes in CO	0.40**		0.12		0.12	
Years since the first settlement in DK x Attitudes in CO		-0.0053		-0.0094		0.005
R ²	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.05
N	1934	1934	1914	1914	1875	1875

Note: * = statistically significant at $p > 0.05$, ** = statistically significant at $p > 0.01$. Scale ranging from fully disagree (0) to fully agree (100) that helping the relevant group is a government responsibility. Reported with unstandardized coefficients and p-levels. All models have been controlled for gender, age, household type, education, income, benefits received, employment, identification, citizenship, and time in Denmark, as shown in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. Data from the Mifare survey, drawing on migrants from Poland, Spain, GB, Turkey, USA, Japan, Philippines, and Russia.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) and ISSP Research Group (2018).

time. All the models presented in Table 7.2 are controlled for the standard set variables used in the other chapters: gender, age, household type, education, income, benefits received, employment, identification, citizenship, and time in Denmark, however, for clarity we will only show the origin country attitudes and the interaction term.

From Table 7.2 we can see that attitudes in the origin country do seem to matter, but that the impact does not seem to be dependent on the time lived in Denmark. For attitudes to government responsibility for the sick, we find that attitudes in the country of origin have a significant impact on attitudes (0.40**). The effect is positive, which means that more positive perceptions in the origin country lead to more positive perceptions among the migrant groups. We find a similar pattern when it comes to the perceptions of the state's responsibility for the old (0.12). Here the effect is, however, only significant if we apply a standard of 90 per cent certainty. Finally, for attitudes to the unemployed, we again see that attitudes are not significant. The effect was strongest for attitudes to the state providing healthcare for the sick, but present in two of the three cases (at least at $p > 0.9$).

While we find that the attitudes in the country of origin matter, we do not find an impact of the interaction with the number of years in Denmark. All

these interaction terms are insignificant, both when running them as categorical variables as in the table and when using the variable as interval scaled (not shown). This means that though attitude in the origin country matters, it does not seem to be a socialization effect. The impact of this is equally strong from day one. This result runs counter to other studies that have used similar methods to study socialization, as they tend to find that the time dimension matters (Fernández & Fogli, 2009; Voicu & Vasile, 2014). One interpretation of this could be that while the other studies look at deeply rooted values or habits, like having children and life satisfaction in the studies quoted before, then perceptions of welfare provision are more pragmatic and easily “mouldable” (Navas, García, Sánchez, Rojas, Pumares, & Fernández, 2005).

To add to the overall question of whether migrants assimilate to the attitudes and values of the welfare state, this chapter takes on the central question of what role the state should have in providing welfare. In answering this, we first showed that when looking at the origin countries through comparative surveys we can show that attitudes differs quite a lot. Generally speaking then the Danes are more positive of government responsibility than the populations in the countries the migrants originate from. Second, we show that these differences in attitudes are very minor when comparing the 14 migrant groups to the Danes, though some do exist. These differences in attitudes we cannot explain with the standard variables used throughout the book. Finally, we show that a small part of the variation in the migrants' attitudes to government responsibility for welfare can be explained by attitudes to welfare in the origin country. Thus, more positive attitudes in the origin country have a small positive impact on migrants' attitudes in the recipient country. The effect is, however, only significant for attitudes to government responsibility for healthcare.

8. Migrants' attitudes towards redistribution and poverty relief

The welfare state regimes described in Chapter 2 also result in very different levels of economic redistribution throughout society. The tax-financed universal benefits and services of the social-democratic welfare regime are believed to install a broad comprehensive redistribution of resources from the better off to the worse off, with the potential to alter the class structure created by capitalism. The insurance payments of the conservative welfare regime, in contrast, are believed largely to conserve existing class structures as the size and quality of benefits and services are closely connected to achievements at the labour market. Finally, the tax-financed targeted benefits and services of the liberal welfare regime, or more residual welfare states in general, are believed to, at best, lift “the poor” out of severe poverty. There is indeed clear evidence that the Danish welfare state has a large distributive impact. To paraphrase Castles and Obinger (2007) the more heavy spending Nordic countries tend to get more “distributional bang for their buck”. When comparing pre- and post-tax situations, the OECD has calculated that Denmark has the largest degree of redistribution throughout society (OECD, 2020b). As a result, inequality in Denmark is relatively low, compared to other countries. Going by the GINI coefficient, a commonly accepted measure of income inequality, then Denmark is among the 15 most equal countries in the world, though inequality has been increasing in Denmark and many other Western countries, mainly due to tax reform that has lowered marginal tax rates and taxes on capital gains (Juul & Andersen, 2017). However, it is still the case that natives and migrants are exposed to a context where historically inherited welfare institutions cause a redistribution of resources, which might influence the institutional logics of consequentiality and appropriateness.

The link between welfare institutions and attitudes towards redistribution is still something of a puzzle. A typical starting point of theorization is that attitudes to redistribution could be guided by self-interest. Following this logic, the classic Meltzer–Richard model suggests that support for redistribution increases with income differences (Meltzer & Richard, 1981). The larger the differences between the average income and the median income in a given society, the larger is the group with self-interest in taxing those with high incomes. This leads to the simple prediction that support for redistribu-

tion will be lower in a relatively equal society, like the Danish, compared to a more unequal society. This is sometimes known as a thermostatic adaption in attitudes, as the attitudes adapt to the policies like a thermostat adapts the level of heating to the room temperature (Soroka & Wlezien, 2005). Most studies of attitudes to redistribution and taxes find that income or social class matters a great deal for attitudes to redistribution (Corneo & Grüner, 2002; Kulin & Svallfors, 2013; Linos & West, 2003). For example, Linos and West (2003) find that in Germany, the US, Austria, and Norway, class, income, and education are some of the most important factors in determining attitudes to redistribution. Thus, there is substantial evidence for Meltzer and Richard's model at the micro-level, whereas the aggregated effect of larger support for redistribution in more unequal societies has been questioned in several studies (e.g. Larsen, 2016b), see below. From a self-interest perspective, we should predict that migrants' support for redistribution will depend on their socio-economic position (SEP) (box 3 in Figure 1.1). Thus, whether migrants assimilate into the natives' attitudes towards redistribution will be dependent on their socio-economic position in relation to the natives. From Chapter 5, we know that the average income of natives is higher than all the migrant groups. The difference between natives and migrants from Great Britain is modest, but for the other groups, the difference is substantial (see the first row in Table 5.2). We also know that in terms of the difference between tax payments and benefits received, there are substantial differences between the groups. While most of the migrant groups in the Mifare survey are not net-beneficiaries from the Danish welfare state, besides the migrants from Turkey, the migrants from Lebanon and Iraq had a substantial gain (see Chapter 5). This interplay between wage income, tax payment, and income transfer is expected to create differences in attitudes towards redistribution across the migrant groups, at least before the socio-economic position of the individual migrant is taken into account.

The self-interest perspective is challenged by a large literature, which finds that attitudes to distribution are also influenced by values and norms (box 2 in Figure 1.1). For instance, Andreß and Heien (2001) find that having egalitarian or anti-egalitarian values matters a great deal for attitudes to redistribution, controlled for the socio-economic position of the individual. This is hardly a surprise as the issue of redistribution is linked to the ideological left–right cleavage found throughout Western countries. This ideological component has led to the prediction that the support for redistribution should be bigger in countries that are more aligned to the social-democratic regime. However, as with a lot of research that tries to combine regimes and attitudes, the results have been somewhere between unclear and disappointing (Hedegaard, 2015; Jæger, 2006). This does not necessarily mean that egalitarian values and norms are absent in the Nordic countries. It might simply be a matter of the

effect of values and norms being moderated by the Meltzer–Richard effect. Furthermore, a perception element should also be included (box 2 in Figure 1.1). As argued in Chapter 6, the trustworthiness of state institutions might also influence redistribution, at least redistribution organized by the state. Thus, we know from previous literature that natives' attitudes to redistribution are influenced by a mix of self-interest, values, norms, and perceptions. Following this literature, one could also predict migrants' attitudes to redistribution to be guided by more than self-interest. Migrants' institutional trust has already been dealt with in Chapter 5. The tendency towards “over-confidence” in destination-country institutions should lead us to expect higher support for redistribution among migrant groups than among natives. Whether egalitarian values and norms from the country of origin affect attitudes towards redistribution is also up for discussion in the literature. Luttmer and Singhal (2011) show that a proportion of migrants' attitudes to redistribution can be explained by attitudes in the country of origin and level of income in the origin country. Hence, Luttmer and Singhal (2011) find that migrants from countries with more pro-redistribution attitudes tend to be more supportive themselves, and that this effect also is present for the second generation. They base this conclusion on a study of migrants from European countries establishing themselves in other European countries. In a recent study, Tabellini (2020) also shows a link between liberal voting among Native Americans and the inflow of migrants from the country with larger welfare states, which is theorized as the transmission of origin-country values and norms from migrants to natives. Thus, the literature points to potential origin-country effects (box 5 in Figure 1.1) mediated by norms and values (box 2 in Figure 1.1).

Finally, the previous literature has shown a large divide between attitudes towards overall retribution and attitudes towards poverty relief. Following the logic of the Meltzer–Richard model, one could expect that while a majority might have a self-interest in general redistribution, it is only a minority that has a self-interest in poverty relief programmes targeted at “the poor”. The attitudes of those reliant, or potentially reliant, on poverty relief programmes might be shaped by self-interest. However, for the other groups, their attitudes are shaped by moral assessment about the deservingness of “the poor” (Larsen, 2008; Petersen, 2009; van Oorschot, 2005). Previous research has found that native Danes have an extraordinary positive evaluation of the deservingness of “the poor”, which might be a matter of the presence of universal benefits and service (Hedegaard, 2014a; Larsen, 2008; Rothstein, 1998) and the media discourses that follow (Hedegaard, 2014b; Larsen & Dejsgaard, 2012). How migrants perceive the deservingness of “the poor” has not received much attention in the literature. In the American context, Luttmer (2001) finds that support for social assistance targeted at mothers living in poverty (AFDC) is shaped not only by self-interest but also by group interest. In communities


with many blacks receiving AFDC, the support for AFDC was higher; even when controlled for individual self-interest. Renema and Lubbers (2019) have studied whether the same group-loyalty effect could be found among migrants living in the Netherlands. They did find a link between group-dependence on social assistance/unemployment benefits and attitudes to social assistance, but they could not find this effect to be mediated by their measure of group-belonging (see Chapter 12 for further discussion).

In our data material, we only have a measure of attitudes to general redistribution in the Mifare-data. Thus, attitudes to general redistribution will only be studied utilizing this dataset. In the Comcon-data, we have a measure of attitudes towards giving to those worst off. Thus, attitudes to poverty relief will be studied using the Comcon-data. This is not optimal, as it gives this chapter a dual focus and makes results incomparable between the sections. However, the migrant groups included in the Mifare-data are more interesting for the attitudes to general redistribution, as they included both high and low-income earners. And the migrant groups included in the Comcon-data are more interesting for attitudes to poverty relief, as a larger part of the interviewed are dependent on the Danish poverty relief programmes.

ATTITUDES TO GENERAL REDISTRIBUTION

In Figure 8.1, we have plotted data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on attitudes to the government's responsibility to ensure redistribution between rich and poor, which we use as an indicator of support for general redistribution. Not all of the countries are represented in the figure, but a good selection of them are present, though mostly from the Mifare survey. The samples from the ISSP have been limited to the 18- to 60-year-olds, like the two surveys (see Chapter 3). The respondents were asked whether it should be a government responsibility to "Reduce income differences between the rich and poor". To this, the respondents could answer that it "definitely", "probably", "probably not", or "definitely not" should be a government responsibility. This has been recalculated into a 0–100 scale, where higher scores indicate more support for redistribution.

Figure 8.1 shows that the attitudes to redistribution vary considerably across origin countries. The lowest support for redistribution support is found in Denmark (average score of 54), USA (57), Japan (60), the Philippines (63), and Great Britain (64). On the other hand, we find more positive attitudes about whether redistribution should be a government responsibility in Spain, Turkey, Poland, and Russia, with average scores of respectively 81, 80, 77, and 77 in the countries. The low level of support for general redistribution in Denmark is in line with the expectations of the Meltzer–Richard model. However, the results also demonstrate the limitations of this theoretical pre-



Note: Migrants and natives in Denmark (Mifare survey) and residents in countries of origin (ISSP 2016 survey on the role of government). Scale ranging from “Definitely not” (0) to “Definitely” (100).

Source: Data collected from the ISSP Role of Government Module V (ISSP Research Group, 2018), except for Poland which is from the ISSP Role of Government Module IV (ISSP Research Group, 2008).

Figure 8.1 Attitudes to whether it should be the government's responsibility to ensure redistribution between rich and poor

diction. As the level of economic inequality is higher in the US, it is a puzzle that the support for redistribution is only a little higher than in Denmark, which points to the importance of values, norms, and perceptions. However, our main interest is the potential assimilation of migrants' attitudes to the less supportive attitudes of native Danes.


For the eight countries where we have both the attitudes for migrants living in Denmark and from the country of origin, we find little difference for six of the groups (see Figure 8.1). The migrants from the US, Japan, the Philippines, Great Britain, Turkey, and Spain living in Denmark hold more or less the same attitudes to general redistribution that can be found in the country of origin. Only the migrants from Russia and Poland indicate much less support for redistribution than what is present in the country of origin. Thus, our first indicator of assimilation, differences between migrants living in Denmark and attitudes in the country of origin, does not indicate a general pattern of assimilation though the migrants from Poland and Russia stand out. Our second indicator of assimilation, absence of differences between migrant groups living in Denmark and natives, neither indicates assimilation. In contrast, Figure

8.1 shows large variations across the groups living in Denmark. The average scores range from 51 to 83. The biggest support for redistribution is found among migrants that originate from Turkey (83), Spain (78), China (77), and Romania (71), while the migrants from Russia (58), Poland (58), Japan (61), the Philippines (61), the US (62), and Great Britain (63) are the most similar to the Danes.

EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES OF SUPPORT FOR GENERAL REDISTRIBUTION

To capture the differences between the groups we will use a series of statistical models, based on the literature presented above. The first model is a binary model that only contains a variable on the origin country, which should produce results similar to Figure 8.1. The second model controls for many of the compositional differences. Here we control for age, gender, household status, and education. The third model controls for factors related to self-interest by adding income, benefits, and employment to the mix. The fourth step adds egalitarian values, trust, and perceptions of corruption or unfair treatment in the public sector. The general egalitarian values are captured in the Mifare survey by a question about whether the government should be allowed to regulate the economy. Institutional trust is captured in a measure of perceived corruption among civil servants used in Chapter 6. Finally, the fifth model adds the length of stay in the country, citizenship, self-perceived language skills, and identification with Denmark/origin country as presented in Chapter 4. This final step contains variables that are only valid to the migrants and not the natives, that is, it can only be used to describe differences across various migrant groups.

Figure 8.2 shows the impact of the different variables on the difference in attitudes between Danes (vertical line) and the migrant groups. Similar to Figure 8.1 the results show that the migrant groups are more positive towards redistribution than the Danes are, as indicated by the positive scores on the x-axis. We see that the second and third models, containing variables on compositional differences and self-interest, do very little to explain this gap. We do find income to be significantly negatively correlated to attitudes to general redistribution and amount in benefits to be significantly positively correlated (not shown). However, the differences between the natives and the migrant groups are not only a matter of different socio-economic positions. Thus, there seems to be an impact of values, norms, and perceptions. This is also what we find in the final model, which adds indicators for values, social trust, and perceived corruption in the public sectors. These indicators close some of the gaps, for all but the migrants originating in Japan. Digging into the full models, we can see that it is the variable about the state's regulation of the economy,




Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing Danes (vertical line) to the migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=2,167.
Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 8.2 Attitudes to general redistribution (0–100 scale)

which reduces differences across groups. Thus, in comparison to the migrant groups, the natives are not less supportive of redistribution once we take this variable into account. However, there is still a sizeable difference between native Danes and migrants from Spain, Turkey, and China, which cannot be explained by the model (see Figure 8.2). Finally, we find that holding Danish citizenship is negatively correlated to support for redistribution, which is further theorized in Chapter 12.

Figure 8.3 shows the difference across migrant groups, using the migrants from Poland as the reference point. As already shown in Figure 8.1, the migrants from Romania, Spain, Turkey, and China are more inclined to support redistribution than are the migrants from Poland. These differences do not disappear after control for the difference in socio-economic position, self-interest, or even trust and our indicator for egalitarian values. So, while values might explain some of the differences in attitudes between natives and migrants' groups, this measure is of little help to explain differences across migrants groups. Finally, we find a significant effect on language skills. Those who speak Danish "very well" are estimated to score 11 points lower on the 0–100 scale than those who do not speak Danish at all. Taking language skills



Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing migrants from Poland (vertical line) to the other migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=1,950.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 8.3 Attitudes to general redistribution (0–100 scale)

into account, we find no significant effect from holding citizenship, length of stay in Denmark, or identification with Denmark.

DO ATTITUDES TO GENERAL REDISTRIBUTION TRAVEL?

