The typology problem and the doxastic approach to delusions

Fecha

2016-10-10

Profesor Guía

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1984-8234

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Facultad

Facultad de Ciencias Sociales

Departamento o Escuela

Escuela de Psicologia

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Nota general

Resumen

This paper explores one of the most fundamental philosophical worries underlying the occurrence of delusions, namely, the problem about the specific type of mental state that grounds a delusional report or, as I shall call it, ‘the typology problem’. The analysis is developed as follows: (i) After formulating and circumscribing the target problem, (ii) I explore the main tenets and advantages of the doxastic view of delusions, perhaps, the strongest candidate currently available within the typology debate. (iii) After, I clarify and evaluate four of the main counter-arguments against the doxastic view offering a number of counter replies to these attacks. (iv) Finally, I conclude that the anti-doxastic argumentation offers no good reasons to abandon the doxastic model and that this model does not need to appeal to external resources to reply to such counter-arguments. At the same time, I finalize with some of the challenges that remain open within the doxastic view.

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Palabras clave

PSICOSIS, DELIRIOS

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