In the sections above, we showed that the migrants' groups included in this book tend to be more supportive of redistribution and that this only partially can be explained by the dominant theories within the field. However, of the theories presented at the beginning, the ideas of Luttmer and Singhal (2011), that attitudes to redistribution travel with the migrants, have still not been applied. To test this we need a measure of attitudes to redistribution in the origin countries, which is exactly what we have in Figure 8.1. Here we presented attitudes to redistribution in the country of origin for most of the Mifare countries (US, Japan, Great Britain, the Philippines, Turkey, Spain, Russia, and Poland). Using this, we can see if migrants that originate from countries where the populations are more positive towards redistribution are

Table 8.1 *The impact of attitudes to redistribution in the origin country on attitudes to redistribution among eight migrants' groups in Denmark*

	Unstandardized OLS-coefficients	Standardized OLS-coefficients
(1) Effect, binary	0.34**	0.11**
(2) Effect, controlled for compositional effects	0.28**	0.09**
(3) Effect, controlled for self-interest effects	0.26**	0.09**
(4) Effect, controlled for values, social trust, and perceived corruption	0.27**	0.10**
(5) Effect, controlled for time lived in Denmark, identification, and citizenship	0.24**	0.09**

Note: * Significant at 0.05. ** Significant at 0.01. For the standardized coefficients, the weights are not used, as this is not possible to combine. Shown as five different models, with increasing numbers of control variables. OLS regression. Unstandardized and standardized coefficients. N=1,776.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).


also more positive towards redistribution. The question used in the Mifare survey is similar to the one used in the ISSP, which is where the data in Figure 8.1 comes from. To test for the impact of attitudes in the country of origin we substituted the country of origin with the values in Figure 8.1. The first model simply tests for the relationship between attitudes in the country and attitudes among the migrant group. The next models add the control variables also used in the figures above, so (1) compositional effects, (2) self-interest, (3) values, (4) trust and perceived corruption, and (5) time, identification, and citizenship. The effects are presented as both standardized and unstandardized coefficients. However, for the standardized coefficients, the weights are not used, as this is not possible to combine.

Table 8.1 shows the impact of attitudes to redistribution in the origin country on attitudes to redistribution among eight migrant groups in the recipient country. The binary model, which is not controlled for anything, shows us that being from a country where attitudes to redistribution are one-point higher leads to 0.34** higher attitudes among migrants in Denmark. This effect is reduced a bit to 0.28** when controlling for the compositional effects of age, gender, household status, and education. The next three models that add variables on self-interests and values, social trust, and perceived corruption does not change the effect. Finally, the effect size is lowered marginally to 0.24** by controlling for time lived in Denmark, identification, and citizenship. Most of the results throughout the book are shown as unstandardized results, as they are well equipped to working with categorical variables, such as country of origin. The unstandardized results, in this case, tells us about the “absolute” impact of

attitudes in the origin country. However, by standardizing the coefficient we can say something about the relative strength of the variable compared to other variables, in explaining attitudes to redistribution among the nine migrant groups. Here the results show that attitudes in the origin country are quite good at explaining the patterns in attitudes. For instance, we find that it is almost as strong an indicator as income and double the strength of perceived corruption (not shown). Thus, as for the question of attitudes towards general redistribution, we find, in line with previous studies, that migrants' attitudes are indeed shaped by the country of origin. In our case, it is a matter of migrants maintaining more positive attitudes to general redistribution than is the case for natives.

ATTITUDES TO POVERTY RELIEF

Turning to the question about poverty relief, we expect the native Danes to hold a more positive image of "the poor" than do most other cultures. To capture attitudes towards "the poor", we use the following item from the Comcon survey; "Do you think that the government should increase the effort to help those worst off in society, even if it means higher taxes". This question is specifically focused on "those worst off in society", which we expect to load moral deservingness assessments. The Comcon questions are answered on



Note: Comcon survey. Shown by origin country on a scale from 0 to 100, where higher scores indicate more support for poverty relief. Sorted by score.

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 8.4 *Attitudes to whether more money should be spent on helping those worst off, even if it costs more in taxes*

an 11-point scale, which we again arrange into a 0–100 scale. Higher scores indicate more support for poverty relief.

Figure 8.4 shows the results of the Comcon survey. Here we see that the Danes are more supportive of poverty relief than are the migrant groups, with a score of 57. Thus, despite Danes' moderate support for general redistribution, they do distinguish themselves by having a positive image of "those worst off in society", as expected from previous research. Among the migrant groups, we find that the migrants from ex-Yugoslavia (a score of 56), Lebanon (53), and Iraq (53), hold fairly similar attitudes as the natives, while migrants from Pakistan (49) and Turkey (43) are less supportive for poverty relief than are natives. Unfortunately, we do not have measures of attitudes towards poverty relief in the country of origin. Thus, we do not know whether this is more or less support for poverty relief than what is found in the country of origin.

EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES TO POVERTY RELIEF

There is a large literature on explaining public attitudes towards "the poor" or those "worst off in society". The previous literature often uses public perceptions about control, attitude need, identity, and reciprocity as explanatory variables behind the moral assessment of the poor (e.g. van Oorschot, Roosma, Meuleman, & Reeskens, 2017). These indicators are not included in the Comcon survey, which leaves us with limited analytical possibilities. However, there is a question about "the poor" free-riding, which often is believed to be one of the most central indicators. Free-riding suggests that the "poor" are in control of their poverty, as poverty to some extent is chosen by the free-riders, and "the poor" as broken the norm of reciprocity. The wording is "How many, in your opinion, receive public benefits, without being entitled to it, when it comes to social assistance". The response category was "many" (used as reference), "quite a lot", "only a few", "almost none", and "don't know". We will add this variable to the standard variables, which we use throughout the analytical chapters. We also add satisfaction with the Danish democracy, which we used as a measure of institutional trust in Chapter 6.

The binary model in Figure 8.5 to the left simply shows the difference between the migrant groups and the native Danes, which is already depicted in Figure 8.4. When we control for compositional effects, the migrant group becomes even less supportive of poverty relief. We find women to be significantly more in favour of poverty relief than men, which is a standard finding. We also find employment and higher income to be related to lower support, and receiving benefits to be related to higher support, as one would expect from a self-interest perspective. Thus, taking the lower socio-economic positions of the migrants into account, the differences between migrants and




Figure 8.5 Attitudes to poverty relief

natives increases. This is what is shown in the composition model. This points to the importance of the perceptions of free-riding, which we include in the full model. As expected, overall institutional trust, measured as satisfaction with the Danish democracy, goes together with higher support for poverty relief. Also, we find a strong negative effect from the perception that many receive social assistance without entitlement. Those who answer “almost none” are estimated to be 27 points more in favour of poverty relief than those that answer “many”, on the scale from 0–100. All the migrant groups perceive the free-riding to be higher than do native Danes, which, in line with previous research, shows a relatively positive image of “the poor”. When these perceptions are taken into account, the differences between natives and migrants are reduced again. This is what is shown in the “Full model”. However, even taking these differences into account, we are left with significant differences between the migrants from Turkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon, which the model cannot explain. Especially migrants from Turkey stand out as the most reluctant to support poverty relief.

The right-side of Figure 8.5 is based on models that analyse the differences across the five migrant groups. We use migrants from ex-Yugoslavia as references as this is the group that resembles the attitudes of natives the most. The “binary model” simply shows that migrants from Pakistan and Turkey are significantly less supportive of poverty relief than are migrants from ex-Yugoslavia; respectively estimated to score 12 and 7 points lower on the 0–100 scale. The next model controls for composition, which reduces the differences across migrant groups. Thus, part of the difference is caused by different socio-economic positions. We also find a strong negative effect from living in ethnic homogeneity couples (-7), while living in ethnically mixed marriages has the opposite effect (8); using the singles as a reference point. Our ad hoc explanation is that general acculturation in Denmark goes together with a more positive attitude towards poverty relief. This is what we find in the “acculturation-model”. We find a strong effect of having Danish language skills.

Those fluent in Danish are estimated to score 28 points higher on the 0–100 scale than those with “very bad” language skills. We also find that those who hold Danish citizenship are more in favour of poverty relief (4.2, significant at 0.09). Taking this into account, we find a weak negative effect from the length of stay in the country and no effect from national identification. Thus, apparently language skills, citizenship, and not living in ethnic homogeneous couples are what make migrants assimilate to the natives’ relatively high support for poverty relief. When these differences are taken into account, the differences between the migrant groups disappear, which is an indication of assimilation mechanisms at play. In the full model, we also include the free-riding measure and the measure of institutional trust used above. The

latter turns insignificant, whereas the former is still highly significant. Taking these perceptions into account, the differences between the migrant groups increase a little again, which leaves us with a difference between the migrants from Turkey and ex-Yugoslavia, which just turns significant.

PERSISTENT DIFFERENCES AND MECHANISMS OF ASSIMILATION

This chapter has shown how living in a social-democratic welfare regime among natives goes together with a (relative) reluctance to (more) general redistribution and a positive moral assessment of “the poor” or those worst off in society. This somewhat paradoxical pattern is in line with previous research. The chapter has also shown that the migrants we have interviewed do not fully assimilate to the attitudes of the natives. In terms of attitudes to general redistribution, the Mifare-data showed that migrants living in Denmark hold fairly similar attitudes as those living in the country of origin. This absence of assimilation was formally tested by including the attitudes in the country of origin in regression models. In line with previous research, we found that attitudes to general redistribution in the country of origin are positively correlated with attitudes to general redistribution in the destination country. We also found that these differences were not simply caused by migrants being in different socio-economic positions in the destination country. In contrast, some of the differences in attitudes to general redistribution could be explained by differences in attitudes to state regulation of the economy and institutional trust; these were variables, which made, at the least, migrants in the Mifare-data more supportive for general redistribution than was the case among natives. Still, the Mifare-data demonstrated persistent differences across the migrant groups, which we take as a sign of an absence of assimilation. Finally, in terms of mechanisms, we found a strong assimilative effect from language skills and attitudes towards general redistribution, while there was no consistent correlation with length of stay in Denmark or national identification.

In terms of attitudes to poverty relief, the Comcon-data shows that migrants living in Denmark are less supportive than are natives. Again, these differences were not simply a reflection of different socio-economic positions of migrants. In fact, taking the weaker socio-economic position of the migrants in the Comcon survey into account, the difference to natives increased. The survey did not include variables about deservingness perceptions. However, we did demonstrate that perceptions of free-riding were strongly correlated to support for poverty relief. Taking differences in perceptions of free-riding into account, the differences between natives and migrants decreased. In terms of support for poverty relief, the Comcon survey also shows differences across the migrant groups. However, in contrast to the attitudes towards general redistri-

bution, most of these differences could be explained by our models. We found that language skills, living in non-ethnic couples, and obtained citizenship go together with higher support for poverty relief. Thus, we find a very different dynamic than what Luttmer and Singhal (2011) found in the American context. Native Danes are largely in favour of poverty relief and the socio-economic position of the groups did little to explain differences. Whether this also holds true for attitudes to giving migrants entitlement to social assistance is further analysed in Chapter 11.

9. Migrants' attitudes towards female employment

Migrants' gender role preferences and support for egalitarian gender norms are prominent in broader public and academic debates all over Western Europe (Eskelinen & Verkuyten, 2018). These concerns have also been prevalent within public and political debates in the Nordic welfare states for a number of years due to their strong commitment to cultural progressiveness in matters of sexuality, gender equality, and lifestyle. Furthermore, the Nordic welfare states are built upon the premise that men as well as women are active participants in the labour market. Being a "good citizen" is closely related to being integrated in the labour market (Breidahl, 2017). All this is in stark contrast to a situation where migrant women, especially from the Middle East and African countries, have been overrepresented in social assistance schemes for a number of years and hold remarkably lower employment rates than native women (Statistics Denmark, 2019).

Consequently, over the years it has become a widespread assumption that cultural legacy – often referred to as the prevalence of so-called "housewife mentality" in the broader public debate – suppresses egalitarian gender norms: Based on the assumption that norms and values from the country of origin hinder female employment. This problem perception is also prominent in numerous labour market integration policies that have been introduced in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden during the last decades as they are based on the assumption that traditional work–family orientations among migrants (particularly among migrants from countries that are predominantly Muslim) are obstacles to female labour market participation. Most notably, this is reflected in reforms of social assistance in Denmark and the reform aimed at migrants "*A New Chance for All*" introduced in 2005. The most controversial aspect of this reform was the so-called "300-hour rule", formally implemented in April 2007. The rule applied to everybody, regardless of citizenship or ethnicity; however, it was primarily targeted at migrants, especially migrant women (The Danish Government, 2005). The reform meant that married couples receiving welfare benefits lose their right to social welfare if they work less than 300 hours over a two-year period.¹ The rule was very controversial because it contained considerable work requirements and economic sanctions, and it was used for testing whether migrant women were actually available to the labour

market. In 2008, the work requirement was increased to 450 hours (Breidahl, 2012).

Addressing to what extent different migrant groups share egalitarian gender values and adapt to the ones held by natives allows us to shed light on some broader assumptions around housewife mentality in the public debate. It also contributes to the broader debate on whether migrants carry cultural values and norms with them or whether an assimilative impact of the institutions of the Danish welfare state can be identified. These questions have also been much discussed in existing research and the results point in different directions. Some studies find support for the cultural explanation based on an examination of gender gap differences in labour force participation and fertility across ethnic groups in the United States, based on the idea that the "culture" in the country of origin is pivotal for explaining gaps in labour force participation (Blau, Kahn, & Papps, 2011; Fernández & Fogli, 2009). Therefore, the effects from culture are separated from the effects of economic factors and institutions by studying the relationship between differences in labour force participation rates in the country of origin and the economic behaviour of migrants in the United States. The underlying rationale is that preferences and beliefs developed in a different time and place have an impact on current economic behaviour (Blau, Kahn, & Papps, 2011; Fernández & Fogli, 2009). These studies do not, however, examine subjective attitudes at the individual level. Rather they estimate traditional gender roles acquired in the country of origin as the *cause* of relatively low employment rates among first-generation female migrants.

Survey studies, directly measuring subjective attitudes, point in different directions. Some studies find that socio-cultural variables, such as gender values, are of crucial importance for low employment rates among female migrants (Koopmans, 2016). Others point out that a significant degree of adaptation in attitudes towards female employment to the host country have taken place from one generation to the next (e.g. Kavli, 2015; Norris & Inglehart, 2012). Moreover, a group of studies draw the conclusion that migrants' gender values tend to adapt to the ones held by natives (Andersen, 2008; Kitterød & Nadim, 2020; Spierings, 2015). Finally, a smaller number of comparative studies suggest that the institutional and cultural contexts of the host country have an impact on migrants' attitudes towards women's paid work (Breidahl & Larsen, 2016), but also that the country of origin is an important socializing determinant when it comes to gender equality norms more broadly (Röder, 2014; Röder & Mühlau, 2014). Looking into survey-based findings from Denmark, conducted over the last decades, they also point in different directions. Gundelach & Nørregård-Nielsen (2007) find remarkable group differences as some migrant groups (from Iraq, Vietnam, and Turkey) are considerably more inclined to support the statement that men should have the right to a job at the expense of women (if jobs are scarce) compared to other

migrant groups (from Pakistan and ex-Yugoslavia). The so-called “Citizenship survey” collected among native Danes, migrants, and descendants finds that the support for the item “men should have the right to a job” is higher among native Danes and descendants than among migrants. However, at the same time the majority in all groups tend to disagree with this statement (Ministry of Immigration and Integration, 2019; see also Andersen, 2008 for a similar finding).

The approach taken in this chapter (and the entire book) differs from existing research in this field by not only focusing on migrants from Muslim or non-Western countries (as most of the literature does), often based on the assumption that people born in these countries are socialized into more traditional gender roles and that they carry these values with them. Comparing 14 different migrant groups living within one context – the context of the Danish welfare state – opens up for a broader discussion and brings in new perspectives to the debate. Comparative welfare state research on the native population within the Western European context points out remarkable cross-national differences when it comes to attitudes towards gender roles and prevailing cultural norms supporting women’s paid and unpaid work, for example between Denmark, Germany, and Italy (Budig, Misra, & Boeckmann, 2012; Pfau-Effinger, 2006; Sjöberg, 2004). Therefore, it is not only interesting whether Muslim migrants adapt to the prevailing attitudes and norms in Denmark, but also how it compares to migrants in general.

The research design of this chapter has some limitations compared to some of the other studies referred to above, as it does not capture change over time (causality). However, as argued in Chapter 1, we make the argument that if broader similarities in attitudes among 14 rather different migrant groups can be identified, it supports the theoretical argument put forward in this book – that the institutions of the welfare state have a possible assimilative impact. One could also argue that if migrants’ attitudes resemble those prevalent among native Danes in terms of female employment we come closer to the “hard core” (Navas, García, Sánchez, Rojas, Pumares, & Fernández, 2005) as these attitudes largely come close to something personal.

THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE ASSIMILATIVE IMPACT OF WELFARE STATE INSTITUTIONS AND COMPETING PERSPECTIVES

The overall theoretical argument of the book relies on the assumption that *welfare state* institutions have the ability to influence or even shape the values and attitudes held by migrants due to the endogenous logic of welfare state institutions, their opportunity structures, and citizens’ experiences with these institutions.

It is well-known from comparative welfare state research that work–family policies, for example family policy constellations, are provided in different ways across countries (Pfau-Effinger, 2004) and that the nexus between the institutional structure of the state and the structure of the family is pivotal for women's labour market participation and their work–family orientations (Sjöberg, 2004). Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund (2013:8) differentiate between three different so-called “family-policy constellations” characterized by separate sets of legislated programmes: one based on the “traditional family”, a second based on the dual-earner family, and a third characterized as a market-oriented constellation (Korpi, Ferrarini, & Englund, 2013:8). The measure of these types of constellations is the extent to which these sets of legislated programmes “enable citizens to secure material support from public authorities in terms of cash and services facilitating gender equality” (Korpi, Ferrarini, & Englund, 2013:8).

The Nordic welfare states share several features in terms of prevalent cultural norms that support their long tradition of dual-earner family constellations and their well-developed family friendly childcare services (Breidahl & Larsen, 2016). Hence, Denmark (together with Sweden, Norway, and Finland) comes close to the ideal type of a dual-earner family constellation, while Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands are closer to the traditional family dimension (Korpi, Ferrarini, & Englund, 2013:11–12). Family policies in Denmark have, as in many other countries, also been subject to political reforms, but the overall approach in Denmark can still be characterized as a dual-earner career model (Breidahl & Fersch, 2018).

Therefore, the migrant groups studied in this book all live their lives in a specific cultural and institutional context for supporting mother's employment (which is different from, e.g. migrants settled in Great Britain, Germany etc.). This raises the question of whether this specific context also has the ability to influence their attitudes towards female employment (the institutional argument) or whether their attitudes in this field are more deep-rooted due to cultural legacy.

As regards institutional opportunity structures of certain policy institutions – in this case family policies – they can be expected to have an impact on attitudes held by residents – natives as well as migrants. The feedback mechanisms from family-policy institutions are thereby exogenous to migrants' preferences and based on the premise that the opportunity structures provided by family policies, for example childcare, create opportunities that women will take advantage of and, consequently, change their attitudes according to these opportunity structures.

Family-policy institutions can also have an impact on citizens' non-instrumental norms about work due to *endogenous institutional logics*. Hence, the conditions of Danish family policies could have an impact on what

migrants see as morally justifiable (e.g. logic of appropriateness) – a view that is expected to influence their attitudes towards female employment.

The empirical insights in this chapter allow us to study in detail whether 14 rather different migrant groups support these underlying values of the welfare state in spite of differences in self-interest and cultural background (cf. Chapters 4 and 5). We cannot, however, draw clear-cut conclusions about these theoretical mechanisms. If institutions matter, we cannot say anything definitive about whether it is because of available opportunity structures (that it is possible to put children into day-care and combine work and family life) or because this is what migrants regard as morally justifiable due to endogenous institutional logics. As stated in the introductory chapter of the book, real-world actors are embedded in a complex process, where ambiguous norms and values are constantly moulded (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Following this logic, the book relies on the assumption that institutions influence self-interests, values, norms, perceptions, and welfare attitudes and it is difficult to detangle these dimensions (cf. Figure 1.1).

A closer examination of the empirical results can, however, give us some hints on the underlying mechanisms. For example, if policy institutions matter as opportunity structures we should expect that families with children and migrants in employment are more supportive towards female employment based on the logic that institutions influence the interest of individuals – and that these interests influence their attitudes.

Furthermore, a number of background variables, which the existing literature have pointed out as important predictors of gender role attitudes, are taken into account, for example socio-economic composition and religious orientation (Diehl, Koenig, & Ruckdeschel, 2009).

DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES ACROSS GROUPS – DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS

Before examining the 14 migrant groups living in the Danish welfare state, we start out by paying attention to broader cross-national differences in attitudes depicted in Figures 9.1 and 9.2. These figures compare attitudes towards female employment in the countries where the 14 migrant groups studied in this book were born (except from a few countries). Survey data from the World Value Survey (WVS) (2010–2014), European Social Survey (2010, in European Social Survey, 2018), and International Social Survey (2012, in ISSP Research Group, 2016) are utilized covering the age group 18–60.² Figure 9.1, left-side, depicts the level of progressive values in a number of countries – measured as disagreement with the statement “*When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women*”. In a similar vein, in Figure 9.1, right-side,

support for progressive gender values is measured as disagreement in the statement *"When a mother works for pay, the children suffer"*.

Although these results should be interpreted with caution, as we cannot compare the migrant groups living in Denmark with the residents in their country of origin (e.g. selection effects), the results in both figures demonstrate large and remarkable cross-national differences. Hence, as regards the question of whether men should have more right to a job than women (when jobs are scarce) around 20 per cent disagree on this statement in a number of countries (Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Japan) while a majority disagree on this statement in Denmark, Spain, and the USA. Moreover, as regards the question of whether children are likely to suffer from a mother working outside the home, we see a pattern where a minority in Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Poland disagree with this statement.

Attitudes Towards Female Employment Among Migrants Living in Denmark

If attitudes towards female employment reflect "cultural legacies" from the country of origin, the large cross-national country differences illustrated in Figures 9.1 and 9.2 should also be reflected in attitudes towards female employment among the 14 migrant groups living within the Danish welfare state. The two statements in 9.1 and 9.2 differ slightly from the items utilized from Comcon and Mifare in the next section, but the items more or less capture the same attitudinal dimensions – whether women should stay at home or not.


When comparing results from the Mifare survey and the Comcon survey below, one should recognize that the items from each survey differ slightly.

Mifare: A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family.

Comcon: Women should not work but stay at home and look after the children.

However, overall, the wording is quite similar and – as will appear from below – the results do not differ much for the groups who are represented in both surveys (e.g. for migrants from Turkey, which figure in both surveys).


Figure 9.2 compares the descriptive results on attitudes towards female employment between the Mifare migrant groups and native Danes, focusing on levels of disagreement in the statements – *"a man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family"* – an indicator of embracing progressive attitudes towards female employment. The figure also demonstrates gender differences in these attitudes.



Note: Left-side, attitudes towards whether men are more entitled to jobs than women when jobs are scarce. Residents in Denmark (ESS 2010 survey) and origin countries (WVS 2010–2014 survey). Right-side, attitudes towards whether children suffer when the mother is employed. Residents in Denmark (ISSP 2012 survey) and origin countries (WVS 2010–2014 survey). Per cent disagree.

Source: Data collected from the ESS 2010 survey (European Social Survey, 2018), WVS 2010–2014 survey (World Value Survey, 2016), and ISSP 2012 survey (ISSP Research Group, 2016).

Figure 9.1 Attitudes to female employment




Note: Migrants and natives in Denmark (Mifare survey). Per cent “strongly against”, and “against”.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 9.2 Attitudes towards whether it is a man's job to earn money while the woman's job is to look after home and family

For all Mifare groups the majority of the respondents express egalitarian gender value attitudes as the majority are “strongly against” or “against” the statement “a man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family”. However, the results also indicate some internal group differences. Migrants from the Philippines, Russia, Turkey, Japan, China, and Poland hold attitudes that are more conservative compared to the rest of the groups. However, compared to the results in Figures 9.1 and 9.2 the differences are modest. The gender differences are also modest except for migrants from the Philippines and Poland where the men are considerably less progressive. Women in most groups tend to express values that are slightly more progressive.

Figure 9.3 depicts the results for the Comcon groups where most respondents in each group “strongly disagree” or “somewhat disagree” in the statement that “Women should not work but stay at home and look after the children”. Again, some smaller internal group differences appear. Native Danes and migrants from ex-Yugoslavia and Iraq hold slightly more egalitarian attitudes than the rest – and migrants from Pakistan hold considerably more traditional views.



Note: Migrants and natives in Denmark (Comcon survey). Per cent “strongly disagree” and “somewhat disagree”.

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 9.3 *Attitudes towards whether women should not work but stay at home and look after the children*

It is interesting to observe from Figure 9.3 how men across all groups express slightly more progressive attitudes towards female employment than women do. This challenges the widespread assumption in the public Danish debate that value-conservative husbands in general suppress migrant women (with a Muslim background). It is also interesting that the results slightly point in different directions than in the Mifare-data where women express more progressive values than men (Figure 9.2).


PATTERNS BEHIND ATTITUDES TOWARDS FEMALE EMPLOYMENT

As the descriptive results in the section above reveal, the differences between the 14 migrant groups are not remarkable and indicate that some degree of attitudinal assimilation has taken place. However, some differences also appear and the descriptive results raise a number of questions. To what extent do the observed differences (e.g. the fact that migrants from Pakistan and Russia express less egalitarian attitudes towards female employment) reflect compositional differences in terms of education and employment or reflect degrees of religiosity? A number of OLS-regressions are presented below that allow us to take into account a number of factors and provide cross-model comparison.

First, we compare the Mifare migrant groups with native Danes to capture some of the underlying mechanisms. The regressions are depicted in a way that allows us to illustrate whether the internal group differences decrease (or increase) when control variables are included. Hence, we are interested in whether including a number of factors in the regressions can help explain differences between the groups or, in other words, whether attitudinal differences persist when a number of factors are taken into account.

As it appears from Figure 9.4, some smaller but significant group differences appear in the binary model (model 1). These differences are not reduced much after control for compositional factors (age, gender, household status, social benefits, education, labour market status, or religiosity (model 2), or having children (model 3). The difference to native Danes is still persistent after control. Most of the Mifare groups embrace progressive gender attitudes towards female employment but some group differences persist. The least progressive group appears to be migrants from Russia.

A number of factors have a significant influence on attitudes towards female employment. Older people and women hold more progressive values than younger people and men. Higher-educated and employed people also express attitudes that are more progressive. Not having children also tends to have a positive effect. This indicates that attitudes towards female employment do not solely reflect self-interest or opportunity structures. Being religious also tends to have a negative impact.




Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing native Danes (vertical line) to the migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=2,780.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 9.4 Attitudes towards whether it is a man's job is to earn money while the woman's job is to look after home and family (0–100 scale)

Next, we direct attention to Figure 9.5 where native Danes are excluded from the regression, which allows us to take a number of migrant-specific factors into account including national identification, time spent in Denmark, and having citizenship or not. As a reference group, we have selected migrants from Great Britain as they come closest to native Danes in Figure 9.4. Models 1, 2, and 3 include the same variables as Figure 9.4. Model 4 includes the relevant specific factors cf. above.

We see a pattern in Figure 9.5 that is similar to Figure 9.4. However, for some groups the difference to the reference group (GBR) disappears and/or are reduced remarkably. For three groups the differences are not significant after control – migrants from Romania, Turkey, and the USA. Interestingly enough, time spent in Denmark does not seem to have an influence on attitudes towards female employment for these groups. This indicates that assimilation patterns do not follow time spent in the new home country. On the other hand, having citizenship tends to influence these attitudes.



Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing migrants from Great Britain (vertical line) to the other migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=2,491.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 9.5 *Attitudes towards whether it is a man's job is to earn money while the woman's job is to look after home and family (0–100 scale)*

Looking next at the Comcon migrant groups, the patterns illustrated in the coefficient plot in Figure 9.6, left-side, is quite different from the Mifare groups as the group differences for most groups disappear after controlling for a number of factors in the models. Only migrants from Pakistan remain significantly less progressive than the other groups after control. This is interesting taking into account that migrants from Turkey, another migrant group who


have stayed in Denmark for a number of years and also came to Denmark as guest workers (or due to family reunification to guest workers), do not appear to be significantly different from native Danes after control. The findings for Turkish migrants to some extent resemble the findings from the Turkish group in the Mifare-data where they do not differ much from native Danes after control. A number of variables tend to influence attitudes towards female employment including gender (men are significantly more egalitarian than women), education, being employed, not having children, living in a mixed couple, and religiosity. Hence, in line with existing literature, people that are more religious also express less progressive gender role values.

The picture does not differ much in the right-side of Figure 9.6 only focusing on the five Comcon groups (where migrants from ex-Yugoslavia figure as the control group). Again, only migrants from Pakistan express less progressive attitudes towards female employment – also after control. Only a few factors seem to influence attitudes in this regression including level of education, not having children, living in a mixed couple, and years spent in the country (which did not have an influence on the Mifare groups). Other variables such as language skills, religiosity, and having a Danish citizenship do not seem to matter.

BROADLY SUPPORT FOR THE DUAL EARNER MODEL

Most of the 14 migrant groups living in Denmark seem to support progressive attitudes towards female employment, as their attitudes largely resemble those who are prevalent among native Danes. These similarities in attitudes are striking considering the rather remarkable differences in Figures 9.1 and 9.2 from the World Value Survey (cf. the first indicator of assimilation). Moreover, attitudes towards female employment can be considered as belonging to the “hard core” (cf. Chapter 2). Consequently, these findings indicate that the institutions of the welfare state could possibly have an assimilative impact on these attitudes as the 14 migrant groups studied in this book are living within a welfare state context that in several ways support women (and men's) employment, for example as regards the opportunity structures as well as prevalent endogenous norms and values.

The findings also indicate that migrants from Muslim countries are not necessarily the least progressive in terms of gender equality. Rather, a number of migrant groups from the Mifare-data (from Russia, the Philippines, and China) express less progressive attitudes towards female employment compared to native Danes – also after control for a number of background variables. For the Comcon groups, it is only migrants from Pakistan that hold significantly less progressive values compared to native Danes. Compared to attitudes towards female employment more broadly, and in the countries of origin for the groups



Note: Comcon survey. Regression models comparing native Danes (vertical line) to the migrant groups, N=1,181 (left). Regression models comparing migrants from ex-Yugoslavia (vertical line) to the other migrant groups, N=361 (right).
Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 9.6 Attitudes towards whether women should not work but stay at home and look after the children (0–100 scale)

included here, the differences among the Comcon groups are rather small. As pointed out in the literature review, most attention in research on attitudes towards female labour market participation focuses on migrants from countries that are predominantly Muslim. The results in this chapter seem to suggest that we should be careful about accepting these assumptions uncritically. Most migrants from these countries in Denmark (represented in this survey) seem to be at least as supportive as most other migrant groups.

A number of factors appear to influence migrants' attitudes towards female employment depending on which groups we are studying. When natives are included in the regression, education, not having children, being employed, and being less religious tend to have a positive effect on holding progressive values. Interestingly, national identification and language skills do not seem to explain the differences in attitudes between the groups. Time spent in the country has a positive effect on the Comcon groups but not for the Mifare groups. On the other hand, having citizenship influences the attitudes of the Mifare groups but not the attitudes of the Comcon groups.

We do not find that people with children (who thereby are more dependent on welfare services) are significantly more progressive than people without children. Rather, migrants without children express more progressive attitudes towards female employment. This indicates that the attitudes we measure here do not only reflect how opportunity structures alter the interest of people.

Finally, it is important to point out that the results in this chapter do not allow us to conclude that cultural legacy or migrant-specific features are not hindering labour market participation. As stated in the introduction, employment rates among some migrant groups (e.g. from Muslim countries) are remarkably lower than among native women and they are highly overrepresented among social-assistance receivers.

NOTES

1. In the first year, from 1 April 2007 to 1 April 2008, the requirement was 150 hours of ordinary work within the last year.
2. Ten out of 14 countries of origin are included in WVS and Denmark is not included.

10. Migrants' attitudes towards public childcare

One of the characteristics that define the Nordic countries is a larger reliance on in-kind welfare services such as healthcare, childcare, and elderly care. According to the OECD, Denmark spends around 13.3 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on in-kind welfare services. In a comparative perspective, this puts Denmark second in the world just after Sweden (13.9 per cent of GDP) and before Norway (11.7 per cent), and at nearly double the average of the OECD (7.4 per cent) in that ranking (OECD, 2020a). Social services are thus a key feature of the Nordic welfare states and play an important role in most residents' lives. This is due to the countries' high degree of universalism where most residents are entitled to more or less the same level of social services. Furthermore, most social services are organized by the state – including health, education, and care for a number of groups like the elderly, disabled, and children – and is therefore predominantly a public responsibility. Studies on the provision and organization of childcare are a well-elaborated research field, and although this area has been subject to a number of reforms, Denmark and the other Nordic countries continue to stand out from other Western European countries due to their remarkably high coverage rates and dual-earner family model (Breidahl & Fersch, 2018; Korpi, Ferrarini, & Englund, 2013).

In this chapter, we direct attention towards childcare provision and the extent to which the 14 migrant groups studied in this book living within the Danish welfare state support public and formally provided childcare. Almost all residents are regularly in contact with social services during their lives and thereby subject to policy feedback from these institutions of the welfare state.

The use of public childcare services among families has received considerable public and academic interest in recent years for at least two reasons. First, public childcare is highlighted as a way to better enable parents to reconcile work and family and thereby support a dual-earner family and female labour market participation. Second, high coverage rates in public childcare provision are framed as an important element in increasing fertility rates, and public childcare has received considerable interest due to the prominence of the social investment agenda and the focus on cognitive improvement at an early point in life (Seibel & Hedegaard, 2017).

The Danish context of childcare provision is – in a comparative context – characterized by a comprehensive childcare system and rather high coverage rates. Hence, almost all children between the ages of one and five years attend formal childcare in Denmark. The general coverage rate for children in Denmark is at a high level, around 82–85 per cent for those aged 2–5, and Denmark has invested many resources in early childcare provision during the years (Rostgaard, 2014). As regards children with a migrant background, the take-up rate of childcare is also very high. The differences between children with migrant backgrounds and natives as regards children aged 1–2 years are 5 percentage points. For older children in the age group 3–5 years the difference is non-existent (FOA, 2019). Part of the explanation of the high take-up rates is probably due to the relatively low price and heavy government subsidies of the payment. The price of childcare varies by age group and municipality, but each municipality is obliged to pay at least 75 per cent of the price and there are programmes to help low-income earners and those with siblings also attending public childcare (Borger.dk, 2020).

In spite of these small differences in the take-up rate, there has been much political and public interest in the subject. Especially the non-Western children living in vulnerable residential areas, also known as “Ghetto-areas”, have received much interest due to concerns for early socialization into so-called Danish democratic values and Danish language proficiency. This is in spite of the fact that when singling out this relatively small group there is not much difference in take-up rates, especially for children who are older than two years (FOA, 2019). The interest in migrant children from vulnerable residential areas is based on an assumption that this group in particular will benefit from early institutionalization into Danish day-care institutions. The assumption is that integration into childcare institutions at an early point in life can promote socio-cultural integration patterns among migrants and descendants in the longer run and, most notably, the language skills of small children with a migrant background. These ideas and intentions were in 2018 materialized in a number of policy proposals presented as a part of the “Ghetto plan” that the Danish parliament passed in the spring of 2018 (Government of Denmark, 2018). The plan dictates that the parents of small children living in specific areas can be forced to sign up their children and make sure they show up regularly in public day-care institutions from the age of one. If the parents do not consent, the municipality can withhold the child support benefit. This strong involvement from the state in people’s daily lives reflects some more general paternalistic features of the Danish welfare state, but also an overall integration philosophy that is not only concerned with how migrants behave – but also how they “think” (Breidahl, 2019).

A number of studies have examined public support and attitudes towards childcare provision in a comparative cross-national perspective among the

general population (Ainsaar, 2012; Chung & Meuleman, 2017; Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Meuleman & Chung, 2012). The question of how migrants born in another context than they currently live approach childcare provision is less explored except for a few exceptions. Seibel and Hedegaard (2017) compare the attitudes towards childcare of nine migrant groups with the attitudes of natives in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands and find, among others, that migrants are less inclined to support public childcare (more supportive towards informal childcare) and that cross-national differences appear. A survey study from Denmark finds that the majority in a number of migrant groups disagree with the statement that “children are likely to suffer if their mother is working” but also that some migrants express considerably more conservative attitudes than others do (Gundelach & Nørregård-Nielsen, 2007).

Migrants' attitudes towards childcare is important to study more deeply as migrant children with poor language skills (most notably a number from the Middle East and African countries) have, as pointed out above, been emphasized as a group that will benefit the most from participating in high-quality childcare facilities. Thus, as pointed out above, public childcare has in recent years been framed as an instrument to facilitate and promote female labour market participation (see Chapter 9), in particular among women from the Middle East and African countries, and as an instrument to facilitate early language proficiency among children with a migrant background.

THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE ASSIMILATIVE IMPACT OF WELFARE STATE INSTITUTIONS AND COMPETING PERSPECTIVES

The broader institutional argument presented in Chapter 2 is central to the theoretical discussion in this chapter, shedding light on whether natives and these 14 rather different migrant groups (cf. Chapters 4 and 5) share attitudes on childcare: Do the findings point to a broader assimilative impact of welfare state institutions or can notable attitudinal differences be identified? The theoretical argument in this chapter bears some similarities to the discussion in Chapter 9 on the role of the opportunity structures, different family policy constellations, and endogenous institutional logics.

What is important in the institutional context for attitudes towards childcare provision is the type of family policy constellations at stake. As emphasized in Chapter 9, Denmark, together with the other Nordic countries, belongs to the dual-earner family policy constellation – and thereby differs from countries where the legislated programmes come closer to the “traditional family” model or the market-oriented constellation (Korpi, Ferrarini, & Englund, 2013). Based on the policy feedback argument emphasizing “that how things are affect perceptions of how things should be” (cf. Chapter 7), we should expect

that living in one constellation rather than another could have an impact on attitudes towards spending on childcare and the organizing thereof (Breidahl & Larsen, 2016). It is difficult to distinguish between whether attitudes to public childcare adhere to a “logic of consequentiality” or a “logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 2006; Sjöberg, 2004). If we want to focus on the “logic of consequentiality” then we have to look at the opportunity structures of certain policy institutions and how they are expected to have an impact on attitudes, values, and norms of migrants. On the other hand, the “logic of appropriateness” hints to the endogenous logic of welfare state institutions and how they underpin certain societal norms, understandings, and values. However, compared to attitudes towards female employment (cf. Chapter 9), studying attitudes towards public childcare it is probably more appropriate to use the institutional argument emphasizing the role of available opportunity structures, as attitudes towards childcare provision are a better indicator of (institutional) self-interest. Moreover, in the literature on attitudes towards childcare provision, self-interest figures as one of the most prominent explanations emphasizing that those families with children more strongly support these services than people who are not in need of them (Seibel & Hedegaard, 2017). Thus, the available provision to put children into day-care and combine work and family life are expected to influence the interest of residents towards spending. The regression analysis in this chapter allows us to go a bit more into depth with the influence of opportunity structures, and the premise that the opportunity structures provided by family policies, for example, childcare, create opportunities that women will take advantage of, even if it challenges their traditional beliefs about childcare (Breidahl & Fersch, 2018). The groups that are expected to benefit from formal childcare are families with children and employed.

Another prominent explanation when it comes to attitudes towards spending is the influence of values and norms (an indicator of cultural legacy). This perspective comes close to the “house-wife mentality” argument presented in Chapter 9, and is based on the assumption that being religious and holding conservative attitudes towards gender roles predicts attitudes towards childcare provision and spending. As regards the cultural explanation, we take a number of things into account: As already pointed out in Chapter 9, migrants from the 14 migrant groups studied here come from national contexts where support for gender equality is at a much lower level than in Denmark. One could argue that if individuals do not support women’s participation on the labour market then they are not that likely to support childcare provision supported by the state. It is also a common finding that people who are more religious have values that are more conservative.

Moreover, Figure 9.2 in Chapter 9 demonstrated quite remarkable and large cross-national differences in perceptions on whether preschool children

are likely to suffer if their mother is working. Hence, a rather small amount of the residents in Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Poland, and Turkey disagreed on this statement. Are these attitudes from the country of origin also reflected in attitudes towards public childcare in their new destination country?


DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS: DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS PUBLIC SPENDING

To shed light on the extent to which migrants assimilate to the welfare attitudes of native Danes, when it comes to childcare provision three items from the two surveys are utilized. From the Mifare survey we get two items. The first measures whether the public sector should spend more or less on childcare provision: *"Listed below are again various areas of government spending in Denmark. Please show ... whether you would like to see more or less government spending (on) childcare care services"*. This was answered on a 5-point scale from "much less" to "much more". The Mifare survey also includes an item on who should be responsible for the organization of childcare provision: *"Who do you think should primarily provide help to working parents who need childcare?"*. Here the options were: "family members and friends", "people that live nearby", "government agencies", "non-profit organizations", "private providers that are paid for", and "cannot choose". For the purpose of this chapter, we will focus on the group who chose "government agencies" and compare those with other options.

The Comcon survey has one item measuring government responsibility for providing childcare provision. Here the question is *"Would you say that the government or the individual has the responsibility when it comes to childcare? You are asked to answer on a scale from zero to ten, where zero represents that the individual is fully responsible and 10 represents that the government has the responsibility"*.

As in the other chapters all three variables have been transformed into 0–100 scales, where higher scores indicate more support for spending on or government responsibility for public childcare, depending on the question. The different items are not directly comparable as the Comcon item focuses on responsibility – should the government or the individual be responsible – while the Mifare item focuses more on how the respondent responds to the current spending situation (more or less) and responsibility for providing these services. However, indirectly all three measures can help us identify whether the different migrant groups are for or against more government responsibility in this area. As attitudes to childcare have a strong gender dimension, we will present the attitudes for men, women, and the two groups combined.

Figure 10.1 depicts the question of public spending on childcare for the Mifare groups – measuring whether the respondents want more or less government spending on childcare care services (on a 5-point scale from “much less” to “much more”). This is shown as averages on the 0–100 scale for the group in total and divided by gender.



Note: Migrants and natives in Denmark (Mifare survey). Scale ranging from “Much less” (0) to “Much more” (100).

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).


Figure 10.1 Attitudes towards public spending on childcare (0–100 scale)

Figure 10.1 shows how the majority in all groups want to spend a little more on public childcare, as reflected by the average scores that are between 60 and 70 for most groups (the exception being the men originating from the Philippines). This is driven by a majority in almost all migrant groups stating that they want to spend the same on childcare (not shown). The exception to this is the migrant group from Turkey where the dominant answer was “spend more”, which is also reflected in their high average score. This indicates satisfaction with the status quo. Here we have to take into account how the government spending on childcare in Denmark is already at a rather high level. In general, the differences are rather small and within a 10-point gap when looking at the combined group of men and women.

As regards gender differences, they are rather small for these groups and no overall pattern can be identified – sometimes men are the most supportive and sometimes it is the other way around. We do not find the expected gender

difference, for either Danes or migrants. The biggest discrepancy we find is when comparing men and women originating from the Philippines. This is interesting and surprising, but as we can also see this does not affect the combined score much as the group consists of 90 per cent women.

Next, we look at attitudes towards the organization of childcare, also from the Mifare survey. This is depicted in Figure 10.2, and here we distinguish between those who prefer government agencies on the one hand and those who prefer other solutions – family members, friends, and people nearby or non-public agencies – on the other. This question is also related to the distinction between formal and informal care – whether childcare should be provided formally or informally.



Note: Migrants and natives in Denmark (Mifare survey). Percentage choosing “Government agencies” rather than “family and friends”, “people that live nearby”, “non-profit organizations”, “private providers that are paid for” or “cannot choose”.


Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 10.2 Attitudes towards whether the government should have primary responsibility for childcare

As we can see from Figure 10.2 the majority in most groups, except for migrants from Romania, express that state agencies should mainly be responsible for providing childcare. This is reflected in them having scores of 50 or above. When examining this figure, we find some larger group differences than we did in Figure 10.1. It appears that Danes and migrants from Russia are the most supportive of government agencies providing childcare while migrants from the US, Romania, Poland, and China are the least supportive. This finding thus partially contradicts assumptions about the assimilative impact of the welfare state.

We also find much larger gender differences in this regard. For the migrants from Turkey, the Philippines, and the US we find that the men are more supportive of government organization of childcare. For the Danes and the rest of the migrant groups we find the opposite picture, that the women are more supportive of government-organized welfare. This difference between the genders is quite large for the migrants from Russia, Japan, Poland, China, and Romania.

Next, we turn to the Comcon groups. As described above, this survey gives us one item on government versus individual responsibility for providing childcare. Figure 10.3 presents the descriptive results on attitudes towards government responsibility for childcare provision. This is presented for women, men, and combined for the five Comcon migrant groups, from Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Danes.



Note: Migrants and natives in Denmark (Comcon survey). Scale ranging from “The individual is responsible” (0) to “It is a government responsibility” (100).

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 10.3 Attitudes towards government responsibility for childcare (0–100 scale)

If we start looking at the overall mean value for each group, we see a pattern where most of the groups are more inclined to support government responsibility rather than individual responsibility in providing childcare (as the mean is closer to 100 than to 0). Some internal group differences also appear: Most notably, migrants from ex-Yugoslavia are more inclined to support state responsibility for childcare compared to the other groups. Migrants from

Lebanon, Iraq, and Pakistan do, to a lower extent, support government responsibility in providing childcare.

Again, it is interesting to observe the remarkable gender differences in attitudes for some of the groups. Hence, for all groups we see a pattern where men and women disagree on this issue and where the gender differences are bigger than the differences in attitudes across groups. It is particularly interesting to observe how women from Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, and ex-Yugoslavia are less inclined to support government responsibility in this area compared to men. Especially women from Lebanon are much less supportive towards government responsibility.


Compared to the findings in Chapter 7 (for the five Comcon groups) the results in Figure 10.3 illustrate how the support for the government providing childcare is at a lower level than for providing help for the sick, old, and the unemployed (the same findings for native Danes). Hence, as appeared from Chapter 7, we have a pattern where natives and the 14 migrant groups to a large extent share a very similar view of what the role of the government should be in relation to helping the sick, the old, the unemployed, and those unable to work.

PATTERNS BEHIND ATTITUDES TO CHILDCARE

The descriptive results reveal how the different migrant groups from an overall point of view share attitudes towards childcare – as the majority are supportive towards government responsibility and rather high spending. On the other hand, some notable differences also appear. The question becomes how to interpret these observed differences in spending attitudes across the groups? Do the differences disappear when we control for compositional effects and gender attitudes, and what role does self-interest and cultural attitudes play? In order to go more into depth with these perspectives, we control for a number of factors in the OLS-regression models below – illustrated as coefficient plots. Figures 10.4 and 10.5 focus on the Mifare groups and Figures 10.6 and 10.7 on the Comcon groups. From the Mifare survey we only used the question concerning spending preferences, shown in Figure 10.1, as the other one is a binary variable that is not suitable for the OLS-models we use for the coefficient plots.

All the figures are structured around three or four models, depending on whether the Danes are included or not. The first model only contains the origin countries and is therefore called the binary model. These results are largely similar to those in Figures 10.1 and 10.3, though some minor differences can occur due to list-wise deletion when building the hierarchical models. In the second model we control for the compositional differences between the groups by controlling for the variables covered in Chapters 3 and 4. Here we

thus control for age, gender, income, benefits, employment, education, partner status, and religiosity. In the third model we control for whether the respondents have children and their gender values, both factors that the literature points to as important for migrants' attitudes to childcare (Seibel & Hedegaard, 2017). The fourth model contains the variables that are only relevant when comparing the migrant groups. This is variables on the number of years lived in Denmark, language skills, citizenship, and identification with Denmark in the Comcon survey and the origin country in Mifare.



Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing native Danes (vertical line) to the migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=2,431.


Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 10.4 Attitudes towards public spending on childcare (0–100 scale)

As we can see from Figure 10.4 the differences in the binary model are quite small. This is not a surprise since this is also what we found in Figure 10.1, but from this we can see what happens when applying 95 per cent confidence intervals. Here we find that in the initial models, when compared to the Danes, the migrants from Romania and Turkey are significantly more positive towards public spending. On the other hand, then, migrants from the US and the Philippines are significantly less supportive of public spending on childcare. However, it is important to mind the scale on the x-axis, as we can see that the differences are within +/- five points on the 0–100 scale. Thus,

while we find significant differences in attitudes, they are still relatively small in absolute terms.

We can also see that adding the models on compositional differences between the groups explains why the migrants from the USA and the Philippines are less supportive of public spending than the Danes. However, adding the compositional differences and the variables on having children and gender values does not explain why the migrants from Turkey and Romania are significantly more positive towards public spending on childcare. This finding indicates some degree of self-interest or an impact of institutional opportunity structures. On the other hand, adding the variables on having children and values around gender equality does not influence spending attitudes for these groups. Therefore, it seems that spending attitudes for these groups do not reflect some sort of cultural legacy. In general, we also see that these variables do not cause much movement in the differences, meaning that they do not explain much of the differences in attitudes between the Danes and the migrant groups.



Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing migrants from Great Britain (vertical line) to the other migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=2,229.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 10.5 Attitudes towards spending on childcare (0–100 scale)

Figure 10.5 shows whether there are any differences between the migrant groups. Similar to Chapter 9, migrants from Great Britain are used as the


dummy as they come rather close to the attitudes of native Danes. The results in Figure 10.5 do not differ much from Figure 10.4. The reference group here is the migrants from Great Britain and again the migrants from Turkey are slightly more willing to spend public money on childcare, while the migrants from the US are slightly less willing to support public spending on childcare. Again, we need to remember that the differences are small and all within a range of \pm five points. As in Figure 10.4, we find that it is largely the compositional differences that explain the variations in attitudes. We also see that adding the variables that are only relevant to migrants – the number of years lived in Denmark, language skills, citizenship, and identification with country of origin – does not really seem to matter, when looking at the intergroup differences.

Finally, we direct attention to the Comcon groups in Figure 10.6. Comparing the five groups to the Danes in terms of government responsibility in providing childcare demonstrates larger differences than for the Mifare groups. On the left-side, we can see that compared to the Danes the migrants from Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan are significantly less supportive of government responsibility for childcare than the Danes. These differences are partially explained for the migrants from Iraq and Lebanon when applying the compositional model, but not to the level where the differences are insignificant (at $p > 0.05$). Adding the model of having children and gender values does not close this gap, and if anything, it widens it slightly. Therefore, we are left with some small differences in attitudes we cannot explain using theories and variables used in this book.

The right side of Figure 10.6 depicts only the differences between the migrant groups, with the migrants from ex-Yugoslavia serving as the reference group, as they come closest to the attitudes of native Danes. Here we can see that the migrants from Iraq and Lebanon are significantly less supportive of public responsibility for childcare than the migrants from ex-Yugoslavia. Adding the controls for the compositional effects does little to explain differences in attitudes for these groups. The models that add having children and gender values move the needle very little, but the migrant relevant variables on migrants from ex-Yugoslavia do. Adding this makes the differences insignificant for all groups except the migrants from Lebanon. If we look into the models (not shown here), we see that it is especially the variables on the number of years lived in Denmark that seems to matter.

BROADLY SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC CHILDCARE AND SOME DIVERGENT TRENDS

In this chapter, we have examined attitudes towards childcare provision among the 14 migrant groups living within the Danish welfare state – and thereby



Note: Comcon survey. Regression models comparing native Danes (vertical line) to the migrant groups, N=1,181 (left). Regression models comparing migrants from ex-Yugoslavia (vertical line) to the other migrant groups, N=361 (right). OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals.

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 10.6 Attitudes towards government responsibility for childcare provision

an institutional context characterized by high take-up rates on childcare and a context where the pressure as well as opportunities to live according to the dual-earner family ideal are rather strong. This institutional context is rather unique in a broader comparative perspective and the question therefore becomes whether “how things are” in the Danish welfare state has an effect on perceptions of “how things should be” among these rather different migrant groups.

The overall empirical findings of this chapter point in different directions. On the one hand, the results indicate that the 14 different migrant groups to a high extent share attitudes with native Danes towards childcare. Most of the Mifare groups support childcare spending levels as they are currently (or want even more) and the majority among the Comcon groups agree that it is a government responsibility to provide childcare. For the Mifare groups, we also see that some groups are more supportive towards increased public spending than native Danes (Turks and to some extent Romanians).

This finding is remarkable taking into account how different the countries of origin appear when it comes to formal childcare provision and, not least, as regards attitudes towards whether children suffer if the mother works. The similarities are also remarkable taking into account that the groups are rather different as regards taxes paid and benefits received (cf. Chapter 5). For many groups, men and women hold different attitudes and for some items, the differences between men and women are larger than between groups.

Although the support for government responsibility in general is strong (the mean rather high) among the Comcon groups, it is interesting to observe that it is also an area where the support is lowest compared to supporting government responsibility within other areas of the welfare state (cf. Chapter 7).

In spite of the overall impression of “shared attitudes” some differences also appear – most remarkable in terms of attitudes towards the provision of childcare among the Mifare groups where native Danes are remarkably more supportive towards government agencies providing childcare compared to, for example, migrants from Romania, China, the Philippines, and the US. Here it is important to point out that even though they are rather supportive towards public spending on childcare it does not say anything about whether childcare should be provided by the state, private providers, or non-government institutions as government spending can go to different types of operators. This reminds us to be aware of not directly comparing different survey measures. Also, in this case, the three used items differ in a number of ways.

Looking at the factors that explain the identified group differences, and thereby have an effect on these attitudes, we find that it is largely the compositional differences covered in Chapters 4 and 5 that seem to explain the differences. On the other hand, then, controlling for factors such as gender values, identification with Denmark or the origin country, and time lived in Denmark

does not help explain differences. Therefore, the relatively small differences in attitudes we find seem to be structured more by differences in the composition of the groups and self-interest than cultural legacies.

What do these results tell us? Do we – from an overall perspective – share values across different ethnic groups or not? The overall conclusion is yes – most seem to agree that the “government solution” is desirable.

PART IV

11. Attitudes to migrants' access to equal social rights

The previous chapters have shown that migrants' welfare state attitudes in many ways resemble those of natives. In this chapter, we describe how the 14 migrant groups respond to questions about respectively including or excluding migrants from access to social services and benefits. As we will show below, the question of migrants' social rights is often subject to a public debate that tends to polarize along political lines. How migrants view this is not quite as obvious.

One way of theorizing these attitudes is to think of the nation-state as a club that delivers several club-goods to its members. These club-goods are often characterized by being available to everyone that resides within the territory. In the words of Olson: "The basic and most elementary goods or services provided by the government, like defence and police protection, and the system of law and order generally, are such that they go to everyone or practically everyone in the nation" (Olson, 1971:14). The classic worry within economic and political theory is the free-rider problem. If you establish a club with low potential for excluding potential beneficiaries, who would then be willing to pay for establishing these goods? Thus, one of the main reasons for having a state is to establish these goods through forced taxation and sanctioning of free-riders, by using the state's monopoly on violence (law and order). Following the argument in Chapter 2, our prediction is that this basic institutional structure of a state is likely to establish logics of both consequentiality and appropriateness among natives and migrants.

The presence of state borders, however, does not mean that it is rational to close state borders. In the initial formulation of the club-good theory, Buchanan (1965) used the example of a swimming pool. With a limited number of members, the use of the swimming pool by one member does not lower the possibility of the use of another member. Using Ostrom's terms, the subtractability of use is low (Ostrom, 1990). Buchanan predicted that in such a situation it will be rational to increase the number of members as the cost per member thereby decreases. Therefore, the cost per member and the consumption possibilities per member need somehow to be balanced (in a rational choice framework the marginal utility of lowering the cost equals the marginal decline in utility caused by crowding). One could label the club-goods with

low subtractability “public club-goods”. The example already used is law and order. In these cases, the resource conflicts between migrants, the new members, and old club members are likely to be modest. Olson labelled this “inclusive groups” as “... usually the larger the number available to share the benefits and costs the better” (Olson, 1971:37). The conflicts can be predicted to be higher for goods where the consumption of one member reduces the consumption possibilities of other members more. One could label these club-goods with high subtractability of use, the “common club-goods”. Public schools and hospitals would be an example of “common club-goods”. The school seat or the hospital bed occupied by a migrant reduces the consumption possibilities of natives or other migrants (if tax payment of the migrant is zero). Olson labelled this “exclusive groups”.

Many of the welfare benefits and services found in the Nordic countries fall in the category of “common club-goods” (see Chapters 1 and 2), which should lead us to expect that natives will behave as an “exclusive group” when it comes to giving migrants access to social benefits and services. This preference for excluding migrants from welfare services and benefits has been labelled welfare chauvinism or welfare nationalism (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990; Larsen, Frederiksen, & Nielsen, 2018). Previous research has shown that welfare nationalism is widespread among natives voting for new-right parties, natives with lower socio-economic status, and natives perceiving migrants to be a cultural or economic threat to the overall society (Eger & Breznau, 2017; Ford, 2016; Larsen, Frederiksen, & Nielsen, 2018; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009; Mewes & Mau, 2012; 2013; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). The preference for including migrants in welfare benefits and services has received less attention, but could be labelled welfare universalism (Nielsen, Frederiksen, & Larsen, 2018) as one of the basic principles of universalism is that everybody permanently residing in a given state territory is entitled.

The issue of migrants' social rights has been a salient political issue in Denmark since the mid-1990s. In particular, the issue of access to social assistance has been salient and the rules have been changed several times (Andersen, 2007; Breidahl, 2012). See Table 5.1 in Chapter 5 for residence requirements for migrants' access to various benefits. Measured by the European Social Survey (ESS) in 2008, previous research has shown that native Danes by comparative standards hold attitudes that are fairly universal (Van Der Waal, De Koster, & van Oorschot, 2013); though one finds large variation across different schemes (Larsen, 2019). The latter study finds the Danish public to be much more reluctant to grant migrants equal access to benefits than to services. Less is known about what migrants think about giving migrants access to welfare benefits and services. Initially, it is easy to imagine that migrants should hold more universal, less welfare nationalist, attitudes than natives as they have a self-interest in being entitled to these club-goods of

the Danish state. The two existing studies based on the European Social Survey (ESS) do indeed find higher welfare universalism among migrants than among natives (Degen, Kuhn, & Van der Brug, 2019; Kolbe & Crepaz, 2016). The difference between natives and migrants in the ESS is statistically significant though not as sizeable as one could imagine from a simple self-interest perspective. The chapter contributes to the overall picture with results based on new data and a different design.

Our main interest is whether migrants' attitudes towards migrants' entitlement to benefit and services assimilate into those of the natives. As in the previous chapters, this will be studied by comparing attitudes between natives and migrants and across the 14 most-different groups. Unfortunately, there are no country of origin surveys for the topic in this chapter, so we cannot compare migrants living in Denmark with attitudes in the origin country. In terms of assimilation mechanisms, the main theoretical argument in the previous literature is that migrants might "enter and slam the door". This could be a matter of residing (interviewed) migrants having a self-interest in not sharing the club-goods with new incoming migrants, which could be (believed to be) attracted by access to social benefits and services (see discussion in Chapter 1). This interpretation is supported by the previous finding that migrants who have naturalized are more restrictive about migrants' access to social benefits and services than are non-naturalized migrants; the former group specifically points to citizenship as a preferred criterion for giving migrants the same social rights as natives (Degen, Kuhn, & Van der Brug, 2019; Kolbe & Crepaz, 2016). Obtained citizenship indicates that the migrant has fully entered the club, which secures his or her access to benefits and services. A more sociological interpretation is that in the process of acculturating in the destination country, migrants might begin to feel native and perceive (other) migrants as the other. Especially, the role of national identification has been discussed as a precondition of solidarity. There is a single study, using election survey data from Belgium, which finds the effect present among Marconian and Turkish; the larger the identification with Belgium, the larger support for redistribution (see Chapter 8). We will try to find these mechanisms for welfare nationalism/universalism by describing the effect of time in the destination country and our measure for national identification. This process might be moderated by a sense of ethnic solidarity that transcends narrow self-interest. Luttmer (2001) showed that such an effect of ethnic group interest was present in black Americans' attitudes on social assistance (AFDC) (Luttmer, 2001). Following this argument, Renema and Lubbers (2019) found a link between an ethnic group's reliance on social assistance and unemployment benefit in the Netherlands and attitudes towards spending on social assistance (but not unemployment benefit). However, they did not find group-belonging to mediate this effect, against their expectation. Thus, it has been difficult to find

a group-interest effect among European migrants equivalent to that of blacks in the US. The chapter contributes with analyses of the effect on attitudes towards excluding migrants for social entitlements. These attitudes might be stronger linked to group belonging than general attitudes towards spending of various benefits and schemes. In practice, we will study whether the (self-interest) effect connected to holding citizenship interacts with a measure of group belonging. We expect the effect of citizenship to be smaller, the stronger the feeling of group solidarity. Or in more popular words: Those who identify most with their ethnic group are expected to “leave the door a bit more open”.

WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE MIGRANTS MEASURED IN THE MIFARE-DATA

The Mifare-data has a rather detailed measure of attitudes towards including and excluding migrants from social rights and benefits. The respondents were asked whether migrants respectively from their own country of origin, the European Union (EU), and migrants from outside the EU should have the same social rights as native Danes. The response categories were adopted from a European Social Survey (ESS)-item with small modifications. The wording was (4) after registering as a resident in Denmark, (3) after residing in Denmark for an extended period of time, whether or not they have worked, (2) only after they have worked and paid taxes and insurances for an extended period of time, (1) once they have become Danish (obtained nationality), and (0) they should never get the same rights. We treat the responses as a scale from 0 to 100, going from least to most inclusive. An average of 0 would mean that everybody in the group answers “they should never get the same right”. An average of 100 would mean that everybody in the group answers “after registering as a resident”. The survey asked about access to people’s pension, unemployment benefits, childcare, and social assistance. For the latter, the migrants were only asked about the entitlement of migrants for their own country of origin.

Levels of Welfare Nationalism in the Mifare-Data


Figure 11.1, left side, shows support for migrants’ access to the tax-financed flat-rate “Folkepension” (Danish people’s pension). As all our respondents are between 18 and 60 years old, none of the respondents receive this benefit at the moment. Thus, it is about a future club-good. The mean among native Danes is 42 for migrants from the EU and 37 for migrants from outside the EU, reflecting that natives are a bit more in favour of giving migrants from EU access to the Danish people’s pension. The support for giving migrants access to the Danish people’s pension is higher for all the ten migrant groups in the

Mifare-data than among natives, as expected. Especially, the migrants from Turkey are in favour of easy access, whereas there is little variation across the other nine groups. Against our expectation, the migrants distinguished little between access for migrants from their own country of origin, EU countries in general, and non-EU countries in general (see Figure 11.1, left). Thus, at least for the Danish people's pension, the migrants are in favour of easier access for all types of migrants than what is found among natives.

Figure 11.1, right side, shows support for migrants' access to Danish unemployment benefits. The natives are somewhat more supportive of migrants' access to unemployment benefits than they are about access to the Danish people's pension, which could be a matter of the insurance element in the former (Ruhs & Palme, 2018). The mean values for EU and non-EU migrants are respectively 49 and 45, which again demonstrates a little more willingness to include EU migrants. The differences between natives and migrants are less pronounced than for the pension. However, except for the migrants from the Philippines, the migrant groups are again more inclusive for all types of migrants than are native Danes. Finally, Figure 11.1, right, shows that the variations between the ten migrant groups are modest. The migrants from Turkey are still the group most in favour of including migrants but the support is not as distinct as in the case for the pension.

Figure 11.2, left, shows support for migrants' access to Danish childcare services. The natives are more willing to give access to childcare than to pension and unemployment benefits. The mean values for, respectively, EU and non-EU migrants are 75 and 72. However, except for attitudes towards the inclusion of non-EU migrants among migrants from Poland (72), all the migrant groups still indicate a higher willingness to include migrants in childcare than do natives. This is in line with Chapter 10, where we found migrants to largely emphasize the idea of state responsibility for childcare. Again, the differences across migrant groups and across attitudes to different types of migrants are moderate. The highest willingness to include migrants in childcare is found among migrants from Russia, Japan, the US, and again Turkey.


As already mentioned, the surveys have only asked for their own country of origin, when it comes to access to social assistance. The average among native Danes is 50 for EU migrants and 53 for non-EU migrants (see Figure 11.2, right side). Thus, on average, the natives are as willing to give access to social assistance as they are to give access to unemployment benefits and the people's pension. However, this average covers a political polarization where some are in favour of stronger and weaker conditions. Turning to the attitudes of the migrants, the result is again that all ten groups are more willing to give access to equal rights than are natives. Again, the migrants from Turkey are the group strongest in favour of equal access, while migrants from Poland and Romania are closer to the Danish level.



Note: Access for migrants from own country of origin, from the European Union and from outside the European Union. Migrants and natives living in Denmark (Mifare survey). Scale ranging from "They should never get the same right" (0) to "After registering as a resident" (100).

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 11.1 Attitudes towards migrants' access to "Folkepension" (Danish people's pension) (left) and unemployment benefit (right), (0–100 scale)



Note: Access for migrants from own country of origin, from the European Union and from outside the European Union. Migrants and natives living in Denmark (Mifare survey). Scale ranging from “They should never get the same right” (0) to “After registering as a resident” (100).
Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 11.2 Attitudes towards migrants' access to Danish childcare services (left) and social assistance (right)

Patterns Behind the Willingness to Include Migrants

The descriptive statistics indicate that the interviewed migrants have not assimilated – fully at least – to the more restrictive position of native Danes. Still, there might be assimilation processes in place as we have no measurement of attitudes in the country of origin. In the following, we will focus on the migrants' willingness to give migrants from their own origin country equal access to benefits and services in Denmark. In Table 11.1 we present the full model but only show coefficients from the impact from the country of origin, citizenship, family status, years since first registration in Denmark, and national identification.

The models in Table 11.1 show significant variation across our (most-different) migrant groups. These models are controlled for socio-economic positions. For the background variables (not shown), we find the expected effect that receiving benefits goes together with a higher willingness to include one's own group, while higher income goes together with less willingness to include migrants. Also as expected, higher education tends to go together with more willingness to include migrants from one's own country of origin. We also find that the family status matters (included in Table 11.1). For access to pension, unemployment benefit, and social assistance we find that those living with Danish partners (mixed couples) are significantly more restrictive than migrants living alone in Denmark. For childcare, we do not find this effect. Here we find that just being a couple (whether mixed or from the same country of origin) increases the willingness to give migrants access. However, significant differences across groups remain even after taking these composition effects into account. On average (over the four different items), the migrants from Poland are the least willing to give social rights to other migrants from the same country of origin. Therefore, this group is used as a reference category. Migrants from Turkey (17.8), China (8.6), Great Britain (7.2), the Philippines (5.3), Spain (4.4), and the US (4.1) are significantly more inclined to give equal rights to the people's pension to migrants from their own country of origin. Thus, our third indicator for assimilation, absence of differences across the migrant groups, does not indicate full assimilation. The same holds for giving equal social rights to unemployment benefits, childcare, and social assistance. Most groups – also controlled for background variables – are more willing to give access than are migrants from Poland. The exception is migrants from Romania, which after control for background variables, are as unwilling to give migrants from their own country of origin access to social rights in Denmark. In the case of social assistance, the migrants from Romania are significantly less inclusive than are migrants from Poland. One could speculate that this is linked to the discriminated Roma minority in Romania, who are often portrayed as beggars and are perceived as a potential threat to

Table 11.1 Willingness to give own group's access to social benefits and service. Unstandardized coefficients (OLS) and significance level

	Access to pension ¹	Access to unemployment benefits ¹	Access to childcare ¹	Access to social assistance ¹
GBR	7.2**	8.0**	2.9 ^{ns}	9.9**
JPN	2.9 ^{ns}	2.3 ^{ns}	8.6**	2.4 ^{ns}
USA	4.1**	3.9**	9.7**	4.9**
TUR	17.8**	8.6**	11.8**	11.3**
POL	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
RUS	1.5 ^{ns}	3.9**	14.4**	1.0 ^{ns}
PHL	5.3**	4.4**	3.6 ^{ns}	4.6*
ESP	4.4**	4.6**	6.8**	7.6**
ROU	1.2 ^{ns}	0.8 ^{ns}	2.0 ^{ns}	-6.4**
CHN	8.6**	6.3**	5.0**	7.4**
Citizenship	-9.0**	-4.5**	-6.5**	-8.2**
Single	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Same ethnic couple	1.4 ^{ns}	0.7 ^{ns}	4.7**	1.6 ^{ns}
Mixed couple	-1.8*	-1.9*	5.5**	-2.0*
Years in Denmark	0.0 ^{ns}	0.0 ^{ns}	0.1 ^{ns}	-0.0 ^{ns}
National identification (1–5 scale)	-1.1**	-0.8**	-0.5 ^{ns}	-2.1**
R ²	0.11	0.06	0.09	0.08
N	2470	2464	2472	2482

Note: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018) ^{ns} Not significant. * Significant at 0.05. ** Significant at 0.01. ¹ Controlled for gender, age, wage-income, benefits, education (in three brackets) and employment situation (degree of employment), household composition.

social assistance schemes in other countries. However, there might be different reasons. As for the migrants from Turkey, the willingness to give access could be linked to the fact that this is the Mifare migrant group with a clear economic gain from the Danish welfare state (see Chapter 5). However, this interpretation relies on a group-interest argument (see below).

In line with previous research, we do find that having obtained citizenship correlates with having more restrictive attitudes. We find a significant effect for pension (-9.0), unemployment benefit (-4.5), childcare (-6.5), and social assistance (-8.5). Thus, obtaining citizenship potentially assimilates migrants to having restrictive attitudes, and we also find a negative relationship between

identifying with Denmark and willingness to give equal access to social rights. The effect is significant for equal rights to pension (-1.1), unemployment benefits (-0.8), and social assistance (-2.1), while insignificant for childcare. Thus, national Danish identification potentially also assimilates to more restrictive attitudes. Finally, we do not find an effect from the number of years since first registration in Denmark; however, it should be noted that both identification and citizenship go together with the length of stay.

Our final step was to analyse whether the more restrictive attitudes of those with citizenship were moderated by group identity. The latter is measured by a question about how close the interviewed migrant felt to other migrants from his or her country of origin living in Denmark. The response categories were “very close”, “close”, “moderate”, “weak”, and “not at all”; the same item as used by Renema and Lubbers (2019). As this item is strongly inversely correlated with destination-country identification, we excluded the latter from the models. In line with our expectation, we find that the effect of naturalization is moderated by group belonging. Thus, the stronger the group belonging,




Figure 11.3 *Effect of naturalization on attitudes towards migrants' access to social assistance, moderated by the feeling of belonging with other migrants from the same country of origin living in Denmark*


the smaller the effect from naturalization. The pattern is present for pension, unemployment benefits, and social assistance but not significant for childcare. The patterns are clearest for attitudes towards access to social assistance, which also was what Luttmer demonstrated in the US context. The predicted willingness to give access to social assistance is shown in Figure 11.3.

The predicted willingness to give migrants access to social assistance is around 67 on the 0–100 scale for those interviewed migrants who do not hold Danish citizenship – controlled for all other variables in the model (see Figure 11.3). For this group, it makes little difference whether one feels close or not to other migrants from the same country of origin living in Denmark. However, for those who do hold Danish citizenship, it makes a difference. Those who hold Danish citizenship and feel “not at all” close to other migrants from the country of origin are predicted to score 49 on the 0–100 scale, that is, they are much less willing to give access to social assistance. In contrast, those with citizenship who feel very close to other migrants from the country of origin are predicted to score 68 on the 0–100 scale, everything else being equal (see Figure 11.3). Thus, group identity does seem to moderate the assimilation towards more restrictive welfare nationalist attitudes caused by becoming a full member of the Danish club.

WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE MIGRANTS IN THE COMCON-DATA

In the Comcon-data, the willingness to give migrants access to welfare benefits and services is measured on a Likert-scale item, where the respondent is asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: “*Refugees and migrants should have the same right to social assistance as Danes, even though they do not hold Danish citizenship*”. Figure 11.4 shows the share agreeing, where 39 per cent of the native Danes either completely agree (14 per cent) or partly agree (25 per cent). The term “social assistance” is a broad term but it has a reference to the means-tested benefits of last resort, which previous studies have found to be the most controversial for natives; especially so in Denmark (Larsen, 2019). The share agreeing is much higher among the five migrant groups; 69 per cent of the migrants from Turkey agree. The share is around 80 per cent for migrants from Pakistan and ex-Yugoslavia. Finally, the share is around 90 per cent for migrants from Iraq and Lebanon. In the Mifare-data, migrants from Turkey are among the most willing to give welfare entitlements to migrants. Thus, the migrants in the Comcon-data are clearly more willing than natives to give access to social assistance. The difference between native Danes and migrants is substantial when asked about access to social assistance. Thus, our second indication of assimilation, absence of difference between

natives and migrants, is not present. Neither is our third indication of assimilation, absence of difference between migrant groups.




Note: Migrants and natives in Denmark (Comcon survey). Per cent agree.

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 11.4 Attitudes towards whether refugees/migrants should have the same right to social assistance, even if not possessing Danish citizenship

The models in Figure 11.5 show substantial differences between the groups. The first binary model simply shows bivariate differences. The migrant group from Turkey is used as a reference as they are the least willing to give migrants equal access to social assistance among the Comcon groups. The other four groups are significantly more willing to give equal rights than are migrants from Turkey. The pattern is stable after control for basic background variables, that is, the “composition model”, which we take as an indication of an absence of assimilation to the more restrictive attitudes of the natives. Chapter 5 showed that among the Comcon migrants, the migrants from Turkey gained less from the Danish welfare state than the migrants from Iraq, Lebanon, and ex-Yugoslavia. However, socio-economic positions are taken into account at the individual level in these models. Thus, it is a self-interest effect framed at the group level as found by Luttmer (2001) for the attitudes of blacks towards social assistance (AFDC) in the US. The background variables (not shown) show that those with higher wages and those that receive benefits are more willing to give migrants access, while having higher education correlates with less willingness to give access. As in the Mifare-data, we find that migrants

living in mixed couples are less willing to give access to social assistance than are single migrants.



Note: Regression models comparing migrants from Iran (vertical line) to the other migrant groups. OLS-regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence interval. N=370. “Composition” includes control for gender, age, wage-income, benefits, education (in three brackets), and employment situation (degree of employment), household composition. “Full model” includes national identification, years since first registration in Denmark, and naturalization.

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 11.5 Attitudes towards whether migrants should have the same right to social assistance (0–100 scale)

The mechanisms behind potential assimilation to the more restrictive attitudes of the native Danes are explored in the full model. We find the expected negative effect of holding citizenship (-0.7) but it is not statistically significant (in a model with only citizenship added, the effect is stronger, -0.26, but still not significant). We find the expected negative effect of national identification (-2.2) but again it does not turn significant. However, in a model with only identification it is significant. Thus, as in the Mifare-data, destination-country identification tends to go together with less willingness to give equal social rights to migrants, but it is a weak effect. Finally, Figure 11.5 shows that the number of years in Denmark also has the expected negative effect (-0.24 per year) though it is not statistically significant. Thus, altogether, we only find

weak and unstable effects but they go in the expected direction. An explanation of these limited signs of assimilation to the restrictive attitudes of the natives could be caused by group solidarity. Unfortunately, the Comcon survey does not include a measure of group identity as was the case in the Mifare-data.

PERSISTENT DIFFERENCES

The chapter has shown that there seem to be persistent differences between natives and migrants when it comes to attitudes towards giving migrants equal social rights. We do not have data about attitudes to equal rights to migrants in the country of origin. Thus, we do not know whether the attitudes of the migrants in Denmark are closer to those of native Danes than to those found in the country of origin, that is, our first indicator of assimilation. However, the cross-sectional data we have indicate clear differences between native Danes and the migrant groups. Thus, our second indicator does not point to assimilation. The differences are largest when it comes to cash benefits such as pension, unemployment benefits, and social assistance, and smaller when it comes to services such as childcare services, as expected. However, for all items we have analysed, the differences between natives and all migrant groups are sizeable and significant. These findings support the theoretical idea that welfare benefits and services are club-goods (or least perceived to be so), which the natives have an interest in not sharing with migrants. This interpretation is supported by the finding that indicators of acculturation go together with less willingness to include migrants. In line with previous research, we found that migrants with citizenship are more reluctant to give other migrants equal social rights. We found correlations between national identification with the destination country and less willingness to give migrants equal social rights. And we found that migrants in mixed couples, typically living together with a native, hold more restrictive attitudes than migrants living alone. These findings indicate the presence of mechanisms of assimilation, which might both be a matter of self-interest and/or identity.

Finally, we also find stable differences across the migrant groups, that is, our third indicator of assimilation. The differences between the migrant groups are difficult to explain as we have controlled for several background variables. These include gender, age, employment, wage, and received social benefits, which should control for most of the self-interest effects. Thus, within this field, there seems to be a country-origin effect, which we are not able to pinpoint. One plausible explanation is the presence of group-interest effects. It was indeed the most vulnerable groups who were most in favour of giving migrants access. In the Mifare-data, this was migrants from Turkey. In the Comcon-data this was migrants from Lebanon and Iraq. These group differences were also present after control for individual self-interest. In the Mifare-data, we were

able to directly analyse whether the more restrictive attitudes among those holding citizenship were moderated by identification with other migrants from the same country of origin living in Denmark. We found the expected effect. Thus, as Luttmer found in the American context, feelings of group belonging seem to matter, especially when it comes to social assistance. In our case, they matter for attitudes about who to include or exclude from the club-goods of the Danish welfare state.

12. Migrants' social trust

The degree to which migrants exhibit generalized social trust tells us something important about assimilation. To be specific, we are talking about generalized social trust in unknown others as opposed to particularized trust in known others (Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011). Trust is particularly relevant in the Danish context characterized by very high levels of generalized social trust in international comparison (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Larsen, 2013). Social trust plays an important functional role for the main object of study in this book, namely welfare attitudes and support for the welfare state. Generalized social trust towards fellow compatriots is conducive to support for the welfare state (Larsen, 2013; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Redistribution and risk alleviation on a large scale requires abstract, generalized solidarity reaching far beyond a limited circle of personal relations.

To what extent do migrant nationalities from very diverse backgrounds and origins then manage to adapt to these high levels of trust? And to what extent are differences across migrant groups and native Danes explained by, for instance, individual socio-economic resources, or do patterns rather point to the institutional and macro-oriented mechanisms discussed in the first chapters of the book? Theoretical perspectives on trust will be discussed further below, but there is certainly support for the role of institutions in the literature.

Research agrees that high trust levels in Denmark have come about as a benevolent cocktail of just political institutions free of corruption, public education, relatively universal welfare provision, and economic equality (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Larsen, 2013; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Sønderskov & Dinesen, 2014). If social trust is a dynamic phenomenon that can change over the life-course, and if migrants experience the benefits associated with well-functioning institutions, we might expect a high degree of adaption to high trust levels. This will include migrants in the “virtuous cycle” of trust that we arguably see in Denmark, since social trust as mentioned at the beginning of this book also by itself furthers support for welfare institutions (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005).

If, on the other hand, migrants do not gain these positive experiences or impressions of their new destination country, or if social trust is a phenomenon rooted much more in culture and identity, trust is much more of a challenge for assimilation. In this respect, it is an open question whether social trust is part of the socio-cultural “hardcore” or “periphery” taken up in Chapter 2.

Social trust is an interesting object of study not only as a test of socio-cultural integration in a high-trust context. It is well established that social trust is conducive to other aspects of social cohesion and individual welfare. Individuals with high levels of trust exhibit high well-being and happiness (Helliwell, Wang, & Xu, 2016). They tend to engage in voluntary work or political participation and generally exhibit pro-social behaviour (Sønderskov, 2011; Uslaner & Brown, 2005). At the macro-level, social trust is associated with economic equality, well-functioning and non-corrupt political institutions, and economic growth (Fukuyama, 1996; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). In short, there are good reasons why social trust is the most widespread indicator of social cohesion par excellence. Trust binds people together, improves social relations, and furthers social exchange.

In the remainder of this chapter, we begin by digging deeper into various sources of trust from a theoretical perspective with a special focus on socialization, public institutions, interethnic contact, and national identification. Then we will proceed with a descriptive look at trust levels among native Danes, migrants in Denmark, and in the countries of origin. Finally, regression models will allow us to gauge various drivers of trust as well as some interesting statistical interactions between them.

SOCIALIZATION, PERCEPTIONS, AND EXPERIENCES

Theoretically, some favour socialization as the primary explanation of trust. The theoretical axiom is that parents and other agents of early life socialization shape our basic faith (or lack thereof) in unknown others. This then becomes a lifelong blueprint for the extent to which we trust others. This perspective is underpinned empirically by studies that show how different trust levels to some extent are passed on by parents to their children, or that they are relatively similar, and that trust is often quite stable over the life course and longer periods of time (Abdelzadeh & Lundberg, 2017; Dawson, 2019; Uslaner, 2008). Besides socialization, there is even some degree of genetic heritability (Weinschenk & Dawes, 2019).

Socialization is at the core of the “cultural” perspective in which trust is a “sticky” phenomenon that does not change easily over the life course. There are a number of studies discussing “socialization” or “culture” versus “experiences” in the new country context (Dinesen, 2013; Dinesen & Hooghe, 2010; Helliwell, Wang, & Xu, 2016; Koopmans & Veit, 2014; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2010; Uslaner, 2008), but see also the review by Dinesen and Sønderskov (2018). Studies from the Danish context specifically have found high adaptability to Danish trust levels when comparing with trust levels in the countries of origin (Nannestad, Svendsen, Dinesen, & Sønderskov, 2014), and that this adaptability is even stronger for descendants (Dinesen, 2012). On

the other hand, even if we find adaptability and higher trust compared to the origin countries, this assimilation may still be less than perfect. Migrants from Middle Eastern countries have previously been found to exhibit trust levels substantially lower than native Danes (Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and Integration, 2011). Studies from the US context have tended to point more towards persistence of social trust for migrants (as in Uslander, 2008), whereas studies from the European context generally find a high degree of adaptability to trust levels in the different destination countries (as in Dinesen & Hooghe, 2010). As a tentative explanation for this pattern, Dinesen and Sønderskov (2018) discuss the particularities of American migration history, which is also different from other Western countries with high levels of migration-induced diversity like Australia or Canada.

This means that social trust can be a more dynamic than “sticky” phenomenon, and that it may be continuously adapted according to changing circumstances throughout the life course. Theoretically, it can be conceived as a more rational or strategic phenomenon as described by James S. Coleman (1990). Coleman conceived trust as a conscious choice, based on expectations towards the reciprocity of the trustee. In addition, perceived risk and information (and information asymmetries) become important. The theoretical explanation of trust favoured here is often described under the label of the *experiential* perspective. However, the sources of trust discussed under this umbrella oftentimes concern perceptions and expectations that may not always be rooted in distinctly personal experiences, but could also stem from various forms of mediated information (Kongshøj, 2018; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2010; Nannestad, Svendsen, Dinesen, & Sønderskov, 2014). The literature within the experiential perspective has stressed the role of political institutions. Well-performing, just, and non-corrupt institutions enforce rules that reward trustworthy behaviour, and more generally convey impressions or perceptions of prevailing standards in society vis-à-vis behaviour and trustworthiness. Again, this may be a result of both personal experiences and more general perceptions and expectations due to information received in other ways. There is ample room for discussion about the direction of causality between trust in political institutions and generalized social trust, but Sønderskov and Dinesen (2016) utilized Danish panel data to conclude that trust in political institutions affects generalized trust, and not the other way around.

Personal contact across ethnic or majority-minority divides constitute another form of “experience”. The so-called “contact hypothesis” emphasizes how interpersonal contact with people of another ethnic background reduces negative perceptions or prejudices towards unknown ethnic others (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005). On the other hand, the “conflict hypothesis” stresses that encounters with ethnic others only increases the awareness of risks or uncertainties associated with placing trust in unknown others who are very different

from ourselves (Gijssberts, Van Der Meer, & Dagevos, 2012; Putnam, 2007). Robert Putnam (2007) preferred the label of “constrict” rather than “conflict”, emphasizing instead how ethnic diversity in residential areas via the same mechanisms lead people to retreat from social life or participation in associations.

The differences between “contact”, “conflict”, and “constrict” are easier to understand and resolve once we consider different kinds of interpersonal relations (Kongshøj, 2018). Perceived status differences between people matter regardless of ethnicity, and interpersonal contact marred by asymmetries in status or power may be harmful to perceived trustworthiness. Consequently, if interethnic contact is to be conducive to social trust, it may be a necessary condition that it is characterized by some degree of equal status and a minimum of intimacy (Marschall & Stolle, 2004; Thomsen & Rafiqi, 2016; Uslander, 2010). Conversely, the “conflict hypothesis” may be more easily confirmed if we examine forms of ethnic contact that are characterized by inequality, status differences, or discrimination. Finally, “constrict” is not necessarily so much about interethnic contact per se, but about exposure to ethnic diversity in the form of more superficial encounters in contexts such as neighbourhoods and workplaces (Dinesen & Sønderskov, 2015; Koopmans & Veit, 2014; Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). Studies have tended to find that interethnic contact is positively associated with trust for ethnic majorities, while they are weaker or non-significant for migrants (Kongshøj, 2018; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005). In tandem with the discussion above, a typical interpretation has been that interethnic contact for migrants too often is characterized by status inequality or outright discrimination, but findings and measures have generally not allowed for valid conclusions about specific negative personal experiences (Bauer, 2014; Thomsen & Rafiqi, 2016). In addition, there may be endogeneity issues or reverse causality in this area as well. In other words, we might to some extent expect that more trusting people are also more likely to engage in various kinds of interethnic contact. Then there are the contextual effects of exposure rather than personal contact, as discussed above. A range of studies point to mixed or non-significant correlations, often on the basis of subjective neighbourhood diversity, but Dinesen and Sønderskov (2015) find a negative relationship in the Danish context. They utilized register data on diversity in the micro-context (within a radius of 80 meters) coupled with survey data on trust.

Naturally, there is room for varying degrees of both socialization and experience in the vast majority of findings in the field. There is neither perfect adaptability to new trust levels in the destination countries, nor perfect transmission of trust from parents or origin countries. For instance, Helliwell, Wang, and Xu (2016) investigate migrants in 132 destination countries and

find that the adaptability to trust levels in the new destination countries is much stronger than the imprint from trust levels in the countries of origin.


This leads us back to the need for a theoretical framework in which we can accommodate these different perspectives on social trust. One such is a sociological framework inspired by Pierre Bordieu as elaborated by Frederiksen (2019). The concept of disposition helps us elaborate how our inclinations to trust or not is shaped both by socialization and personal biography over the life course. Society and its social structures may also be internalized in our personal *habitus*. Importantly, the results of Frederiksen (2019) substantiate how these sources of trust and dispositions may vary between individuals. One disposition is fundamentally individualist and it is close to the more rational or experience-based perspective, while other individuals express a disposition in which a social trust is founded in norms and morals.

A FIRST LOOK AT LEVELS OF SOCIAL TRUST

The measures of generalized trust differ across the two surveys. Among the five nationalities in the Comcon survey, respondents have answered the question: *"To what extent do you generally trust people you meet for the first time?"* (four response categories from "Trust completely" to "Not at all"). This measure has entered some international surveys, including the World Values Survey, and has been corroborated as a valid measure of generalized trust, at least in Western countries (Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011; Torpe & Lolle, 2011). In the Mifare survey, the measure available to us is the statement *"There are only few people in Denmark that I trust completely"* (standard Likert-scale with five responses from "Fully agree" to "Fully disagree"). While the question inquires about an abstract group of generalized others, it is specified as "... people in Denmark", which for migrants may highlight the issue of Danes as a potential out-group. Furthermore, the phrasing is negative ("There are only few people ...").

With these caveats in mind, Figures 12.1 and 12.2 proceed to compare our nationalities within Denmark and their countrymen in the countries of origin. The question in the Mifare survey is directly comparable to a question from the 2006 module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), whereas the measure from Comcon is the same as in the World Values Survey (WVS). There is a considerable time lag when comparing a 2006 survey with the Mifare survey from 2014, but in most country contexts, aggregate levels of generalized social trust changes little and only slowly (Larsen, 2014). This contrasts with what we often see for migrants at the individual level. As mentioned, previous studies looking into migration as a "natural experiment" generally do find that migrants to some extent seem to adapt to trust levels in their new destination countries, at least for migrants into Europe and also

Denmark. The first results presented below cannot establish anything new in this respect, and only serve as a descriptive glance at trust levels. Still, it does allow for some interesting observations.



Note: Migrants and natives in Denmark (Comcon survey) and residents in the countries of origin (WVS 2010–2014 survey). Scale ranging from “Not at all” (0) to “Trust completely” (100).


Source: Data collected from the World Value Survey 2010–2014 (2016).

Figure 12.1 Generalized social trust in strangers met for the first time (0–100 scale)

First, among the nationalities in Comcon, the pattern does not provide unequivocal support for the expectation that migrants in high-trust contexts exhibit higher trust levels than their countrymen in the countries of origin. The differences between migrants and their countrymen are modest and even insignificant for the Lebanese (but we should remember that significance levels are affected by the small survey populations in Denmark in the Comcon survey).

Second, trust levels among these five non-Western nationalities are markedly and significantly lower than those reported by Danish respondents. Whereas 66 per cent of Danish respondents to some extent trust people they meet for the first time, the share is only around half of that among the five migrant nationalities (but differences are not quite as stark on the 0–100 scale presented above).

Third, among the more diverse set of nationalities in Mifare, the picture is more mixed. Most migrant nationalities exhibit trust levels close to that of Danish respondents. A few exhibit trust levels markedly higher than those of



Note: Migrants and natives living in Denmark (Mifare survey) and residents in countries of origin (ISSP 2006 survey). Scale ranging from “Fully agree” (0) that “... there are only few people I trust”, to “Fully disagree” (100).

Source: Data collected from ISSP 2006 (ISSP Research Group, 2008).

Figure 12.2 Social trust towards people in general (0–100 scale)

Danish respondents. American and British migrants score 10 points higher on the 0–100 scale. At the other end of the continuum, only Polish and Romanian migrants exhibit trust levels below Danish respondents. Still, even for the Polish migrants, who exhibit the lowest trust levels, it is only six points lower than Danes on the 0–100 scale.

Fourth, it is interesting to note that when we look at the origin countries, all Mifare nationalities in the countries of origin exhibit trust levels well below that of Danes. This observation indicates that it might be easier for migrants from most Mifare countries to adapt to Danish trust levels relative to migrants from the non-Western, mostly Middle-Eastern origin countries in the Comcon survey.

INTERETHNIC CONTACT, POLITICAL TRUST, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND SOCIAL TRUST

In the following analyses, the main objective is to explain differences in trust levels in relation to native Danes and to establish the associations between interethnic contact, perceived institutional fairness, and national identification


on the one hand, and generalized trust on the other (following the theoretical discussions above).

However, all three of our three main independent variables of theoretical interest differ substantially. In the Mifare survey, interethnic contact is based on a question regarding personal friendships. The indicator is a composite index of two questions on the prevalence of friendships from EU or non-EU countries, respectively. For migrants, the variable indicates friendships with Danes. In the other survey, the questionnaire enquires into the frequency of contact within personal homes. For Danes, we tap into frequency of contact with people of “... *an ethnic background different from your own*”, whereas it is contact with people of Danish backgrounds for migrants. While both variables arguably try to get at conditions for contact that are free of status inequality or power asymmetries, per the previous discussion, there is of course a substantial difference between personal friendships and contact with unspecified relations in personal homes. As regards trust in institutions or the perceived fairness of public institutions in Denmark, the Comcon survey offers us a question specifically on this perception. In the Mifare survey, however, the closest related variable instead taps into perceived corruption among Danish politicians. While it is well-established that political corruption is corrosive for social trust, the perceived behaviour of Danish politicians is not necessarily synonymous with the more fundamental quality or perceived fairness of the public administration in Denmark. Finally, while the two measures of national identification are different, they both tap into the same dimension of national identification vis-à-vis Denmark and the country of origin.

Besides these survey-based variables, our other independent variables are register-based and they are the same as throughout the book. This includes gender, age, wage income, benefit income, employment status, civil/marital status, Danish citizenship, number of years spent in Denmark, education, religiosity, and language skills. The latter three variables are survey-based, while the others are based on Danish register data.

In Figure 12.3, we see how the dummy coefficients for each migrant nationality change across three regression models with the native Danes as the reference category. The first model essentially provides the same overview as in Figure 12.2 – relative differences in trust levels across nationalities but shown here as unstandardized correlation coefficients on a 0–100 trust scale.

We see that Spanish, Chinese, British, and American respondents appear to be significantly more trusting, whereas Polish respondents are significantly less trusting than Danish respondents. This pattern is surprising, given that we know that trust levels in all of the countries of origin are lower than they are in Denmark. We should be mindful that the dependent variable is different from standard measures of generalized trust, and that trust in “... people in Denmark ...” might be more particular, especially for migrants in Denmark. However,



Note: Mifare survey. Regression models comparing native Danes (vertical line) to the migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=2,652.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 12.3 Generalized social trust (0–100 scale)

there are also meaningful interpretations to be made. If social trust to some extent is based on rational expectations, and the impression or perception that people reciprocate and that social norms are strong in the new country context, then migrants might quickly adjust their trust levels upwards relative to the standards they were used to. In research into trust in political institutions, this has been a standard interpretation of the finding that political trust is very high, at least for recent migrants (Adman & Strömblad, 2015). In research into social trust, only few studies have paid much attention to the role of time, with more inconclusive or insignificant findings (Kongshøj, 2018).

In the subsequent regression models, we see how we gradually manage to explain differences in trust levels vis-à-vis native Danes for those nationalities who initially seemed to have higher trust levels than native Danes. For these nationalities, their higher trust levels are explained by the fact that they in general are even better positioned than native Danes in terms of socio-economic resources as well as interethnic friendships and their perceptions of corruption, as discussed more at length below. In the full regression model, we find that no nationalities have significantly higher trust levels. In

the case of the US, Great Britain, China, and very nearly Spain too, it turns out that just one variable renders these dummies insignificant (not shown). This is the control for friendships with Danes. It appears that particularly for these nationalities, the number and quality of Danish friendships pushes their trust towards "... other people in Denmark" towards relatively high levels.

Otherwise, we find in the full model that women in general are more trusting than men, that older respondents are somewhat more trusting, that wage income is modestly positively related to trust, and that respondents with tertiary education are more trusting than people with low or short education (not shown). Social benefits are negatively associated with trust. Depending on outlook, incomes and education represent socio-economic resources that affect individual experiences and autonomy, or they represent positions in social space that are interwoven with more basic dispositions to trust (or not) (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Frederiksen, 2019).


Furthermore, we find that both personal friendships and marriage/cohabitation between Danes and migrants correlate positively with social trust. The standardized correlations also indicate that these two variables are among the strongest correlates. This would support the aforementioned "contact" hypothesis. However, we should be mindful that the design of the data does not allow us to determine causality. It is possible that trusting individuals would be more likely to engage in interethnic contact to begin with, and particularly to engage in interethnic relationships. However, as mentioned before, the literature has continued to find support for the "contact" hypothesis, at least for ethnic majorities. The findings are more inconsistent for migrants (Thomsen & Rafiqi, 2016). We will return to this, since the picture is different for the nationalities in the Comcon survey.

Finally, we find the expected result that perceived corruption among politicians is negatively associated with social trust. It is the strongest predictor of trust in the model. The vast majority of respondents regardless of nationality (70–75 per cent) believe that "none" or "just a few" of Danish politicians are involved in corruption. There is some variation across nationalities between these two responses, however. For instance, only 24–25 per cent of Polish or Turkish respondents reply "none", while the figure is 35–45 per cent for most other nationalities, including the Danes themselves.

Let us proceed to regressions for migrant nationalities only (not shown). This allows us to gauge the importance of national identification and time spent in Denmark for migrants. The model also allows us to check whether we can confirm our previous results when we only look at migrants and when we include these additional independent variables. In this model, age and education ceases to be significant for social trust. Otherwise, other findings essentially remain the same.

Importantly, we find that national identification is a highly significant and strong predictor of generalized social trust among migrants. There is a difference of about 23 points on the 0–100 trust scale between those who identify the least and those who identify the most with Denmark. Acculturation in the form of national identification clearly matters for social trust.

Let us proceed to the five migrant nationalities in the Comcon survey. Like Figure 12.3, Figure 12.4 illustrates the dummy coefficients for each origin country with Danish origin as the reference country. As before, we finish off with separate regression models for migrants only, which allows us to address citizenship status, time spent in Denmark, perceived language skills, and national identification.



Note: Comcon survey. Regression models comparing native Danes (vertical line) to the migrant groups. OLS regression. Unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. N=1,162.

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 12.4 Generalized social trust (0–100 scale)


What we find this time, as opposed to the Mifare survey, is that all migrant nationalities exhibit trust levels that are clearly well below that of native Danes. Furthermore, our various independent variables do not change this picture very much. As in the Mifare survey, we find positive correlations with age and education, and this time they remain significant and pronounced for

migrants specifically. We also find a positive correlation from wage income and negative correlations from benefit income. Religiosity is the primary reason (not shown) why the trust gap between Danes and migrants declines somewhat when we introduce the independent variables. As opposed to the other survey, we find that religious culture does play a small role for these nationalities. Furthermore, here the number of years spent in Denmark correlates negatively with social trust. The correlation is sizeable. These migrants adjust their trust levels downwards over time, but it is an open question whether it reflects increasing expectations as the origin country becomes more distant (as discussed in the literature on political trust), or whether it rather reflects negative experiences in Denmark.

The important finding here is that we cannot in any way “explain away” the markedly lower trust levels for our migrants in these models. Furthermore, it is striking that neither interethnic contact nor national identification matters for trust levels among migrants. We find a small positive effect from perceptions of institutional fairness. The fact that contact and institutions work as expected in the full Comcon sample is driven exclusively by the larger sample of native Danes. Danes engaged in interethnic contact and Danes who perceive the public administration to be fair are more trusting than those who do not. This general finding could support the interpretation that for these migrant groups characterized by low trust levels, social trust does not reflect experiences, perceptions, or dynamic acculturation – that is, social trust might appear to be much more “sticky” or rooted in deeper cultural circumstances. Considering the origin countries, it could support arguments and findings that particularly origins rooted in collectivist, in-group oriented, and more religious cultures lead to lower trust levels as opposed to more individualist societies (Uslaner, 2002; Van Hoorn, 2015). However, when we properly assess the interactions between ethnicity and these variables in Figure 12.5 we could arrive at a different interpretation.

In the visual presentation of these interactions we see what we found before – positive correlations between contact and social trust as well as institutional fairness and social trust for native Danes, while the story is different for the migrants. It is particularly striking that social trust even decreases with contact, but this negative correlation is not significant. The main story in these figures is that we clearly see that the difference in trust levels across ethnicity is very small and insignificant among Danes or migrants with little interethnic contact or low perceived fairness of the public administration. The trust gap grows larger with increasing interethnic contact or more positive evaluations of institutional fairness.

Particularly for interethnic contact, the interpretation is relatively straightforward: Interethnic contact for these particular migrant nationalities in Denmark might be marred by other barriers, noting the aforementioned discussions in



Note: Comcon survey. Correlations between social trust and institutional trust (left) or interethnic contact (right) by ethnicity (native Danes vs. immigrants). N=1,162.

Source: Data collected from the Comcon survey (2015).

Figure 12.5 Interactions with ethnicity

the literature on the inconsistent effects of contact among migrants. It could be that contact is affected by perceived inequalities in status or lack of recognition across the ethnic divide. This would entail that the friendships analysed for the Mifare migrants entail contact on a more equal footing than the contact experienced by the low-trust, non-Western Comcon migrants, or that the problems stem from other forms of contact not measured in the Comcon survey.

For perceived institutional fairness, straightforward interpretations are not offered to us by the literature in the same way. Naturally, we could still speculate that even when migrants perceive that public institutions are generally fair or effective in their new destination country, this does not preclude negative personal experiences with public institutions. It is at least interesting to note that the gap in trust levels between Danes and migrants is much lower for individuals with more negative evaluations of institutions.


Further pursuing the clear and important role of perceived institutional fairness generally found in the literature, Figure 12.6 reports some interesting interactions for the migrant groups in the Comcon survey. In these interactions, all five migrant nationalities are included in the same ethnicity dummy, considering the small size of the groups in Comcon and the fact that their trust levels are all low at similar levels.

In Figure 12.6 we see that if migrants perceive institutions to be fair, there are positive correlations between social trust on the one hand and contact and national identification on the other. It is particularly evident for the interaction with contact. The other interaction is not significant.

For non-Western migrants with positive evaluations of public institutions, we now find that the less they identify with the origin country, the more trusting they are. On the other hand, if they do not perceive the public administration in Denmark to be fair, they are less trusting with declining origin country identification. This latter circumstance is one of clear marginalization where unfair public institutions in the new country is combined with loss of identity vis-à-vis the origin country, which drives down social trust. On the other hand, if destination country institutions are evaluated positively, it further increases trust the less one identifies with the origin country. Migrants with relatively positive perceptions of the public administration and little identification with the origin country are much closer to the trust levels of native Danes.

The other interaction is weaker and not statistically significant, but nevertheless trust levels are higher if migrants both perceive fair institutions and engage in interethnic contact. On the other hand, if institutions are not perceived to be fair, trust declines with increasing levels of contact. This result makes sense on a very basic level.

More generally, these interactions support the view that fair public institutions is a necessary foundation for other building blocks to work on the way to social trust. It would seem that positive evaluation of institutions in the



Note: Common survey (migrants only). Correlations between social trust and national identification (left) or interethnic contact (right) by lowest and highest values of institutional trust. N=357.

Source: Data collected from the Mifare survey (2018).

Figure 12.6 Interactions with institutional trust

destination country is very nearly a precondition for other experiences and acculturation dynamics to work positively for trust. This is one interpretation. As a minimum, these results emphasize that even among our low trust nationalities, some individuals manage to positively combine high social trust, interethnic contact, national identity, and perceptions of fair institutions.

SOCIAL TRUST: EASY ASSIMILATION FOR SOME, CHALLENGING ACCULTURATION FOR OTHERS

In our efforts to explain trust among migrants and the relative difference from trust levels among native Danes, we arrive at a diverse set of results across the two surveys. We should be mindful that the indicators of social trust are quite different variables, and this also applies to indicators of interethnic contact, public institutions/politicians, and national identity. However, we can draw conclusions on the dynamics of experiences, perceptions, and acculturation across different migrant backgrounds.

In all of the origin countries included here, trust levels are lower than in Denmark. It seems broadly easier to adopt to Danish trust levels for migrants coming voluntarily to work or study from mainly Western or industrialized economies. Trust levels were close to (and sometimes even above) that of native Danes among the migrant groups in the Mifare survey. The main explanatory variables also worked in the same way for both migrants and native Danes. Socio-economic background matters somewhat, and we could confirm the expectation that interethnic contact, trust in politicians, and national identification with Denmark furthers social trust among these migrants.

On the other hand, for our migrants in the Comcon survey of non-Western, mostly Middle-Eastern background, the vast majority of whom have come due to asylum or family reunification, the story was quite different. Their markedly lower trust levels remained low even when controlling for our independent variables, and interethnic contact, perceived institutional fairness, or national identification did not seem to work for social trust like we expected. Furthermore, trust levels decline somewhat with religiosity. This could support the interpretation that for these migrants from these low-trust countries, trust is a more sticky and fundamentally cultural phenomenon. Previous research has found that societies dominated by more collectivist, in-group oriented, and religious values also exhibit lower social trust compared to more individualist societies (Uslaner, 2002; Van Hoorn, 2015). To the extent that trust changes over time in Denmark, it actually seems to decline among these migrant nationalities. This could reflect both increasing expectations (as the origin country becomes less present or salient) or negative experiences in Denmark.

However, statistical interactions shed light on the potential for the assimilation of social trust. Statistical interactions with ethnicity revealed that the gap

in trust levels between native Danes and migrants from these five countries is low or insignificant among individuals with little interethnic contact or relative negative perceptions of institutional fairness. In addition, we found that migrants from these low-trust groups who perceive institutions to be fair exhibit positive correlations between contact or national identity on the one hand, and social trust on the other. The interaction between perceived institutional fairness and national identity makes it possible to identify migrants very close to Danish trust levels.

As a minimum, these latter interactions emphasize that even among migrant groups where social trust is low in general, some individuals combine perceptions of fair institutions with national identity or interethnic contact in ways that are also associated with high social trust. One interpretation would be that some individuals are able to overcome their background – both the low-trust origin favoured by the “cultural” perspective and the migration experiences associated with asylum or family reunification. It could be an indication of a form of “segmented assimilation” (as mentioned in Chapter 2) where only some individuals from particular origins manage to assimilate into Danish society in ways that are associated with social trust. Among other nationalities, successful assimilation in terms of social trust is more widespread.

However, a further interpretation building on the “experiential” perspective would be that such results also suggest a potential for further improvement with regard to the experiences migrants with low trust have had in Denmark. Interethnic contact may be affected by status inequalities or other negative experiences as opposed to the conditions of equality or even some forms of intimacy that are necessary in order for contact to work for trust. The statistical interactions support the view that the perception of fair institutions is an important foundation for other building blocks of social trust (such as contact or national identity) to work if we want to achieve higher trust levels among low-trust minorities.

In short, while it particularly is a challenge to explain social trust among migrant groups with low trust with a pronounced gap in trust levels vis-à-vis native Danes, it is after all possible to combine explanatory factors in a way that brings us much closer. This suggests that even among migrant nationalities with low and seemingly sticky trust levels, there is a potential for dynamic assimilation, even if it is more of a challenge compared to what we see among migrants who more easily adapt to the high trust levels of the Danish context.

13. Conclusion

What happens to individuals who move from one social and geographical context to another, and to what extent do migrants assimilate into their new destination societies? Migration scholars have engaged with these long-lasting, and much disputed, questions for decades. This book has been motivated by a curiosity about migrants' assimilation patterns in a Danish – or Nordic – welfare state context. Based on the theoretical argument in Chapter 2, our point of departure was that this institutional welfare state context might be of crucial importance for assimilation processes, at least with respect to welfare attitudes. As both natives and migrants are embedded in this institutional context, our initial prediction was that migrants largely assimilate into the same welfare attitudes as natives. The empirical investigations were guided by the following two questions:

1. To what extent do migrants assimilate to the welfare attitudes of native Danes?
2. What are the mechanisms of migrants' assimilation to the welfare attitudes of the native Danes?

The empirical analyses have been based on two large survey studies, combined with unique high-quality register data, which allowed us to establish representative samples of these migrant groups. Rather than following the rough distinctions that often dominate the literature, for example, EU/non-EU migrants and Western/non-Western migrants, we have focused on 14 migrant groups of diverse origins with different backgrounds in Denmark. We have argued that they constitute something approaching a most different design for assimilation of migrants coming to live in the same welfare state context. These were migrants born in Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, ex-Yugoslavia (primarily Bosnia), Turkey, the Philippines, China, Japan, Russia, the US, Great Britain, Spain, Poland, and Romania.

DO MIGRANTS ASSIMILATE?

We have only interviewed migrants at one point in time, which makes it difficult to study the very *process* of assimilation. Our alternative approach was to look for three indicators of assimilation.

The first indicator of assimilation was to compare the welfare attitudes of migrants living in Denmark with the welfare attitudes of residents in their specific countries of origin. The logic was that large differences between attitudes in the migrants' group and the origin country would be an indication of assimilation. Based on previous survey research among natives, we already knew that welfare attitudes varied across countries. This provides support for the idea of individuals' attitudes being shaped by the institutional context of any given country. Thus, as expected we found native Danes to display high institutional trust, to support the idea that the government is responsible for healthcare, pensions, and unemployment insurance, to be reluctant towards (more) redistribution, to be in favour of poverty relief, to support female employment and childcare, to trust most people, and to be reluctant to give migrants access to benefits and social services. The 14 migrant groups originated from countries where many of these attitudes diverge from those of native Danes. However, the central finding is that on several indicators we found that the welfare attitudes of migrants living in Denmark do indeed differ from those dominant in the country of origin. This was the case for institutional trust, attitudes to female employment, childcare, and social trust. The expected differences were also found concerning state responsibility – though low initial variations across countries were more moderate, which makes it difficult to observe assimilation. In terms of attitudes to general redistribution, we did not find an indication of assimilation on this indicator. In contrast, we found that migrants living in Denmark hold attitudes towards redistribution fairly similar to those found in the country of origin; the exceptions being migrants from Poland and Russia. For attitudes towards poverty relief and giving migrants access to welfare benefits and services, we could not make this comparison due to the lack of survey data from the country of origin. Of course, one has to consider potential selection effects. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the 14 migrant groups living in Denmark are not random samples of the residents of the origin countries but instead representative of these migrant groups living in Denmark. However, these findings provided some first indications of assimilation.

The second indicator of assimilation was based on a comparison of the welfare attitudes of migrants living in Denmark compared with those of native Danes. The absence of differences was regarded as a sign of assimilation, whereas large differences between natives and all 14 migrant groups would be a sign of little assimilation. In general, we found the differences between migrants and natives to be minor. We also found some attitudes where migrants distinguished themselves from natives. This was the case for attitudes towards redistribution (where Danes were more reluctant), partly towards female employment (where Danes expressed more progressive attitudes compared to some of the migrant groups), and towards giving migrants access to benefits and services (where Danes tended to be more restrictive). Thus, in these cases,

first-generation migrants have not fully assimilated to the welfare attitudes of natives, which in any case would have been a very surprising result. In other cases, we found no general differences between migrants and natives. This was, for example, the case for institutional trust, attitudes to government responsibility, attitudes to poverty relief, and spending on childcare. These findings provide additional indications of assimilation.

The third indicator of assimilation was to compare welfare attitudes across the 14 most-different migrant groups. The logic was that an absence of differences between groups approaching a most different design with the institutional context as the common denominator would be yet another, and a rather strong, indicator of assimilation. The demographic and socio-economic differences between the 14 migrant groups were exhaustively presented and demonstrated in Part II of the book (Chapters 4 and 5). As regards "time spent in Denmark", most of the Mifare migrant groups had arrived more recently, except for those originating in Turkey. For some of the groups, like the migrants from Poland, Romania, and Spain, their arrival was tied to the increased mobility of workers and students in the EU. As regards the Comcon groups, migrants from Pakistan and Turkey have arrived steadily in the period from the mid-1970s, through a combination of work permits and family reunification. Finally, the migrants from ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Lebanon mostly arrived in the span of a few years, coinciding with wars or civil wars in the origin country. As expected, we found substantial differences in educational backgrounds and labour market participation, leading to large differences in incomes from wages and welfare benefits. Furthermore, there were large differences in the share of each group with respect to Danish citizenship and in terms of religious beliefs among the migrants with both Christian and Muslim backgrounds. Chapter 5 established several additional measures of self-interest, which further strengthen the most-different design logic. The Comcon groups were, on average, more reliant on benefits compared to native Danes and compared to the Mifare groups. Migrant groups from the Mifare survey displayed diversity with respect to benefits, wages, and taxes. Based on the first two parts of the book, we concluded that migration into Northern Europe has indeed become more mixed. One could also conclude that these first-generation migrants have indeed assimilated very differently into not only the Danish labour market but also in terms of household composition, language skills, and sense of belonging. The central finding is that, despite these fundamental differences, the 14 migrant groups in some areas hold very similar welfare attitudes.

The differences in welfare attitudes across the 14 groups varied from policy field to policy field. In most cases, we did find statistically significant differences across groups, but in absolute terms, on the 0–100 scales, these were often minor and there was no clear pattern of some groups across all fields being more assimilated than other groups. Furthermore, some of the

minor differences across the groups could be explained with differences in the basic composition of the groups. In terms of institutional trust, attitudes to government responsibility, redistribution, poverty relief, and social trust, we only found minor differences across migrant groups. Larger differences were found in terms of attitudes towards female employment and childcare as one might expect from the distinction between “hardcore” and more “peripheral” values and norms (see Chapter 2). From the empirical findings in Chapter 9, we conclude that most of the 14 migrant groups living in Denmark seemed to support progressive attitudes towards female employment and that their attitudes largely resembled those who are prevalent among native Danes. However, there were also differences. Several migrant groups from the Mifare survey (from Russia, the Philippines, and China) expressed fewer progressive attitudes towards female employment compared to native Danes. For the Comcon groups, it was only migrants from Pakistan that held significantly fewer progressive values compared to native Danes. These findings also indicate that migrants from Muslim countries are not necessarily the least progressive in terms of gender equality. As for attitudes to childcare, we also found differences. On the one hand, the results indicated that the 14 different migrant groups to a high extent share attitudes with native Danes. Thus, most of the Mifare groups supported childcare spending levels as they are currently, and the majority among the Comcon groups agreed that it is a government responsibility to provide childcare. On the other hand, some differences also appeared – most remarkably in terms of attitudes towards the provision of childcare among the Mifare groups where native Danes were substantially more supportive towards government agencies providing childcare compared to, for example, migrants from Romania, China, the Philippines, and the US. In line with previous research, we also found differences in social trust across migrant groups. The Middle Eastern migrants in the Comcon survey had lower trust levels than other migrants, which could not be explained by socio-economic positions or other indicators of general overall assimilation.

Summing up, some areas of the welfare state are better cases of assimilation than others. Trust in institutions and attitudes towards the role of government in welfare provision clearly match all three logics of assimilation, although attitudes in many origin countries also favour public responsibility. The same can be said for attitudes towards female employment and public childcare for most migrant groups, although some groups, for instance, migrants from China, the Philippines, Russia, or Pakistan, also exhibited less support for these attitudes. The case of social trust was very broadly one where migrants coming from mainly Western or industrialized origins in the Mifare survey assimilated to higher trust levels in Denmark, whereas the migrant groups in the Comcon survey exhibit low trust levels only marginally higher than in the countries of origin. Finally, attitudes towards redistribution and access to

welfare for migrants did not really match our indicators of assimilation, but in such a way that migrants are more in favour of public responsibility for redistribution and more inclusive welfare access for migrants (but also less supportive for more assistance for the poor in the face of higher taxes). Besides these latter fields, our general interpretation is one of assimilation to most attitudes with some minor and very specific exceptions. In most fields, migrants come to share attitudes with each other, as well as native Danes, despite substantial variation in attitudes across origin countries and differences in socio-economic status in Denmark.

MECHANISMS OF ASSIMILATION

In Chapter 2, we theorized how we expected welfare state institutions to shape attitudes via the logic of both consequentiality and appropriateness, which would shape both the welfare attitudes of natives and migrants. In Chapter 5, we demonstrated how migrants living in Denmark were indeed influenced by the welfare state. Close to everyone had to pay tax; even an amount of welfare benefits are symbolically paid in taxes, and close to everybody receives some kind of benefits or service from the welfare state. Some pay much more in taxes (or receive more income benefits) than others, however. We calculated the net gain and losses for various groups. From an (institutional) rational choice perspective, one could predict that such variations in self-interest might explain the welfare attitudes of natives and migrants. In line with previous research, we did find that various measures of self-interest influence attitudes at the individual level, for example, attitudes towards redistribution. However, variations in self-interest did very little to create or explain variations in welfare attitudes across groups. For example, migrants' general support for redistribution was not only a matter of self-interest. In most of our other analyses, we found similar patterns. Differences remained after taking socio-economic position into account. The clearest example of an effect, which easily could be interpreted as a matter of self-interest, was found in Chapter 11. Migrants were more willing to give migrants access to benefits and services, but this was reduced, everything else being equal if the migrants held Danish citizenship. Here we also found an example of attitudes potentially being guided by the self-interest of the migrant group. We found that the reduced willingness to give migrants access to benefits and services among those holding citizenship was more moderate among those who felt close to others from the same country of origin living in Denmark. Besides this example, however, the effects of self- or group interest seem modest. It was, for example, not the case that migrants from the US and Great Britain, who largely lose economically in the Danish welfare state, were less supportive of the Danish welfare state than were other migrant groups.

The moderate effects from self-interests could point to the importance of the logic of appropriateness as emphasized by sociological institutionalism. However, it is important to notice that we found a very limited effect of time lived in Denmark. For most welfare attitudes, time spent in the destination country was not an important driver and sometimes it directly had a reverse impact on attitudes and thereby extended the group differences. This was, among others, the case for social trust among the Comcon groups, attitudes towards female employment among the Mifare groups, and institutional trust and attitudes towards government responsibility for all groups. These findings indicate that ascribing to welfare attitudes similar (or close to) those of native Danes is not merely a matter about “time”. In more sociological terms, one could say that it is not merely a matter of steady socialization. This interpretation is supported by the finding that other variables related to migrants’ general assimilation, such as national identification, language skills, and citizenship, often had little impact on welfare attitudes as well. It was often the case that differences across migrant groups were only marginally reduced by taking such variables into account. Thus, migrants’ assimilation to the welfare attitudes of natives is not simply a reflection of the long-term broad socialization into being a Dane. Apparently, some of the migrants’ welfare attitudes assimilate at a much quicker pace.

In our view, some of the assumptions on feedback mechanisms prominent within historical institutionalism offer a better interpretation of our results. When migrants’ welfare attitudes adapt rather immediately, and this adaptation is relatively uniform across groups regardless of large differences in socio-economic position, it suggests that neither self-interest nor processes of socialization are the main drivers of assimilation. Our interpretation is that new opportunity structures, new experiences, and new perceptions of how the (destination) society works lead to quick adaptations of welfare attitudes. When the welfare state, for example, provides opportunities for female employment and childcare, migrants adapt their attitudes quickly. If institutions are perceived to be just and efficient, and if the welfare state assumes responsibility for various forms of welfare provision, this quickly becomes the new normal. In many ways, the assumptions in historical institutionalism, emphasizing that humans are knowledgeable, but still institutionally embedded fit our results. The welfare attitudes of both natives and migrants seem to be dependent on the very specific context of different welfare state areas. For example, institutional trust was closely related to the institutional quality of the Danish state, attitudes towards general redistribution were closely related to having a fairly equal income distribution, and support for childcare was closely related to high childcare coverage already in place. These findings stress the importance of distinguishing between the regime and the policy effects of institutions on welfare attitudes. Furthermore, studying welfare attitudes among migrants

within a broad number of welfare state areas comprises an important contribution to existing research in this field as it has mainly paid attention to attitudes within specific areas independently of each other in various studies (cf. Chapter 2).

THE WIDER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESULTS

One of the central motivations behind this book was simply to learn about what migrants themselves think about the welfare state in their new destination country. In our view, this is an interesting and much-needed dimension to include in the broader debate on immigration and the welfare state, as argued in Chapter 1. From the empirical findings of this book, we have learned that migrants in general hold positive attitudes towards a strong and involving welfare state. Migrants do indeed find existing institutions and policies to be legitimate. Thereby natives and migrants in Denmark share some fundamental and important attitudes towards how society ought to be despite differences, for example in terms of religion or national identification. In the long run, this might have important political implications. Over the years, the share of migrants (and their descendants) in the total population has increased considerably in many Western countries, including Denmark. Consequently, the share of migrant voters for local and national elections has increased, despite the difficulties of getting Danish citizenship. If the migrants were to decide, one could predict that we would largely preserve the Danish welfare state. If anything, one could imagine somewhat larger support for general economic redistribution and somewhat larger support for giving migrants access to benefits and services. The latter, according to our results, would be moderated by processes of naturalization and national identification. Whether it is normatively desirable that migrants support the welfare state is not for us to tell. This is also one of the reasons why we prefer the non-normative “assimilation concept” derived from the new assimilation theory rather than the “integration” term.

A motivation behind the book has also been to contribute to the broader theoretical debate on drivers of assimilation. As we described in Chapter 2, North American migration scholars have during the 20th century dominated empirical and theoretical discussions on migrants' assimilation processes. More recently, European scholars have entered the debate and brought new dimensions into the discussion, including a more explicit focus on the role of the national context in the destination country. Following this line of reasoning, we have argued that contemporary migration studies could benefit from taking welfare state institutions more into account. Finally, we also aimed to contribute to the broader institutional literature. We have found that migrants do not simply settle with static origin “cultures” and that they only to a limited degree adapt according to their self-interests. Encompassing welfare

states with just and efficient institutions has a high degree of potential for assimilation of migrants who are quick to adapt as perceptive and reflective human beings. This book reflects the academic background of the four authors in comparative welfare state research. Numerous studies from this research tradition have demonstrated how historically inherited welfare institutions can influence welfare attitudes of residents in several ways and how welfare regimes produce feedback effects. This book hopefully adds another piece to the puzzle by showing how institutions also influence the increasing number of migrants living in Western Europe, as the book empirically demonstrated that, across a number of areas of the welfare state, existing and inherited institutional structures are an integrated part of what we in Chapter 1 denoted the Danish melting pot.

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